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Abstract 
 
This thesis aims to contribute to our understanding of the social influence 
processes commonly at play in public debate; to understand how rhetoric about 
issues and about social groups can influence public opinion. This research draws 
upon the social identity tradition (Tajfel, 1972; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner, 
Hogg, Oakes, Reicher & Wetherell, 1987) which suggests that people’s attitudes 
and behaviour are influenced by the norms of groups they identify with, and that 
this influence depends on the extent to which the issue at hand is perceived as 
relevant to the group (e.g., Smith, Terry, Crosier & Duck, 2005; Mackie, Worth & 
Asuncion, 1990; Wyer, 2010). The question of which group is relevant to a 
particular issue, however, is not always self-evident and those who seek to shape 
public attitudes will offer interpretations of the nature of groups or issues in order 
to establish the relevance of a group whose norms are in line with their own 
agenda.  
In Chapter 3, we detail work by Reicher, Hopkins and colleagues on the 
strategic construction of identity, and their notion that those who seek to shape 
public opinion need to become entrepreneurs of identity. In Chapter 4, we review 
the literature on issue framing which shows how different rhetorical constructions 
of an issue can influence attitudes (e.g. Chong & Druckman, 2007). We outline 
findings from the field of political science demonstrating the extent to which 
people are guided by party cues, particularly in contexts which suggest that the 
issue is relevant to the party (Slothuus & de Vreese, 2010; Druckman, Peterson 
and Slothuus, 2013). We also outline research by Cohen (2003) suggesting that 
people draw upon their understanding of groups and group norms to make sense 
of issues.  
  viii 
Chapter 5 reports on two studies investigating the connection between 
religion and political attitudes. The results indicate that highlighting the relevance 
of either cultural issues (i.e. abortion, euthanasia and gay rights) or civic issues 
(i.e. welfare, climate change, asylum seekers) to participants’ Christian identity 
can influence the extent to which group norms influence attitudes towards 
different types of issues. Chapter 6 reports on two further studies that examine the 
effect that framing climate change as a moral, economic or political issue has on 
the extent to which religious/spiritual group, class group or partisan group norms 
predict attitudes. The results indicate that different framings of climate change can 
influence the extent to which different group norms predict attitudes, with 
contrasting effects depending on the level of identification with the group.   
In the final chapter we draw out the implications of these findings with 
regard to the theoretical background outlined. We identify a number of 
implications relating to the practice of research in the field of social identity as 
well as the practice of mass persuasion. We also identify some avenues for future 
research to add to the wealth of knowledge in this area.  
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Chapter 1 – Introduction 
 
“The aide said that ‘guys like me were in what we call the reality-
based community,' which he defined as people who ‘believe that 
solutions emerge from your judicious study of discernible reality.’ I 
nodded and murmured something about enlightenment principles and 
empiricism. He cut me off. 'That's not the way the world really works 
anymore,' he continued. 'We're an empire now, and when we act, we 
create our own reality. And while you're studying that reality - 
judiciously, as you will - we'll act again, creating other new realities, 
which you can study too, and that's how things will sort out. We're 
history's actors . . . and you, all of you, will be left to just study what 
we do’.'' (US political correspondent, Ron Suskind, describing an 
encounter with a senior aide to then US President George W. Bush), 
(Suskind, 2004). 
 
The aim of this thesis is to contribute to our understanding of the social 
influence processes that are commonly at play in public debate; to understand 
how rhetoric about issues and about social groups influences public opinion. This 
research draws upon the social identity tradition (Tajfel, 1972; Tajfel & Turner, 
1979; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher & Wetherell, 1987), which suggests that 
people’s attitudes and behaviour are systematically influenced by the norms of 
groups to which they belong, and particularly so for those who are highly 
identified with the group (e.g. Terry & Hogg, 1996; Terry, Hogg & White, 1999). 
However, even those who strongly identify with a group will not be guided by 
group norms on every conceivable issue. Evidence from both the social influence 
(e.g., Smith, Terry, Crosier & Duck, 2005) and persuasion literature (e.g., Mackie, 
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Worth & Asuncion, 1990; Wyer, 2010) shows that influence depends on the 
extent to which the issue in question is perceived as relevant to the group. 
The question of which group or social identity is relevant to a particular 
issue is not always self-evident. There may be a range of groups that could be 
perceived as relevant, depending on how the issue and the various groups are 
construed. Indeed, there is often a degree of ambiguity in people’s understanding 
of the nature of issues (what they are about, what interests or values they 
implicate) and the nature of groups (what defines them, what interests and values 
they represent). This can be of some consequence given that the norms of various 
groups may differ on a given issue, and one’s attitude could vary significantly 
depending on which group is deemed to be relevant (Reicher, 2004). As such, 
those who seek to shape public attitudes may attempt to influence which group is 
perceived as relevant to a particular issue, offering interpretations of the nature of 
groups or issues to establish the relevance of a group whose norms are in line with 
their own agenda. It is this process that I seek to explore in this thesis. 
In Chapter 2, I trace the theoretical roots of the contemporary 
understanding of social influence, exploring the differences between the 
individualist and the interactionist view of the relationship between the individual 
and the group. I outline the evolution of these ideas with reference to some of the 
seminal studies in social psychology. I outline the social identity perspective on 
social influence and review evidence that group-based influence can be the 
product of a deliberative, rational process. I then explore the crucial role that 
perceived relevance plays in group-based influence, citing research demonstrating 
that people are guided by group norms and are persuaded by ingroup members to 
the extent that the issue is perceived to be relevant to the group. 
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In Chapter 3, I explore the implications of these ideas both for the practice 
of social psychological research, and for the practice of social influence. I detail 
work by Reicher, Hopkins and colleagues on the strategic construction of identity, 
and their notion that those who seek to shape public opinion need to become 
entrepreneurs of identity. I then outline Reicher and Hopkins’ analyses of the 
social categorical underpinnings of the rhetoric of public figures who seek to 
persuade and mobilise constituencies to a common cause (Reicher & Hopkins, 
1996a, Reicher & Hopkins, 1996b, Reicher, Hopkins & Condor, 1997, Reicher & 
Hopkins, 2001a, Reicher and Hopkins, 2001b; Haslam, Reicher & Platow, 2010).  
In Chapter 4, I review the literature on issue framing that explores how 
different constructions of an issue can influence attitudes (e.g. Chong & 
Druckman, 2007). While much of this research is based on an individualist view 
of attitudes and attitude change, there are notable exceptions that incorporate an 
understanding of the role of groups and social context. I then outline findings 
from political science research demonstrating the extent to which people are 
guided by party cues in their attitudes towards issues. Here, too, I cite evidence 
that this is more than simply mindless conformity; that people are only guided by 
party cues in contexts which suggest that the issue is relevant to the group 
(Slothuus & de Vreese, 2010; Druckman, Peterson and Slothuus, 2013). I also 
outline research by Cohen (2003) that offers valuable insights into the process by 
which people are guided by group norms. Cohen’s findings suggest that people 
draw upon their understanding of groups and group norms to make sense of 
issues. It also suggests that this process depends in part on a degree of ambiguity 
in people’s understanding of the group, or the issue, or both. This work represents 
a launching point for the empirical studies presented in this thesis. 
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Chapter 5 reports on two studies designed to investigate the connection 
between religion and political attitudes, and whether the way religious identity is 
framed can influence the connection between religious identification, religious 
norms and attitudes towards various political issues. More specifically, the studies 
examine whether highlighting the relevance of either cultural issues (i.e. abortion, 
euthanasia and gay rights) or civic issues (i.e. welfare, climate change, asylum 
seekers) to religious identity increases the extent to which religious group norms 
influence attitudes towards those types of issues, particularly among those who 
are highly identified with the religious group. 
Chapter 6 reports on two further studies that aim to investigate whether the 
way an issue is framed can affect the perceived relevance of various groups and 
the extent to which the norms associated with those groups predict attitudes. The 
studies explore these ideas in the context of attitudes towards climate change, 
employing the type of frames that are commonly found in the public debate about 
the issue. Specifically, I examine the effect that framing climate change as a 
moral, economic or political issue has on the extent to which religious/spiritual 
group, class group or partisan group norms predict attitudes, particularly for those 
who are highly identified with those groups. I also investigate whether the effect 
of these frames is more pronounced among those with high levels of political 
knowledge, and whether perceived relevance mediates the effect of framing.  
In Chapter 7, I summarise the findings of the four studies reported. I draw 
out the implications of these findings in terms of the theoretical background 
outlined and identify a number of implications in terms of the practice of research 
and the practice of mass persuasion on important issues. Finally, I identify some 
avenues for future research to add to the wealth of knowledge in this area.   
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Chapter 2 – Social influence as a single, rational process 
From the birth of modern social psychology there has been a tension 
between two perspectives on group-based phenomena: an individualist 
perspective and an interactionist perspective. The individualist view, represented 
by Floyd Allport (1924), Festinger (1950) and others, sees the individual as the 
sole psychological reality, with all social and group-based phenomena as merely 
an extension and elaboration of individual psychological processes. The 
interactionist view, on the other hand, represented by the likes of Le Bon (1896), 
Sherif (1936), Levin (1947) and McDougall (1920) contends that there is 
something sui generis about group phenomena, something that cannot be 
explained by or reduced to intra-individual processes. Drawing on principles of 
Gestalt psychology, they argue that groups have emergent properties; that the 
individual is fundamentally transformed by participation in the group. 
One area where this dispute has played out is in relation to social influence 
– the sense in which people’s perceptions, beliefs and attitudes are influenced by 
those around them. The traditional view is that individuals are motivated to hold 
accurate and valid beliefs about their world; that people seek what Festinger 
(1950) termed ‘subjective validity’. According to Festinger there are two means 
of achieving this subjective validity: physical reality testing and social reality 
testing. Physical reality testing is where we directly observe the world and rely 
upon the evidence of our own perceptive and cognitive faculties to achieve an 
accurate understanding of reality. But when direct perception is either 
unavailable, or the evidence of our own perception is ambiguous, we resort to 
social reality testing where we rely on the views of others to apprehend reality and 
establish subjective validity. The individualistic slant of this theory stems from 
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the fact that direct individual perception and cognition is regarded as sovereign 
and given primary status. Validation achieved through checking and matching the 
views of others is accorded a secondary status; it is seen as less valid, less reliable. 
To the extent that individuals’ views are influenced by those around them, it is 
only as a last resort when they cannot make objective determinations on their 
own. 
This process was demonstrated in Sherif’s (1936) seminal autokineses 
studies. In these studies, participants sat alone in a darkened room and were asked 
to focus on a dot of light projected on the wall. Although the dot was stationary, 
an optical illusion (known as autokinesis) means that the dot of light appears to 
move and participants were asked to estimate how far it had moved. Participants 
tended to give varying estimates on the initial trials, but over time would settle on 
a personal norm. For some participants, this norm was quite large, for others it 
was quite small – that is, they each established their own reference point. In the 
next stage of the study participants were again brought into the darkened room 
and repeated the same procedure, but this time they did so in groups with each 
participant announcing their estimate out loud. Sherif found that participants’ 
initial estimates in this second stage were consistent with those they had made in 
the first, which were often quite different from each other. Over a series of trials, 
however, their estimates converged on a group norm to the point where they 
essentially came to agree on how much the dot was moving. 
This research offers a classic illustration of social reality testing where an 
ambiguous situation, in which people are unsure of their own judgement, leads 
them to look to others for guidance as to what is appropriate. Interestingly, Sherif 
found that the consensus estimate persisted even when participants were again 
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tested alone, suggesting that they had internalized the norm. Later research by 
Jacobs and Campbell (1961), in which confederates were used to generate an 
extreme norm, found that this norm persisted even when the confederates were 
gradually replaced with genuine participants. 
While participants in Sherif’s studies ultimately conformed to the group 
norm, this is not to say that they did so in response to perceived group pressure, or 
out of mindless compliance. Rather, the dominant interpretation was that this 
conformity was the result of a rational process where the views of others were 
used to develop a shared frame of reference that gave meaning and structure to an 
otherwise ambiguous situation. It follows that people would only rely on the 
views of others and conform to group norms to the extent that they were 
personally uncertain. People would not go along with others when there was no 
ambiguity. 
To test this idea, Asch (1951) devised an experimental paradigm known as 
the ‘line judgment studies’. In these studies, participants (who thought they were 
taking part in a study of visual discrimination) were asked to look at a line 
projected on a screen and then call out one by one which of three comparison 
lines was the same length as the original. The study was conducted in groups of 
seven to nine, with only one person being a genuine participant - the rest being 
confederates who were instructed to give the wrong answer on specific trials. The 
genuine participant always responded second to last so they had heard the 
judgement of others before calling out their own. The task was designed to be as 
unambiguous as possible so that participants would not need to rely on others. 
Indeed, in a control study in which people performed the task privately, less than 
one percent of participants gave incorrect responses, confirming that the task was 
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not at all difficult. The results of the actual study, however, were quite different. 
Asch found that three quarters of participants went along with the incorrect 
judgement of the confederates in at least one of the 12 trials, and 50 percent went 
along with the others on at least half the trials. Rather than being immune to 
influence, the results indicate that many participants conformed to the views of 
others even when those views were in direct conflict with the evidence of their 
own senses.  Far from reflecting a rational process, the findings suggested a form 
of social influence based on craven, or, at best, mindless conformity to perceived 
group pressure. 
 These findings caused quite a stir in the field of social psychology and led 
theorists to draw a sharp distinction between two forms of social influence. This 
distinction has many instantiations, but is perhaps best encapsulated in Deutsch 
and Gerard’s (1955) dual process theory of social influence which distinguishes 
between informational influence and normative influence. According to the 
theory, informational influence, which is akin to Festinger’s social reality testing, 
is motivated by the desire to accurately understand the world; to achieve 
subjective validity. It involves reliance on the views of others when we are 
uncertain about the appropriate judgement or response. Informational influence 
leads to genuine, private acceptance of the views of others; people are guided by 
the norm because they consider it to be informative about reality. It is, above all, a 
rational process. Normative influence, on the other hand, is conceived as mere 
public compliance to the prevailing group norm in an attempt to gain approval or 
to avoid sanction. As such, it is not thought to be true influence since it does not 
involve genuine acceptance or internalization of the norm. Unlike informational 
influence, this type of influence is considered to be inherently irrational. 
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 A similar dual-process model is evident in the dominant theories of 
persuasion such as the Elaboration Likelihood Model (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986; 
Petty, Cacioppo, Strathman & Priester, 2005) and the Systematic-Heuristic Model 
(Chaiken, 1980; Chaiken, 1987; Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). Both of these theories 
distinguish between the genuine, long-lasting attitude change that results from 
careful processing of persuasive messages, and a more superficial process that 
produces ephemeral shifts in attitude. At the heart of these theories is a distinction 
between a thoughtful, rational process of persuasion where people weigh the 
evidence objectively and are convinced only by strong, valid arguments. This type 
of persuasion is seen as an asocial process where information is abstracted from 
the social context in which it is encountered. Indeed, one’s place in the social 
world is thought to have no bearing on the individual’s thinking since information 
is evaluated objectively, according to the standards of evidence and logic. 
 This is contrasted with an alternative form of persuasion that is neither 
rational nor objective. According to these models, when people lack either the 
requisite motivation or ability to process information carefully, they rely upon 
peripheral cues or heuristics including the extent to which the message reflects the 
norm of a valued group, or comes from an ingroup source. According to this view, 
the extent to which social factors such as group norms and group memberships 
weigh upon persuasion reflects the absence of careful, rational processing.  
 These dual-process models, both in the area of social influence and 
persuasion, reflect a meta-theroetical view of individual cognition that sees people 
as cognitive misers (e.g. Fiske & Taylor, 1984). From this perspective, the use of 
social information, be it in the form of group stereotypes or group norms, 
represents cognitive short-cuts that are used in order to preserve cognitive 
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resources. They may enable more efficient thinking, but they inevitably lead to 
distortions. While this is still the dominant view within social psychology, it is by 
no means universally accepted. It has been challenged on both theoretical and 
empirical grounds by those with a more interactionist view of the relationship 
between the individual and the group, and on group influence. Turner (1985; 
1991), for example, rejected the dual process model of social influence and, in 
particular, the sharp distinction between the rational process of informational 
influence and the irrational process of normative influence. He argued that the 
distinction between seeking accurate information about reality, and wanting to 
understand the views of similar others was a false one; that individual perception 
and consensual validation are in fact interdependent elements of a single process.  
In rejecting the dual-process model, Turner proposed a single-process 
theory of social influence known as referent informational influence. The theory 
is based on the notion that we regard people who are similar to ourselves as valid 
sources of information about reality (or at least about matters relevant to the basis 
of this similarity). We both expect to agree with similar others and are motivated 
to do so. From this perspective, being a member of the same group as another 
person, rather than being a source of coercive pressure, in fact provides the basis 
for validation of our own perceptions and beliefs. That is, the agreement of similar 
others lends a sense of objectivity to our subjective judgements. Reicher, Spears 
and Haslam (2010) describe the referent informational influence approach as 
follows: 
“We can only establish the validity of our collective beliefs in 
collaboration with others who we categorise as similar to ourselves. 
Hence, fellow group members serve as essential reference points for 
our own perception. Our reliance on them is not in conflict with our 
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concern for reality – it is through them that individual views are co-
ordinated and transformed into shared values, beliefs and behaviours 
that have an objective quality” (p. 53). 
Essentially, this view suggests that in seeking to establish subjective 
validity it is only natural for us to look to others with whom we share particular 
relevant characteristics in order to validate our own judgement. On matters of 
religion, for example, we might look to people of the same religious 
denomination; on matters of politics, to those who support the same political 
party. The influence that follows is no less real or lasting because it stems from a 
common group membership. Indeed, to the extent that a particular view is 
perceived to reflect the consensus position (i.e. the norm) of a relevant reference 
group, it is likely to be all the more influential. Turner claimed that a single-
process model of social influence was necessary given the inherent contradictions 
of the prevailing approach. “The difficulty with the dual-process models,” he 
argued, “are the implications that social norms have no effect on private attitude 
change and that informational influence is non-normative” (1991, p. 147).  
This theory of group-based social influence is firmly based in the 
interactionist view of the relationship between the individual and the group. In 
particular, it grew out of the social identity tradition (Tajfel, 1972; Tajfel & 
Turner, 1979; Turner et al, 1987) which is based on the notion that we can define 
ourselves in terms of what makes us unique from other individuals (personal 
identity), or in terms of our membership in social groups (social identity). One of 
the key insights of this tradition is that social identity is not a sublimation or 
distortion of one’s true identity, rather it is just as valid an expression of selfhood 
as personal identity. The concept of social identity helps provide a bridge between 
the personal and the social, the individual and the group. Indeed, as Turner (1982) 
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argued, “social identity is the cognitive mechanism that makes group behaviour 
possible” (p. 21). 
 The original social identity theory of intergroup relations (Tajfel & Turner, 
1979), as the name suggests, was principally concerned with the relations between 
groups. Broader questions of how we come to define ourselves in terms of group 
memberships, and which group membership in particular, were subsequently 
addressed by self-categorisation theory (Turner, 1985; Turner, et al. 1987), which 
provides a more cognitive analysis of group processes. According to this theory, 
the extent to which a particular social identity becomes salient (i.e. perceived as 
self-defining) at any given time results from the interaction of the individual’s 
propensity to assume a particular identity, and the extent to which that identity fits 
the social context. As Oakes (1987) explains, the concept of fit involves two 
interrelated factors: comparative fit and normative fit. Comparative fit reflects the 
extent to which a particular identity minimizes the differences within categories 
while at the same time maximizing the differences between categories. Normative 
fit is defined by the degree to which the actual differences between categories 
(and the similarities within them) accord with normative expectations. In a group 
discussion, for example, one would be more likely to define themselves and 
others in terms of gender to the extent that the women among the group tended to 
be in dispute with the men, while the men and women also tended to agree among 
themselves (comparative fit). Similarly, gender identity would be salient to the 
extent that the women’s views tended towards a pro-feminist position, and the 
men’s towards a more anti-feminist position (normative fit).  
While the particulars of the social context have a large bearing on which 
identity becomes salient, it is not solely dictated by the stimulus; salience is also 
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influenced by aspects of the individual: their prior expectations, their memories, 
knowledge, habits, as well as their goals, values, and their theories about the way 
the social world is organised (Turner & Oakes, 1989). That is, salience depends 
on an individual perceiver’s readiness to apply a particular categorisation. For 
example, a feminist may have a high propensity to perceive and analyse the social 
world in terms of gender categories. A Marxist, on the other hand, might be more 
likely to view the world (indeed, potentially the same social contexts) in terms of 
class differences, while a devout Christian may be inclined to categorise 
themselves and others along denominational lines, or in terms of believers and 
non-believers. Because it derives in part from the social context and the principles 
of comparative and normative fit, the way individuals define their sense of self is 
potentially variable and fluid. That is not to say, however, that it is in a constant 
state of flux. Individuals’ readiness to use particular categories to define 
themselves and others places an important constraint on this variability. Indeed, as 
Haslam (2001) argues, “people organise and construe the world in ways that 
reflect the groups to which they belong and in this way their social histories lend 
stability and predictability to experience” (p. 52). 
 When a particular social identity is the basis for self-definition it leads to a 
process of depersonalization where people come to see themselves as relatively 
interchangeable with other members of the ingroup and as distinct from members 
of other groups. It is the propensity to see themselves as relatively interchangeable 
with others that leads people to expect to agree with ingroup members and to 
actively strive to reach consensus (Haslam, Turner, Oakes, McGarty & Reynolds, 
1998), thus opening the way for social influence. In outlining his theory of group-
based social influence, Turner (1987) argued that the degree of mutual influence 
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between people is a product of four factors: (1) the degree to which they perceive 
themselves to be similar in ways relevant to the matter at hand; (2) the degree to 
which they are perceived to be responding to the same stimulus or situation; (3) 
the extent of perceived disagreement about the matter at hand (subjective 
uncertainty); and (4) the degree to which being right on this particular matter is 
deemed to be important to the group.   
 In other words, this approach suggests that social influence derives from 
the expectation that we will agree with similar (i.e. interchangeable) others about 
the same stimulus situation. Their agreement validates our own responses as 
reflecting the objective qualities of the stimulus, rather than our own biases and 
idiosyncrasies (Turner, 1987). However, if agreement with those deemed similar 
to ourselves leads to subjective certainty, it follows that disagreement will lead to 
subjective uncertainty. Where disagreement occurs people will be motivated to 
reduce this subjective uncertainty by either: changing their views to bring them in 
line with the similar others; attributing the disagreement to differences in the 
stimulus situation; or recategorising the others as an outgroup (Haslam, 1997). To 
this, one could add the possibility that people will redefine the issue or the subject 
of the disagreement as something that is not relevant to the group, something that 
group members would not necessarily be expected to agree upon. For example, if 
a Christian finds themselves at odds with other Christians about the importance of 
dealing with climate change, they might: (a) change their own view; (b) assume 
their understanding of climate change differs from that of other Christians; or (c) 
re-categorise either themselves or those they disagree with as other than Christian. 
They may also, however, conclude that climate change is not relevant to what it 
means to be Christian; that it does not implicate any values that Christians hold 
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dear and is therefore an issue on which it is appropriate, indeed only natural, for 
Christians to hold differing views.  
 This understanding of social influence as being driven by the expectation 
of agreement with similar others and the motivation to reduce subjective 
uncertainty in the event of disagreement leads to a re-evaluation of the results of 
Asch’s (1951) line judgement studies. Asch interviewed participants after the 
study to ascertain why they went along with the obviously incorrect judgements 
of the group. While some acknowledged that they knew the group consensus was 
wrong but conformed simply to avoid standing out, many others said that the 
disagreement of others led them to feel uncertain and to question their own 
judgement. For these participants, conformity wasn’t the result of a craven 
tendency to bow to group pressure, but the product of a genuine attempt to 
understand why their own judgement differed from those of others with whom 
they expected to agree. Indeed, if one considers the situation facing the 
participants, and just how vexing the unanimous disagreement of the rest of the 
group must have been, it is only natural that they would have at least considered 
the possibility that they themselves were in error. In the end, in order to make 
sense of the situation, many sincerely came to suspect that their own perception 
must have been wrong. Viewed in this light, we see that group influence need not 
be considered a passive, mindless process of conformity, but can in fact be the 
result of a considered, rational effort to make sense of the world.  
 Empirical support for this view comes from a number of sources, 
including research by Mackie and colleagues on what is known as the ingroup 
persuasion effect. This effect describes the common finding that messages from 
ingroup sources tend to be more persuasive (i.e. produce more attitude change) 
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than messages from outgroup sources. Mackie, Worth and Asuncion (1990) ran a 
study in which participants read a persuasive message on the topic of student 
exams that was either strong or weak, and attributed to either ingroup or outgroup 
sources. As noted above, the dominant models in the persuasion literature view 
the ingroup persuasion effect as the product of peripheral or heuristic processing. 
According to this view, people don’t actively process ingroup messages, they 
simply accept them because they like or identify with the source. While Mackie 
and colleagues did find evidence of the ingroup persuasion effect, with ingroup 
messages producing more persuasion than outgroup messages, they also found 
that participants were much more persuaded by strong messages from the ingroup 
than weak messages. Far from accepting the ingroup message in a mindless, 
heuristic fashion, this suggested that participants had carefully and systematically 
evaluated the ingroup messages, and were only persuaded by those independently 
pretested as being based on strong and valid arguments. 
 A second study by Mackie and colleagues provided further insight into the 
processing of information from fellow group members. As in the first study, 
participants read messages from either ingroup members or outgroup members 
that were either strong or weak. This time, however, the researchers added another 
variable: the degree to which the issue was relevant to the group. In one condition, 
the message related to an issue (oil drilling off a nearby coastline) that pretesting 
suggested was particularly relevant to the ingroup, while in the other condition the 
message referred to an issue that was considered much less relevant (acid rain in a 
distant part of the country). They found that on the issue that was relevant to the 
group, participants were persuaded to a much greater extent by ingroup messages 
with strong rather than weak arguments. However, on the issue that was not 
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relevant to the group they found that participants were somewhat persuaded by 
ingroup messages regardless of their strength. There was no evidence that 
participants were persuaded by outgroup messages regardless of whether they 
were weak or strong. These results qualify those of the earlier study, indicating 
that ingroup membership can lead to systematic processing of messages when the 
issue is deemed relevant to the group. Yet when it is not relevant to the group, 
ingroup membership can indeed be used as a heuristic cue.  
Later research by Wyer (2010) confirmed the critical role that the relevance of 
the issue to the group plays in the ingroup persuasion effect. In a series of studies, 
Wyer found evidence of the ingroup persuasion effect only in cases where there 
was direct relevance of the issue to the group. In addition to measuring attitude 
change, Wyer also measured participants’ cognitive responses to persuasive 
messages, finding that positive responses to messages from ingroup members on 
issues relevant to the group mediated attitude change. This, according to Wyer, 
indicated that persuasion was “based on systematic processing of the message 
rather than reliance on cues such as the group membership of the message source” 
(p. 463).  
The impact of relevance has also been demonstrated in research on the 
consistency between attitudes and behaviour intentions. Following on from 
research showing that referent group norms are related to behavioural intentions, 
Smith and colleagues found that ingroup norms have more influence when the 
issue is seen as relevant to the group. Indeed, they concluded that, “certain norms 
are linked more closely to the group prototype and may become more definitive of 
group membership” (Smith, Terry, Crosier & Duck, 2005, p. 168). Again, this 
suggests that while groups and group identity can have a powerful impact on 
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people’s perceptions, attitudes, and behaviour, people will not be guided by 
ingroup norms on every conceivable issue. The fact that people are more likely to 
be guided by group norms and influenced by ingroup messages on issues 
perceived to be relevant or central to group membership suggests that there is a 
rational basis to group-based social influence. It also highlights that the notion of 
relevance depends upon people’s understanding of the group and of the issue at 
hand.  
This chapter has outlined some of the theoretical and empirical currents in the 
study of social influence. It has explored how key studies in the field of social 
psychology have informed the social identity perspective on social influence. This 
chapter has reviewed evidence that group-based social influence can follow from 
a deliberative, rational process and lead to genuine influence, rather than merely 
public compliance. It has also outlined research to demonstrate the extent to 
which group-based social influence is dependent upon the issue in question being 
perceived as relevant to the group, a theme that will be explored further in 
subsequent chapters. 
 
 
 
 
  
  19 
Chapter 3 – The strategic use of identity arguments 
 
 The fact that each of us has a range of different group or social identities 
that may be salient at a given time – that may be seen as relevant when 
considering a given issue – has dramatic implications for individuals’ attitudes 
and the way they might be influenced. To the extent that the normative position of 
these different groups are perceived to differ on a particular issue, we could 
expect very different attitudes and behaviours depending on how people 
understand the issue and which group identity they therefore view as relevant. 
Reicher (2004), for instance, notes that an issue like the influx of migrants into 
low paid jobs could be construed as a matter of race, of nation, or of class. An 
individual’s attitude towards the issue, and indeed towards the migrant group in 
question or immigration more generally, could vary markedly depending upon 
this act of construal. 
 Work by Reicher, Hopkins and colleagues (e.g. Reicher & Hopkins, 
1996a; Reicher & Hopkins, 1996b; Reicher, Hopkins & Condor, 1997; Reicher & 
Hopkins, 2001a; Reicher and Hopkins, 2001b; Kahani-Hopkins & Hopkins, 2002; 
Hopkins & Kahani-Hopkins, 2004; Haslam, Reicher & Platow, 2010) on the 
strategic construction of identity demonstrates that judgements about the 
relevance of group membership to particular issues, and about the alignment of 
group norms with particular issue positions are not made by individuals in ascetic 
isolation. In public debate, as in everyday conversation, we are bombarded with 
messages about the meaning of groups, of issues, and of the implications of one 
for the other. That is, the intra-psychic processes of perceiver readiness and fit are 
not the only factors that influence the salience of social identities, or judgements 
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about whether a particular group is relevant to this or that issue. There is also the 
dimension of discourse, argumentation and social influence. Indeed, contest over 
the meaning of groups and issues is often the very stuff of politics. 
 Reicher and colleagues’ investigation of the centrality of identity and self-
category arguments in public debate is firmly grounded in the social identity 
perspective and the principles of self-categorisation theory in particular. However, 
there are a few important points of difference where they take issue with the 
dominant practices or approach of social identity researchers. Firstly, they argue 
that most research within the social identity tradition has tended to focus on the 
consequences of categorisation into groups with little or no attention devoted to 
how those categorisations are arrived at. Reicher and Hopkins (2001) cite the 
example of Sherif’s ‘boys camp studies’ in which the experimenters manipulated 
the structural relationship between groups of boys in order to study its effect on 
intergroup conflict (Sherif, 1966; Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood & Sherif, 1961). 
They refer to one of the lesser known of these studies in which the two groups of 
boys recognised that the experimenters were conspiring to manufacture conflict 
between them. As a result, rather than turn on each other, the two groups united in 
opposition to the experimenters. Sherif abandoned the study at the point that the 
boys rejected the experimenters’ group categorisation in favour of one that 
reflected their new understanding of the situation. Reicher and Hopkins suggest 
that because Sherif saw the “division into different groups of boys as a non-
negotiable starting point, he ignored the issue of category construction. He 
ignored any alternative categorical possibilities” (p. 394). 
According to Reicher and Hopkins (2001a), Sherif’s approach is indicative of 
a general tendency for researchers to take certain groups and categorisations for 
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granted, concentrating on the effects of those categorisations rather than 
investigating the process that gives rise to them. “The ways in which the divisions 
come about lie before the starting line and therefore slip from the disciplinary 
spotlight” (p. 394). While acknowledging the value of investigating the impact of 
these categorisations, they argue that intergroup research that assumes particular 
self-categories only tells part of the story. Reicher and Hopkins pay tribute to the 
important contribution of social identity research to our understanding of racism, 
for example, but claim that a focus on the consequences of racial prejudice has not 
been accompanied by an attempt to understand ‘racialization’; of how race came 
to be a basis of identification and discrimination.  
 In line with the social identity perspective, Reicher, Hopkins and 
colleagues reject the social cognitive view of people as ‘cognitive misers’ who 
use categorical thinking to represent people in the social world when they lack the 
capacity to represent them as unique individuals. Rather, they contend that people 
categorise themselves and others in terms of social groups because this is often 
how the social world is organised. Such thinking helps to render the social world 
more meaningful; it reflects rather than distorts social reality. However, while 
acknowledging the critical role of social context in determining identity salience, 
or, more broadly, the categories and category relations that come to define social 
reality, they go beyond the standard social identity analysis in a couple of ways. 
In contrast to most social identity theorists, for instance, Reicher, Hopkins and 
colleagues also emphasise the interdependent relationship between categories and 
context – that the construction of social categories can influence social reality. In 
effect, Reicher and Hopkins chart something of a third way, one that goes beyond 
both the social cognition view that people use group-based categories to simplify 
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the complex social world, and the self-categorisation notion that emphasises the 
flexible nature of categorisation in response to the changing social context. While 
acknowledging that the social categories available to people at a given moment 
are to some degree determined, or at least constrained, by the social context, they 
also stress the role that social categories play in shaping the social context given 
that “all self-categories are theories of how the world works and how one can be 
in such a world” (2001a, p. 398).  
Much of their work in this area has focused on the key role that 
nationalism and nation-based categorisation has had on the development of 
nation-states. “… To see oneself in national terms is both to conceive of the world 
as organised into nations and to occupy a particular place in that world of nations” 
(Reicher & Hopkins, 2001a, p. 398). However, the same is true of any other social 
category. Their main point is that almost invariably, social change to advance the 
interests of a particular group is predicated on the promulgation of that group as a 
distinct category in the social world. This accords with work on politicised 
collective identity (Simon & Klandermans, 2001) which suggests that awareness 
of shared grievances among a group, and attributing those grievances to a specific 
outgroup helps foster the type of ‘us vs them’ frame on which collective political 
mobilization to effect social change is based. In other words, social categorisation 
is a necessary step in the consciousness raising process that leads to real changes 
in social reality. Reicher and Hopkins (2001a) argue that while this has been 
acknowledged in theory (e.g. Haslam, 2000) it has rarely been addressed in 
practice. Subsequent research by Livingstone and Haslam (2008) in the context of 
intergroup conflict in Northern Ireland, however, demonstrated the critical 
importance of category content in creating social reality. They found that the 
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relationship between past experiences of intergroup conflict and negative 
behavioural intentions towards the outgroup is mediated by the content of ingroup 
identity. That is, past experience of intergroup conflict only predicts future 
conflict to the extent that it leads group members to define ingroup identity in 
terms of conflict with the outgroup. 
Based on this understanding of the interdependent relationship between 
category boundaries, identity content and social context, Reicher and Hopkins 
(2001a) argue that the traditional social identity approach has neglected the extent 
to which people will use group categorisations strategically, not merely to make 
sense of the social world, but to actively shape it. They claim that, “… a proper 
understanding of salience demands that we study the subject as an active 
participant in debate and social struggle rather than as simply a passive processor 
of information” (p. 309). That is, Reicher and Hopkins do not simply see the 
social context or frame of reference as an objective field from which category 
salience is deduced. Rather, they stress the agency of individuals and groups in 
determining how the social context is defined and construed. Precisely because of 
the potential for social categories to transform social reality, they argue that those 
who seek to shape public opinion and mobilise groups of people to a common 
cause need to be adept at manipulating people’s sense of selfhood; they need to be 
what Reicher calls entrepreneurs of identity. 
“Our identities are no longer impressed upon us from an external reality. 
Identities may better be seen as projects, and those with different projects 
will propose different versions of their own identities and that of others… 
Those who seek to influence their peers and who aspire to direct the 
masses need to become entrepreneurs of identity before they can be 
leaders of people” (Reicher, 2004, p. 53). 
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Entrepreneurs of identity in practice 
While Reicher and Hopkins offer a compelling theoretical case for the 
central role identity can play in political movements, they have also sought to 
demonstrate how entrepreneurs of identity use identity arguments in order to 
create, persuade and mobilise constituencies. In a series of studies, they have 
detailed real world examples of how those involved in public debate (a) define the 
boundaries of a particular category to include all those they want to mobilise; (b) 
define the content of the category such that their proposals are portrayed as the 
fulfillment of group norms; and, (c) define themselves as prototypical of the group 
such that they are uniquely placed to lead and influence the membership. Each of 
these dimensions is important in understanding how aspects of social identity are 
used strategically to achieve mass social influence.  
In one example, Reicher and Hopkins (1996a) analysed a speech by David 
Alton, a British MP and anti-abortion campaigner, to a group of medical staff and 
students at a Scottish hospital. The key to Alton’s pitch was to broaden the frame 
of reference around the abortion debate beyond the traditional pro-choice vs. pro-
life categories. Alton placed the pro-choice position in a broader societal context, 
linking it to a culture of selfishness and a fixation on individual rights (such as the 
right to pollute) regardless of the consequences for others. He contrasted this by 
defining the pro-life position on the basis of “concern for the unborn child” and 
linking it with a “concern for the environment, for animal welfare”. On the basis 
of this construction, Alton was able to draw upon the normative content of the 
medical profession as ‘caring’ to argue that abortion was a violation of those 
norms. By expanding the frame of reference for the debate to incorporate other 
issues and positions, Alton was able to challenge the common conception of anti-
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abortion activists as ‘reactionary cranks’, while also challenging the conception of 
the pro-choice position. As Reicher and Hopkins describe it, “if the abortion vs. 
anti-abortion debate involves those who are selfish/unprincipled vs. those who are 
caring/principled, then clearly medical staff are in the latter category” (p. 304).  
In another example, Reicher and Hopkins (1996b) examined the differing 
constructions of a single issue (the British miner’s strike of 1984-85) by two 
opposing politicians: then Conservative Prime Minister of Britain, Margaret 
Thatcher, and Labour opposition leader Neil Kinnock. As the authors explain, 
Thatcher, who was seeking to mobilise the public against the strike, defined the 
issue in the context of a struggle between democracy on one side and violent 
extremists on the other – there had been an IRA bomb attack on the conference 
venue in the early hours of the morning of Thatcher’s speech, killing a number of 
delegates and injuring many others. Among the ingroup category opposed to the 
strike she included the party members and delegates in attendance, and the general 
British public, including miners who continued to work, as well as the striking 
miners, many of whom she claimed were opposed to the strike. She characterised 
this group in terms of common British attributes and values such as respect for 
order, freedom, self-reliance, courage and steadfastness in the face of threat. In 
constructing the opposing category, she assimilated the executive of the National 
Union of Mineworkers (NUM), who were leading the strike, with other forces 
opposed to democracy and the rule of law such as IRA terrorists and even the 
government of Argentina with whom Britain had recently waged war over the 
Falklands/Malvinas islands. In the context of this construction, as Reicher and 
Hopkins suggest, “it is normative not only to oppose the strike but also to show 
resolve and commitment in actively standing up against the strike” (p. 364). 
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Kinnock, on the other hand, was seeking to galvanise support for the 
striking miners and foment opposition to the government. He set the dispute in the 
context of the negative effects of Thatcher’s policies, including cuts to welfare, 
unemployment and civil disorder. Within this context, he defined the striking 
miners as representative of a broad ingroup who had been afflicted by and were 
opposed to Thatcherism. Unlike Thatcher, Kinnock didn’t invoke the national 
category explicitly, nor did he define the categories in class terms. Indeed, he was 
quite deliberate in his efforts to include within the ingroup exemplars beyond the 
traditional working class. The authors suggest that Kinnock’s ingroup could be 
defined as ‘the people’ in the radical sense as being distinct from the 
monopolisers of political representation and power. He characterised this ingroup 
as valuing liberty, compassion, care and opportunity; as being concerned with the 
welfare and cohesion of society. In Kinnock’s construction, the outgroup was 
systematically whittled down to just the personage of Thatcher herself. Even her 
cabinet colleagues were described as not so much supportive but as simply too 
meek to resist her. “The category ‘Thatcherism’ is therefore reduced to the will of 
one person” (p. 367). Indeed, Kinnock went so far as to place Thatcherism outside 
the bounds of the usual partisan categories such that she was not even 
representative of the party or political tradition she led. Her’s was a different form 
of Toryism, one that “is exhumed from the past.” Kinnock defined Thatcher, in 
contrast to the ingroup, as “coercive and dictatorial, arrogant, vain, prejudiced, out 
of touch and contemptuous of ordinary people” (p. 368).  
As the juxtaposition of these two speeches demonstrates, the way in which 
the issue is characterised, the categories that are posited to be involved, and the 
way those categories are defined differ in such a way as to advance the 
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contrasting political causes advanced by the different speakers. Thus, it is not 
simply that political rhetoric involves arguments about which groups are relevant 
to an issue and how the groups are defined. These arguments are also internally 
coherent and serve a strategic purpose in persuading an audience that one 
particular course or action is consonant with the interests and values of a common 
ingroup, while at the same time discrediting alternatives. As Reicher and Hopkins 
explain, Thatcher’s frame of ‘democracy against terrorism’, her definition of the 
ingroup as British and as defined on the basis of resoluteness and courage presents 
the strike as anathema to its values; Kinnock’s frame of ‘Thatcherism against 
society’ portrays the ingroup as ‘the people’, whose values of care, compassion 
and solidarity naturally lead them to support the strike. This demonstrates the 
authors’ notion that “category constructs in political rhetoric reflect a speaker’s 
project of mobilization” (p. 369). 
Reicher and Hopkins have also examined how national identity 
(predominantly in the context of Scottish politics) has been used by activists of 
various stripes to advance very different political agendas. In the context of the 
debate about Scottish independence from Great Britain, for example, Reicher and 
Hopkins (2001a) describe how a Scottish National Party (SNP) activist 
characterises the Scots as shy and reticent, in contrast to the garrulous English. 
Meanwhile, a Conservative politician depicts the Scots as naturally expressive. 
For the SNP activist, the picture of Scots as shy and somewhat downtrodden 
reinforces the need for Scottish independence from England in order to assert and 
pursue their own interests. The Conservative politician’s portrayal, on the other 
hand, suggests that any seeming tendency on the part of Scots to complain about 
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their position in Great Britain is more a result of their expressive bearing than the 
fact that they have anything to complain about.  
They also describe an instance where two political candidates from 
opposing parties, Labour and Conservative, both refer to a famous line from 
Scottish poet Robert Burns – “a man’s a man for a’ that” in discussing the caring 
and communal nature of the Scots. However, the apparent similarity disguises the 
contrasting projects the allusion is being used for. For the Labour politician, the 
Scots’ caring and communal nature is used to justify support for the welfare state; 
for the Conservative, it is used to justify mutual self-help and personal charity as 
an alternative to social welfare. They also cite other examples where activists 
from the same party make very different arguments about the distinction between 
Scots and the English: one Labour activist claims that the Scots’ caring nature 
distinguishes them from the English, while another argues that the Scots and 
English are essentially one and the same people (Reicher, Hopkins & Condor, 
1997).  
The point of these examples is not merely to demonstrate that identity is a 
prominent feature of political rhetoric, but also to show that identity arguments 
are used strategically in order to underpin the political project of the speaker. It 
may be unremarkable that people representing different political traditions will 
draw upon similar conceptions of national identity, or that people with similar 
ideals may vary. However, the fact that these differences and similarities appear 
to vary in line with the political argument the speaker is trying to advance attests 
to how identity is used for strategic purpose. Indeed, in all of the cases cited 
above, the unifying factor is that the definition of Scottishness serves to underpin 
the prototypicality of the speaker’s party, and position a particular policy or their 
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party’s platform as consonant with the national character. However, as Reicher 
and Hopkins (1996b) themselves note, it is one thing to demonstrate that category 
arguments are present in political rhetoric and that differing construction of issues 
and groups are used in order to achieve mass influence; it is quite another to 
demonstrate their effect. 
Empirical research within the social identity tradition has demonstrated the 
powerful influence the frame of reference exerts on the way people understand 
themselves and others. For example, in a demonstration of the principle of 
comparative fit, Haslam and colleagues showed that expanding the range of 
groups in the social context had a marked effect on perceptions of group 
boundaries, with erstwhile outgroup members being redefined as part of a 
common ingroup (Haslam, Turner, Oakes, McGarty & Hayes, 1992). Likewise, 
Hopkins, Regan and Abell (1997) demonstrated the relative nature of group 
definitions, showing that the way the ingroup was defined, including the 
dimension of definition, varies depending upon who the salient outgroup is. This 
was taken a step further by Rabinovich, Morton, Postmes and Verplanken (2012) 
who demonstrated that changes in the comparative context (i.e. salient outgroup) 
can influence perceptions of the ingroup norms on a particular issue, and 
ultimately influence individuals’ attitudes and behaviour regarding that issue. 
While these studies illustrate the influence that can be achieved by manipulating 
people’s understanding of the social context, in each case the social context was 
tightly controlled and directly manipulated by the experimenter. As such, they 
offer only limited insight into how such influence is achieved in the context of 
public debate, where those who seek to shape public opinion on a given issue 
must present their particular interpretation of the social context, the nature of 
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groups and of the issue in ways that are plausible and compelling to those they 
seek to influence.  
This chapter has outlined work by Reicher, Hopkins and others on how 
identity arguments are used to persuade and mobilise groups of people to a 
common cause. It explains how this work builds on the social identity perspective 
on social influence to offer novel insights into rhetorical strategies at play in much 
public debate. While experimental work in the field of social psychology 
compliments Reicher and colleagues’ more qualitative analysis, it is in the 
communication and political science literature, most notably work on issue 
framing and partisan cues, where we find a more thorough empirical examination 
of the effect of public discourse on individuals’ attitudes. 
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Chapter 4 – Issue frames, party cues, and the meaning of issues and groups 
 
The way in which issues are defined or ‘framed’ in public debate and the 
impact this has on people’s attitudes is the subject of considerable interest in the 
fields of political science and communication. Research into what is known as 
‘issue framing’ is based on the notion that issues can be complex and there is 
often ambiguity about what the essence of an issue is. According to Nelson and 
Kinder (1996), issue frames are more than a single argument or a position on an 
issue, they provide meaning to an issue and suggest how to understand and think 
about it. Issue frames are thought to influence attitudes on three levels: by making 
new beliefs or considerations about an issue available; by making particular 
available considerations more accessible; or by making certain accessible 
considerations seem more applicable or more important in determining one’s 
attitude (Chong & Druckman, 2007). Despite debate over the exact process by 
which framing effects are mediated, there is general agreement that issue frames 
change attitudes by altering the underlying considerations people bring to bear in 
forming their attitudes (see Nelson, Oxley & Clawson, 1997; Nelson & Oxley, 
1999; Jacoby, 2000; Druckman, 2001). 
This understanding of issue framing is based on an expectancy value 
model of attitudes (e.g. Azjen & Fishbein, 1980), according to which an 
individual’s attitude towards an object or issue can be thought of as the weighted 
sum of a series of evaluative beliefs. In the classic example, attitudes about 
whether a hate group rally should be allowed to proceed might consist of a 
positive evaluation based on the principle of free speech and a negative evaluation 
based on concerns about public safety. One’s overall attitude would depend on the 
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relative weight ascribed to each of these components. Two people could share the 
same range of considerations and evaluations, but attach differing weights to each 
and thereby arrive at different conclusions. Someone exposed to a frame 
emphasising the free speech element might be more likely to see this as the most 
relevant consideration and conclude that the rally should proceed. Whereas 
someone who read an article that framed the issue in terms of public safety might 
be more likely to oppose the rally on the basis of this consideration.  
Research on framing effects traditionally rests on an individualistic 
understanding of attitudes, characterised by Hogg and Smith (2007) as “cognitive 
representations that are acquired and possessed by individuals and which, to a 
great extent, are a part of human individuality” (p. 91). This has been the accepted 
view of attitudes within social psychology as far back as Floyd Allport (1919) and 
continues to dominate the field (see Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Maio & Haddock, 
2009). While framing research considers the impact of social context on attitudes, 
as a source of information and communication, the social identity perspective 
offers a broader understanding of the social context which Hogg and Smith (2007) 
conceptualise as the wider social environment of group memberships, group 
norms, social identities, intergroup relations and ideologies. In this sense, much 
research on framing follows a perspective that fails to take account of the way in 
which attitudes are grounded in group memberships; that “our sense of ourselves 
as group members plays a key role in shaping attitudes and attitudinal processes” 
(p. 91).  
The individualistic bent in framing research is far from monolithic, and 
there have been some notable exceptions. Nelson and Kinder (1996) went some 
way towards integrating framing research with a more socially-based 
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understanding of attitude processes in investigating what they termed the ‘group 
centrism’ of public opinion. They argued that people’s attitudes towards social 
groups were fundamental to their opinions on a variety of issues, but that the 
influence of this group-centrism depends on how issues are framed. In studies in 
the US, they found that support for affirmative action was highly correlated with 
racial attitudes, and particularly so when the issue was framed in a way that drew 
attention to African Americans as the intended beneficiaries. While this research 
is notable in recognising the key role of groups in shaping individual’s opinions 
on specific issues, it goes only part of the way. In focusing on the impact of 
attitudes towards groups, and particularly the role of racial prejudice, the 
emphasis is on how the individual views and responds to ‘others’ in forming their 
opinion, rather than on how one defines the ‘self’ in relation to the issue. While 
self-categorisation is always relative (Hopkins, et al., 1997), and the self is 
defined in relation to the ‘other’, from a social identity perspective the main point 
of interest is how people view themselves, who they identify with, and the types 
of values and norms they come to be guided by. 
  Price (1989) was the first to explicitly apply social identity principles in 
attempting to understand the impact of framing on individual’s attitudes. Focusing 
on the tendency for the media to frame issues in terms of conflict between 
opposing sides, Price argued that “the construction of an issue as a matter pitting 
defined social groups against one another is not a simple peripheral cue; it 
interacts with recipients’ social identities to alter in a fundamental way their 
approach to thinking about and responding to the issue” (p. 202). According to 
Price, this type of framing influences attitudes firstly by indicating which groups 
are relevant to the issue and secondly by outlining the norms of those groups. For 
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people formulating their opinion on the issue, this type of group conflict frame 
changes the question from one of ‘where do I stand?’ on the issue, to ‘with whom 
do I stand?’ 
In testing these ideas empirically, Price conducted a study in which 
participants read a mock article from a student newspaper about plans to increase 
university course requirements. In the group frame condition, the article described 
the issue in terms of the conflict between Science majors who opposed the move, 
and Humanities majors who supported it. In the other condition, the article noted 
that students were divided on the issue without mentioning any specific groups. 
The personal relevance of the issue was also manipulated by stating that the plan 
was to be implemented either soon, or in the future. The results indicated that 
Humanities students were influenced by the frame such that those who read the 
group conflict version of the article were more likely to support the planned 
increase in course requirement than those who read the non-group frame. 
However, this effect was evident only among those Humanities students who 
were told that the changes were to be implemented soon (i.e. high personal 
relevance). Science students, on the other hand, were not influenced by the frame 
regardless of the supposed timing, though Price suggests that this might have been 
due to constricted range as opposition to the plan was the default position of most 
students. 
 Price’s (1989) research demonstrates that when informed of a group norm 
on an issue, those who identify with the group tend to conform to the normative 
position. In this sense, the results are in line with those of the ingroup persuasion 
studies outlined above (e.g. Mackie et al, 1990; Wyer, 2010). Indeed, focusing on 
the results among Humanities students, the fact that the frame only had an effect 
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on those who believed the issue to be an imminent concern suggests that this 
might have heightened the sense of relevance of the issue to the group such that 
they saw their fellow ingroup members as an appropriate reference group. 
The matter of relevance has been explored more recently in the field of 
political science through research looking at the conditions under which 
individuals will and will not be guided by group (i.e. political party) norms. 
Slothuus and de Vreese (2010), for example, found that participants were much 
more inclined to adopt the position advocated by the party they supported (and 
reject the position of an opposing party) on an issue where there was traditionally 
partisan conflict (welfare for senior citizens). However, on an issue that was 
usually characterised by partisan consensus (international trade), the source of the 
message had little or no impact on whether participants adopted the advocated 
position. Furthermore, they found that the influence of party source was stronger 
among those who were more politically aware. These findings confirm, in the 
realm of political attitudes, that while group memberships and group norms can 
exert a powerful influence on attitudes, people do not slavishly adhere to group 
norms in all instances. There are important situational and individual factors that 
have a bearing on the extent of group influence.  
In explaining these results, the authors suggest that message source 
mattered more on the conflict issue because this is where partisan values are 
particularly at stake. This is another way of saying that the issue is relevant to 
group membership; that one’s stance on the issue is somehow central to what it 
means to be a group member. It follows, therefore, that people who are committed 
partisans will be swayed by the position of the ingroup. Equally, for those who 
receive the message about the outgroup position, it makes sense to assume that 
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this position will reflect the values of that party, which are at odds with one’s 
own. As such, people will naturally assume that their own party’s position will 
differ, and be motivated to react against the outgroup’s stated position. In contrast, 
issues where there is usually partisan consensus, do not, almost by definition, 
implicate partisan values and will therefore not be viewed as relevant to group 
membership. Given the expectation of consensus across groups, there is no reason 
to expect agreement within one’s group. As such, there is little or no motivation to 
adhere to the ingroup position or to reject the outgroup position.  
These findings run counter to previous issue framing research which has 
suggested that citizens are likely to be more responsive to framing on issues that 
they are not particularly invested in, and that framing effects are stronger among 
those who are less politically aware (Kam, 2005; Mondak, 1993). They are, 
however, in keeping with the social identity perspective and associated evidence 
reviewed above that group-based influence is the product of effortful, rational 
processes. Indeed, Slothuus and de Vreese (2010) argue that “… parties appear to 
function as much more than merely facilitating cognitive efficiency – parties are 
important landmarks in the political landscape that citizens relate to” (p. 643). As 
such, it makes sense that it is the most politically aware in the context of 
politically relevant issues who will have both the motivation and ability to 
rationalise why they should support the ingroup position, or, for that matter, 
generate counterarguments to justify rejecting the outgroup position.  
Similar results were found by Druckman, Peterson and Slothuus (2013) 
who investigated the effect of party cues under conditions of high and low 
partisan polarisation. They found that when the political context surrounding an 
issue (e.g. immigration reform in the US) was described as non-polarised (i.e. not 
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much difference between the parties, and differing views within parties), 
participants, who were made up of committed Democrats and Republicans, were 
swayed by the substantive merits of the arguments presented for or against a 
particular policy rather than by the official position of their party. However, when 
the political context was described as highly polarised (i.e. large difference 
between the parties and a high level of agreement within parties), participants 
conformed to the stated position of their party, regardless of the relative merits of 
the arguments. As with earlier research, these results raise concerns about the 
pernicious effects of partisanship on citizen decision-making and the quality of 
public opinion. While acknowledging these concerns, the authors argue that 
citizens, particularly those who are committed partisans, generally understand 
what the political parties stand for and take this into account when determining 
whether they should be guided by party cues. Indeed, just as in Slothuus and de 
Vreese’ (2010) example of the partisan conflict issue, the polarised political 
context indicates that the issue implicates the types of values that distinguish the 
parties, and which are presumably important to committed partisans. So while a 
participant may have been presented with information about the merits of the 
policy that point in one direction, they will have to weigh this against the 
knowledge that their political party (with whom they share relevant values) holds 
a different view. In this case, it may be rational to assume that the party’s position 
is based on a more thorough understanding of the policy.  
The research on issue framing and particularly party cues is consistent 
with that on ingroup persuasion (Mackie et al, 1990; Mackie et al, 1992; Wyer, 
2010) in pointing to three distinct conclusions: (1) group norms can exert a 
powerful influence on the attitudes of those who identity with the group; (2) 
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people are only influenced by group norms to the extent that they regard the issue 
in question to be relevant to the group; and (3) being guided by group norms is 
not simply the result of mindless conformity, but can be the outcome of a 
thoughtful, rational process.  
In considering the nature of this rational process, Asch’s early work on 
persuasion offers some useful insights. Drawing on the principles of Gestalt 
psychology, Asch argued that the characteristics of the source are not simply 
something we add into the mix when considering a persuasive message; it actually 
influences the meaning we ascribe to the message.  That is to say, it is not a matter 
of considering the same message from one or other source; they are actually two 
different messages because the content of the message and the source constitute a 
meaningful whole: a Gestalt. To illustrate this point, Asch (1952) replicated a 
study by Lorge (1936) where American students were presented with a message 
arguing that “a little rebellion now and then is a good thing…” attributed to either 
Vladimir Lenin or Thomas Jefferson. Not surprisingly there was more agreement 
with the message among those who thought it came from Jefferson rather than 
Lenin. Lorge’s interpretation was that the liking participants felt towards Jefferson 
was simply transferred to the message. But Asch also had students describe how 
they interpreted the term rebellion from the passage, finding that when attributed 
to Lenin rebellion brought to mind images of revolution, bloodshed and anarchy; 
whereas when attributed to Jefferson it was associated with debate and 
democracy, “gentle winds of change.” This was good evidence of Asch’s notion 
that the source affects the meaning of the message; that people’s interpretation of 
the message was based on their understanding of the source. They were indeed 
two different messages. And it is the interpretation of the message, the meaning 
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we give to it, not simply the objective qualities of the message itself, which 
determines whether we accept the message or reject it. 
It was this understanding of attitudes and attitude change that Cohen 
(2003) brought to his investigation of party cues. In a series of studies with 
committed Democrats and Republicans, participants read a mock newspaper 
article about a proposed reform to welfare policy. In the article, the policy was 
either presented as being substantively generous or stringent. Half the participants 
read that the policy was supported by the majority of House Democrats, and 
opposed by the majority of Republicans, with the party labels being reversed for 
the other half. In line with other research, he found that partisans’ attitudes 
towards the issue were guided by the stated position of their party, even when 
their natural ideological inclination would suggest an alternative view. In the final 
study, conducted with Democrats only, participants read an article describing a 
government funded program that would “guarantee both job training and gainful 
employment … to poor people who receive welfare benefits and to those whose 
benefits have ended.”  Half of the participants read that the Democrats opposed 
the program, but the Republicans supported it; the other half did not receive any 
information about the position of the two parties. In addition to reporting their 
attitude towards the program, participants were also asked to write an editorial 
outlining why they held that attitude. The results showed that participants who 
had read that the Democrats opposed the program were more likely to oppose it 
themselves, and in their editorials were more likely to emphasise humanitarian 
values over self-reliance in justifying their opposition. Participants who had not 
read about the party’s position were more likely to support the program and gave 
equal emphasis to humanitarianism and self-reliance in the editorials. 
  40 
In keeping with Asch’s (1952) view of persuasion, Cohen interpreted these 
results on the basis that the information about the party position on the issue 
helped define what he referred to as the social meaning of the welfare program in 
the eyes of participants. In a sense, the party position and participants’ 
understanding of the nature of the party itself provided a ‘frame’ for interpreting 
the issue. So rather than forsaking their ideological beliefs, participants were 
interpreting the meaning of the program on the basis of the ideological beliefs or 
values they shared with their party. As Cohen explained, the Democrats in the 
United States define their ideological tradition on the basis of a dual commitment 
to the values of humanitarianism and self-reliance. For those who read the 
objective information, the program was viewed as reflecting both values. 
However, this interpretation was inconsistent with the Democrat’s opposition to 
the program. As such, those who read that the Democrats opposed the program 
interpreted it as violating the value of humanitarianism. This was how they made 
sense of the Democrat’s opposition. In line with Turner’s (1991) view of attitudes, 
Cohen (2003) argues that it is not simply the substantive, objective elements of an 
issue that determines attitudes, but rather the social meaning or what he describes 
as “the perceived ‘goodness’ of fit between the attitude object and socially shared 
values” (p. 809). 
Cohen claims that there are two factors that affect the extent to which this 
process plays out. The first factor relates to the issue of relevance noted above - 
that the issue must be perceived as relevant to the group in the sense that it 
involves values that are central to group membership, that in some way define 
what the group stands for. If this is not the case, then people will not feel 
motivated to agree with the group position. The second factor is that the meaning 
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of the issue must be sufficiently ambiguous that it can be plausibly reframed on 
the basis of the group’s position. If, for example, the welfare program had been 
unambiguously both generous and self-enhancing for recipients, it would have 
been extremely difficult for participants to ascribe a social meaning to the 
program that squared with the Democrats’ opposition. To the extent that the 
Democrat’s opposition appeared inexplicable, based on the values that define the 
group Democrats, participants may well have dismissed the group’s position in 
their consideration of the policy (or indeed it may have led them to reconsider 
their view of the Democrats). In addition to these two factors (or perhaps implicit 
in them) is the extent to which there is ambiguity about what defines the group. 
The more ambiguous the group definition, the greater scope there is to interpret a 
diversity of positions as consistent with the group’s values. Indeed, to the extent 
that there is ambiguity, or plurality, in the values that define the group, the greater 
the range of issues that can potentially be construed as relevant to the group.  
The research on issue framing and party cues suggests that issues are often 
multi-faceted and the social meaning people ascribe to them is open to 
manipulation. This social meaning can be manipulated either directly through 
explicit issue frames or indirectly through information about group norms. 
However, the same can be true about the social meaning (or content) of groups. 
There can be many features or values that define a group; many values can be 
seen as central to what it means to be a group member. To the extent that there is 
ambiguity about which of the various values is most relevant or definitive of the 
group, there is scope to shape the group definition by emphasising one over the 
alternatives. Doing so could fundamentally alter the extent to which a given issue 
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is seen as relevant to the group, and indeed what the group position on an issue 
might be. 
 
Overview of current research 
Based on the literature and research reviewed in Chapters 2, 3 and 4, we 
can draw a number of key points that will inform the empirical element of this 
thesis. First, that people’s attitudes are influenced by the norms of groups they 
identify with, and particularly so for those who are strongly identified with the 
group. This is motivated by a desire to accurately understand the world and 
represents a rational process where people look to relevant others to lend a sense 
of validity and objectivity to their subjective judgements and attitudes. This 
caveat about ‘relevant’ others is critical: people only expect to agree, and only 
seek agreement with group members on issues that are relevant to the group. The 
perception that the issue implicates values that are relevant or central to what it 
means to be a group member provides the basis for the expectation of agreement 
and opens the way for social influence. If the issue is not perceived to be relevant 
to the group, then it is logical to assume that it is one on which group members 
could be expected to differ, and there is no motivation to be guided by the group.  
The second point is that there is often a degree of ambiguity about the 
meaning of issues (i.e. what interests and values it entails), as well as the meaning 
or content ascribed to groups (i.e. what values or interests it represents). Most 
people have a range of groups with which they identity, and thus a range of 
groups that may be perceived as relevant to a given issue, depending on how the 
issue and the groups are construed. To the extent that these different groups are 
perceived to have different norms regarding an issue, an individual’s attitude 
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towards the issue could vary greatly depending on which group identity is seen to 
be relevant. 
The third point stemming from the review of literature is that the meaning 
ascribed to both groups and issues are not simply determined by individual 
reflection, but can be influenced by the information and messages people 
encounter. Indeed, a great deal of public discourse involves rhetoric about the 
nature of issues and the nature of groups, which is designed to shape people’s 
attitudes. In many cases this rhetoric can be seen as an attempt to establish the 
relevance of an issue to a group (or a group to an issue) among the audience, such 
that attitudes of those who identify with the group come to align with group 
norms. While elements of this process have been demonstrated experimentally, 
and others have been explored through more qualitative analysis, we aim to 
contribute to the understanding of social influence by exploring the process by 
which rhetorical frames about issues and identities influence attitudes. 
We will explore these ideas through four empirical studies. In the first 
two, we will attempt to manipulate the meaning of a group identity in order to 
establish its relevance to different types of issues. In the third and fourth studies, 
we will attempt to manipulate the meaning of a specific issue in order to establish 
the relevance to particular group identities. Studies 1 and 2 are set in the context 
of religious identity. Research consistently finds a connection between religiosity 
and conservative attitudes towards cultural issues (e.g. abortion, gay marriage), 
more so than other types of issues (Malka et al, 2012; Davis & Robinson, 1996; 
Guth et al, 2006; Jelen, 2009, Layman & Greene 2005). We argue that this is in 
part due to a social context that has prevailed in the United States, where most of 
this research has been conducted, in recent decades in which the dominant public 
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discourse is one in which religious and political leaders emphasise the relevance 
of cultural issues to religious identity, while giving much less emphasis to other 
issues (Wallis, 2005; Micklethwait & Wooldridge, 2009). We therefore suggest 
that framing religious identity in a way that emphasises the relevance of cultural 
issues will enhance the normative influence on those issues, but equally, framing 
religious identity in a way that emphasises the relevance of civic issues will 
enhance the normative influence on those issues. In the first study, conducted with 
an Australian sample, we explore this through the use of a fairly simple identity 
frame that merely suggests that some people may see these issues as relevant to 
their religious identity. In Study 2, conducted with a sample drawn from the 
United Kingdom, we employ a more elaborate identity frame that seeks to explain 
why it is that cultural or civic issues are relevant to religious identity. 
Studies 3 and 4 explore these processes in the context of attitudes towards 
the issue of climate change. The public debate about climate change is 
characterised by a range of different and competing frames. Many emphasise the 
moral imperative to act on climate change, while others highlight the economic 
costs of reducing emissions. Research indicates that attitudes toward the issue has 
come to be associated with the Culture war between different ideological groups, 
and attitudes towards climate change are partly an expression of commitment to 
those ideological groups (Kahan et al, 2012; Kahan, 2013; Kahan, 2015). We 
argue that this connection is likely driven by the nature of public discourse around 
climate change and that the social identity perspective offers a good way to 
understand these results. We therefore suggest that framing climate change in a 
way that resonates with the meaning ascribed to different types of groups will 
enhance the normative influence of those groups. 
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In Study 3, we explore this in relation to two issue frames commonly 
encountered in public discourse about climate change (moral and economic) to 
determine whether this increases the relevance and therefore normative influence 
of religious/spiritual and class groups, respectively, that participants identify with. 
In Study 4 we also include a political frame and explore the role of partisan group 
identity and norms, as well as examining the role of political knowledge which 
has been shown to moderate the effect of issue frames (Slothuus & de Vreese, 
2010). In Study 4, we also explore the role of perceived relevance to the group 
and the extent to which this mediates the effect of the frame on attitudes towards 
climate change. 
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Social psychological research on group-based social influence has shown 
that people’s attitudes are influenced by the norms of groups they identify with. 
However, this influence is limited to issues that are perceived as relevant to the 
group. Research in the communication and political science literature has shown 
that the way people understand issues, and in turn their attitudes towards those 
issues, can be influenced by the way the issue is framed in communication. This 
research seeks to combine the insights of these two bodies of research. More 
specifically, the two studies described in this chapter examine whether messages 
about the nature of a particular group can influence the extent to which different 
types of issues are seen as relevant to the group such that attitudes come to reflect 
the group’s norms. 
This question is examined in the context of religious (in this case 
Christian) group identity. Research has consistently found a strong relationship 
between religiosity and conservative political attitudes regarding ‘cultural’ issues 
(e.g. abortion, gay rights). Based on the premise that the connection is driven to 
some degree by elite religious and political rhetoric that emphasises the relevance 
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of cultural issues, the studies described test whether messages about the nature of 
religious group identity influence the extent to which religious identity and norms 
predict attitudes towards cultural issues and civic issues (i.e. welfare, climate 
change, asylum seekers). This research applies the social identity approach to 
social influence in a more thorough and systematic way than has previously been 
done in the study of framing effects. Similarly, drawing on the social identity 
perspective on social influence is a novel approach in examining the association 
between religiosity and political attitudes.  
The findings indicate that messages about the nature of religious identity 
and the issues relevant to it can influence the extent to which perceived religious 
group norms predict attitudes. These findings support the notion that elite 
religious rhetoric that emphasises conservative positions on cultural issues is at 
least partly responsible for the commonly found connection between religiosity 
and political conservatism. The results also suggests that such rhetoric can work 
to define what issues are, and are not, relevant to the religious identity and 
therefore the issues on which one should be guided by religious group norms. 
These findings contribute to our understanding of the impact of elite rhetoric, and 
in particular provide an insight into the social identity processes through which 
such rhetoric influences attitudes. 
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Abstract 
Research on the intersection of religion and politics consistently finds a strong 
relationship between religiosity and conservative political attitudes, particularly 
on so-called cultural issues (e.g. abortion, gay marriage). Drawing on the social 
identity perspective on group-based social influence, we argue that the connection 
between religion and political attitudes is driven by a social context in which elite 
religious discourse emphasises the religious import of cultural issues over civic 
issues (e.g. welfare, climate change). Across two studies involving self-identified 
Christians, we predict that highlighting the relevance of either cultural or civic 
issues to religious identity (Study 1), or defining religious identity in terms of 
either family values or social justice (Study 2) will affect the extent to which 
religious group norms influence participants’ attitudes towards cultural and civic 
issues. Findings support the predictions and suggest that elite religious discourse 
influences attitudes towards specific issue by affecting which issues are seen as 
relevant to the group. 
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Render unto Caesar: Rhetorical construction of religious identity affects the 
influence of religious group norms on political attitudes. 
 
 Research on the intersection of religion and politics consistently finds a 
strong relationship between religiosity and conservative political attitudes (Malka, 
Lelkes, Srivastava, Cohen & Miller, 2012; Guth, Kellstedt, Smidt & Green, 2006; 
Layman & Green, 2005; Olson & Green, 2006). While there is general agreement 
about the existence of this relationship, particularly in the United States, there is 
considerable debate about why it exists. One side of this debate contends that the 
connection is organic, that the same types of ideologies and predispositions that 
incline people towards religion also underpin the politically conservative world-
view (e.g. Alford, Funk & Hibbing, 2005; Graham, Haidt & Nosek, 2009; Jost, 
Nosek & Gosling, 2008). Others argue that the connection is driven by a social 
context in which religious leaders often espouse conservative political views, and 
conservative political elites (i.e. those in positions of authority who have the 
means to influence the opinions of others) appeal to religious values in advancing 
their political agenda (Malka et al, 2012; Guth, Green, Smidt, Kellstedt & 
Poloma, 1997; Layman & Green, 2005).  
 While the weight of evidence suggests that the connection between 
religiosity and conservative politics is driven at least in part by the social context, 
the process by which elite discourse (i.e. the rhetoric of religious and political 
leaders) might influence attitudes has received relatively little attention. We adopt 
a social identity approach to religion in conceptualising its connection with 
political conservatism. Drawing on Reicher and colleagues’ work on the rhetorical 
construction of identity (Reicher, 2004; Reicher & Hopkins, 1996a; Reicher & 
Hopkins, 1996b; Reicher & Hopkins, 2001; Kahani-Hopkins & Hopkins, 2002; 
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Hopkins & Kahani-Hopkins, 2004; Haslam, Reicher & Platow, 2010), we 
investigate whether defining religious identity in terms of issues and values 
commonly associated with either the conservative or progressive side of politics 
affects how religious variables influence political attitudes.  
Religiosity and political conservatism: is it nature or nurture? 
 Many theorists contend that there is a natural and organic connection 
between religiosity and conservative politics. Graham, Haidt and Nosek (2009), 
for example, argue that political conservatives and liberals possess different 
foundations for moral judgements, and that those which motivate conservatives, 
such as concerns over purity and sanctity, are naturally relevant to religion. Others 
suggest that a desire to minimize uncertainty and threat may underpin both 
religiosity and conservatism (Bonanno & Jost, 2006; Kay, Gaucher, Callan, 
Napier, & Laurin, 2008), or that resistance to both change and equality, which is 
integral to the conservative mind-set, also drives religious inclinations (Jost, 2007; 
Jost et al, 2008). This view feeds into the Culture war thesis (Hunter, 1991) which 
depicts the political system, particularly in the US, as riven by a deep cultural 
divide between religious conservatives and secular progressives; one that is 
fundamental and unbridgeable. Other research, however, indicates that 
antagonistic relations between religious and non-religious groups are not 
inevitable and that religious and irreligious identification can even attenuate 
hostility between these groups (Ysseldyk, Haslam, Matheson & Anisman, 2012).   
 There is, however, considerable evidence to indicate that the connection 
between religion and conservatism owes more to contextual factors. For instance, 
the connection does not apply consistently across religious groups. In the US 
context, Malka and colleagues (2012) found that Black Protestants and Jewish 
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Americans were more liberal than a non-religious control group across a number 
of domains, including (among Jews) social issues such as abortion and gay rights. 
This research also found that the connection between religiosity and conservatism 
was strong among those who were highly politically engaged but either weak or 
non-existent among those who were less engaged with politics. Furthermore, 
Malka and colleagues report results from the American National Election Studies 
(ANES) which show that the link between conservatism and religiosity has been 
far from uniform over time. For example, the share of self-identified 
conservatives among weekly church attenders rose sharply in the early 1990s and 
fluctuated considerably thereafter. While these findings do not preclude the 
possibility of an organic connection, they strongly suggest that the political 
context does indeed have an impact. 
Conceptualising religion 
Theory and research on religion within the social sciences has traditionally 
defined religiosity in terms of different orientations. While it was acknowledged 
that there were doctrinal differences across religions and religious denominations, 
the prevailing view was summed up by Gordon Allport (1950) who claimed that 
the religion to which people subscribed was less important for understanding their 
behaviour than the way they were religious. Indeed, Allport and Ross’ (1967) 
distinction between intrinsic (i.e. looking to religion for spiritual development, 
guidance and meaning) and extrinsic (i.e. using religion primarily for personal or 
social gain) religious orientations was the dominant conceptualization in the 
scientific study of religion for many decades (for reviews see Burris, 1999; 
Donahue, 1985; Gorsuch & Aleshire, 1974; see Kirkpatrick and Hood, 1990 for a 
critique). The orientation approach was superseded by more ideologically-based 
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approaches involving measures such as Christian orthodoxy (Fullerton & 
Hunsberger, 1982), Fundamentalism (e.g., Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992; Hood 
& Morris, 1985; Fulton, Gorsuch & Maynard, 1999; McFarland, 1989) and then 
Right-wing Authoritarianism (e.g. Altemeyer and Hunsberger, 1992; Laythe, 
Finkel, & Kirkpatrick, 2001; Laythe, Finkel, Bringle & Kirkpatrick, 2002; Hall, 
Matz & Wood, 2010). The move to explore ideological measures has been found 
to be somewhat problematic (see Mavor, Macleod, Boal & Louis, 2009; Mavor, 
Louis & Laythe, 2011 for a critique), but demonstrates the importance of broader 
political and ideological contexts rather than simply personal orientation. 
As an alternative socially-contextual approach, theorists have begun to 
approach religion from a social identity perspective, based on the view that 
religious affiliation serves “a uniquely powerful function in shaping psychological 
and social processes” (Ysseldyk, Matheson & Anisman, 2010, p. 60). Indeed, 
several researchers had anticipated the value of a social identity approach to these 
issues (e.g. Schwartz & Such, 1989; Jackson & Hunsberger, 1999). 
The social identity approach (Tajfel, 1972; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner, 
Hogg, Oakes, Reicher & Wetherell, 1987) is based on the notion that we can 
define ourselves in terms of what makes us unique as individuals (personal 
identity), or in terms of our memberships in social groups (social identity). One of 
the key insights of this perspective is that social identity is not a sublimation or 
distortion of one’s true identity; that it is in fact just as valid an expression of 
selfhood as personal identity. The concept of social identity helps provide a bridge 
between the personal and the social, the individual and the group. In this sense it 
is particularly useful for conceptualizing the psychological and social impact of 
religiosity given that it not only involves a very fundamental personal 
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commitment but also subscription to a shared system of belief, and membership of 
a defined social group. The social identity approach has been used to analyse the 
relationship between religion and a range of phenomena including 
fundamentalism (Herriot, 2007), prejudice (Jackson & Hunsberger, 1999), 
intergroup conflict (Cairns, Kenworthy, Campbell & Hewstone, 2006; Verkuyten, 
2007), and mental health (Koteskey, Little & Matthews, 1991; Ysseldyk, 
Mattheson & Anisman, 2009). However, there has been little research from a 
social identity perspective on the relationship between religion and political 
attitudes, and less still on the way in which the framing effect of elite religious 
rhetoric might influence the attitudes of group members. 
Group-based social influence 
The traditional view in social psychology drew a sharp distinction between 
two forms of social influence. This distinction has many instantiations, but is 
probably best encapsulated in Deutsch and Gerrard’s (1955) dual process theory 
which distinguishes between informational influence and normative influence. 
Informational influence is thought to be driven by the desire to accurately 
understand the world, and involves reliance on other people’s views in situations 
where we are uncertain about the appropriate judgement or response. 
Informational influence, according to this view, leads to genuine private 
acceptance of the views of others since they are thought to be informative about 
reality. Normative influence, on the other hand, is conceived as mere public 
compliance with the views of others in an attempt to gain approval or avoid 
sanction. This dual process model of social influence (which has echoes in the 
persuasion literature) has been rejected by social identity theorists who argue that 
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seeking accurate information about reality and wanting to understand the views of 
similar others are interdependent elements in a single process.  
In rejecting the dual process model, Turner (1985; 1991) proposed a single 
process theory of social influence know as referent informational influence. The 
theory is based on the notion that we regard people who are similar to ourselves as 
valid sources of information about reality. We both expect to agree with similar 
others and are motivated to do so. From this perspective, the views of a church 
leader or fellow members of a religious group is not a source of coercive pressure 
but in fact provides the opportunity for validation of our own perceptions and 
beliefs. That is, the agreement of others lends a sense of objectivity to our 
subjective judgements. As Reicher, Spears and Haslam (2010) put it: 
“We can only establish the validity of our collective beliefs in 
collaboration with others who we categorise as similar to ourselves. 
Hence, fellow group members serve as essential reference points for 
our own perception. Our reliance on them is not in conflict with our 
concern for reality – it is through them that individual views are co-
ordinated and transformed into shared values, beliefs and behaviours 
that have an objective quality” (p. 53). 
Essentially, this view suggests that in seeking to understand and form 
opinions about the world, it is only natural for us to be guided by those with 
whom we share relevant characteristics. On matters of religion, for example, we 
might look to our church leaders or members of our own congregation; on matters 
of international relations we might look to national leaders or our fellow 
countrymen and women. To the extent that a particular attitude is perceived to 
reflect the consensual position (i.e. the norm) of a subjectively relevant reference 
group, then it is likely to influence our own opinion. 
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There is extensive empirical support for this social identity account of 
social influence.  People’s attitudes and behaviour are systematically influenced 
by the norms of groups to which they belong, and particularly so for those who 
are highly identified with the group (e.g. Terry & Hogg, 1996; Terry, Hogg & 
White, 1999; Smith & Terry, 2003; Louis, Davies, Smith & Terry, 2007; Smith, 
Terry & Hogg, 2007; White, Smith, Terry, Greenslade & McKimmie, 2009). 
However, even those who strongly identify with a group will not be bound by the 
group’s norms on every conceivable issue. Smith and colleagues found that the 
effect of ingroup norms on attitudes and behavioural intentions was moderated by 
the perceived relevance of the issue to the group (Smith, Terry, Crosier & Duck, 
2005). They concluded that, “individuals do not follow group norms 
automatically, but take into account the extent to which the issue and the norm are 
both relevant and central to group membership” (p. 168). This accords with 
evidence from ingroup persuasion studies which have found that ingroup 
messages lead to more systematic processing only when the issue is seen as 
relevant to the group (Mackie, Worth & Asuncion, 1990; Wyer, 2010).  
Render unto Caesar 
The social identity approach to religion and social influence suggests that 
people who identify with a religious group will be motivated to agree with what 
they believe to be the normative views of the group. But this influence will be 
limited to those issues they perceive to be relevant to their religious identity – 
issues that implicate the types of values that are central to what it means to be a 
member of the group. So, to the extent that they believe group norms are towards 
the conservative end of the spectrum on political issues, individual members will 
be more likely to hold conservative attitudes themselves. Indeed, to the extent that 
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elite religious discourse, be it from the pulpit or in the media, leads people to 
perceive religious norms to be conservative, it would in turn drive the connection 
between religiosity and political conservatism. However, the import of this elite 
discourse in not simply that it informs individual members of what their leaders 
and their religious group peers think about this or that issue, it also conveys a 
deeper message about what the group cares about, what defines it; which issues 
are relevant to it, and which are not.  
While a thorough analysis of elite religious rhetoric is beyond the scope of 
the current paper, it is clear that the matter of which issues are and are not relevant 
to one’s religious faith are not merely theological or philosophical questions; they 
are often, in fact, the very stuff of politics. With the rise of the Christian Right in 
the US in recent decades the relevance of religion to politics and public policy 
came to be focused on a narrow set of so-called ‘cultural policy’ issues such as 
abortion, gay marriage, and stem-cell research (Dionne, 2008). On these issues the 
norms of most mainstream religious groups are well known and are in line with 
the socially conservative stance of the contemporary Republican Party. The 
prominence of these issues has been an effective tool in mobilizing large numbers 
of religious voters in favour of Republican candidates, even among those who 
might not benefit from or endorse the Republicans’ economic agenda (Frank, 
2004). The prominence of these cultural issues in elite religious discourse is 
reflected in research which shows that the relationship between religiosity and 
conservative policy preferences is far greater for cultural issues than for other 
policy domains (Malka et al, 2012; Davis & Robinson, 1996; Guth et al, 2006; 
Jelen, 2009, Layman & Greene 2005). This highlights a dichotomy between so-
called ‘cultural’ issues and what we might call ‘civic’ issues; between issues that 
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are clearly relevant to religious faith and those for which the relevance is not so 
obvious, or is a matter of dispute. This dichotomy is epitomized by the quote 
attributed to Jesus in the gospel according to Matthew, “Render therefore unto 
Caesar the things which are Caesar’s; and unto God the things that are God’s” 
(Matthew 22:21, KJV). 
This, however, reflects only one perspective on the relationship between 
religion and politics. Many have argued that religious teachings have a great deal 
to say about a wide range of issues and should not be restricted to questions of 
sexual and reproductive practices. There are in fact signs of a progressive 
backlash against the narrow focus of the Religious Right, with figures such as 
Rev. Jim Wallis (2005; 2008) and even Pope Francis (2013) attempting to alter 
the terms on which religious people engage with politics. By talking about civic 
issues, such as war, poverty and climate change, in religious terms, the likes of 
Wallis and Pope Francis have highlighted the religious import of issues 
traditionally emphasised by the political Left. Indeed, some have expressed the 
view that the era of the Religious Right is over (Dionne, 2008), and a new era of 
religious progressivism is upon us. Donald Trump’s victory over more 
conventionally religiously candidates in the Republican primaries and the 
Presidential election in 2016 suggests that although progressivism may not be in 
the ascendency, the relationship between religion and politics, at least in the US, 
is being reshaped (Jones, 2016). In this context, while many church leaders and 
members may hold progressive opinions on a range of issues, the success of this 
progressive movement depends on promulgating a version of religious identity 
with these types of concerns and issues at its heart.   
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The strategic construction of identity 
The struggle to define group identity is often integral to politics. 
According to Reicher (2004), those who seek to shape public opinion and 
mobilise groups of people to a common cause need to be adept at manipulating 
people’s sense of selfhood: 
“Our identities are no longer impressed upon us from an external 
reality. Identities may better be seen as projects, and those with 
different projects will propose different versions of their own identities 
and that of others… Those who seek to influence their peers and who 
aspire to direct the masses need to become entrepreneurs of identity 
before they can be leaders of people” (p. 53).  
In a series of articles, Reicher and colleagues have analysed the strategic 
use of identity arguments in the rhetoric of political leaders and other elites. In 
one example, Reicher and Hopkins (1996a) analysed a speech by a British anti-
abortion campaigner to a group of medical staff and students. Drawing upon the 
normative content of the medical profession as ‘caring’, the speaker argued that 
abortion was a violation of medical norms; that performing abortions was 
anathema to what it meant to be a medical professional. While this example 
involves arguments about the nature of group norms rather than the relevance of 
the issue to the group, it illustrates how arguments over identity definition are 
often integral to political debates. However, as Reicher and Hopkins (1996a) 
themselves note, it is one thing to demonstrate that arguments over group 
definition play a significant role in political rhetoric, it is quite another to 
demonstrate their effect. 
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Overview of the present research 
The current research starts from the premise that elite rhetoric can have an 
impact on not only individuals’ understanding of the norms of the religious 
groups with which they identify, but also on the types of values that define the 
group and the issues that are relevant to it. While previous research has 
consistently found a strong connection between religiosity and political 
conservatism, particularly on cultural issues such as abortion and gay marriage, 
we explore how the way religious identity is defined can influence the connection 
between religious identification, religious norms and attitudes towards various 
political issues.  
Based on findings (e.g. Malka et al, 2012) indicating that the connection 
between religiosity and conservative attitudes is largely limited to cultural issues, 
as well as the notion that the dominant rhetoric about the connection largely 
relates to cultural issues, we would expect that higher levels of Christian 
identification will be associated with more conservative attitudes on these issues, 
but not civic issues. While most previous studies have been conducted in the US 
context, we expect similar findings among both Australian (Study 1) and UK 
(Study 2) sample, given the degree of cultural similarity across the three contexts.  
Furthermore, drawing on the social identity approach to religious identification 
and social influence, we predict that highlighting the relevance of either cultural 
or civic issues to religious identity (Study 1), or defining religious identity in 
terms of either family values or social justice (Study 2) will affect the extent to 
which religious group norms predict participants’ attitudes towards cultural and 
civic issues. More specifically, we expect that highlighting the relevance of 
cultural issues or family values to one’s religion will strengthen the relationship 
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between religious norms and attitudes towards cultural issues. On the other hand, 
we expect that highlighting the relevance of civic issues or social justice to 
religious identity will strengthen the relationship between group norms and 
attitudes towards civic issues. In both cases, we expect these effects to be 
particularly evident at higher levels of religious group identification.  
 
Study 1 
Participants and Design 
Participants were 98 self-identified Christians who were recruited for an 
online survey. Posters promoting the survey were displayed around the campus of 
the Australian National University, and were disseminated via Facebook. First-
year psychology students were offered course credit for their participation in the 
study. Christian participants were identified on the basis of a range of 
demographic questions and were not aware of the centrality of this identity to the 
study. The sample consisted of 75 females and 23 males, with a mean age of 
28.78 years (SD = 13.80). The design included four between-subjects conditions 
based on whether participants were exposed to a message suggesting that they 
may consider their religious faith to be relevant to particular types of issues: 
cultural issues, civic issues, both cultural and civic issues, or a no-issue control. 
Procedure  
Participants were supplied with the web address for the survey web page, 
which directed them randomly to one of four versions of an online survey hosted 
on an Australian National University web page. The four versions were identical 
in all respects except for the title and introductory paragraph that contained the 
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experimental manipulation on the page preceding the criterion questions (see 
below). The manipulation was intended to frame the relationship between religion 
and political issues. In the control condition, the section was titled “What 
influences your attitudes?”. In the cultural issues condition it was titled “How 
does religion influence your attitudes about issues like abortion, euthanasia and 
gay marriage?”, in the civic issues condition it was titled “How does religion 
influence your attitudes about issues like welfare, asylum seekers and climate 
change?”, and in the cultural and civic issues condition it was titled “How does 
religion influence your attitudes?”. This framing was also reflected in the 
introductory paragraph participants read before completing the remaining survey 
items: 
In the remainder of the survey, we are interested in learning about your 
attitudes toward a range of social and political issues, as well as the 
factors that influence your attitudes. [All conditions] 
For those who are religious, you may find that your attitudes towards 
some issues are heavily influenced by your religious faith, while for 
others your faith might be completely irrelevant. [All conditions 
except Control] 
For example, many Christians consider their religious faith to be 
particularly relevant when it comes to issues involving abortion, 
euthanasia and gay marriage / asylum seekers, welfare recipients, 
and the environment. [Note, in the cultural and civic condition, all 
of these issues were listed]  
After reading the introductory message, participants then completed items 
measuring their attitudes towards a range of social and political issues, their level 
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of identification with Christians and their perceptions of Christian norms 
regarding various social and political issues. Participants then completed 
demographic items about their sex and age. Unless otherwise indicated, 
participants responded to items on a seven-point Likert scale ranging from 
Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree, with a Neutral mid-point. 
Measures 
 Political attitudes were measured via 24 items. Four items were devised to 
assess attitudes towards each of six political issues covering both cultural issues – 
abortion, euthanasia and gay marriage – and civic issues – welfare, asylum 
seekers and climate change (all items are included in Appendix A). Scale scores 
were calculated as the mean of the four item scores (allowing for reverse-scored 
items), with higher scores reflecting more politically conservative attitudes. 
  Christian identification was assessed via five items derived from Leach et 
al (2008). Items assessed solidarity with other members of the group, satisfaction 
with being a member of the group, the centrality of membership to one’s self-
concept, degree of self-stereotyping with the group, and perceived in-group 
homogeneity. Scale scores were computed as the mean of the five items with 
higher scores indicating greater identification with Christians (α = .89).  
 Six items were devised to assess perceived Christian norms for the six 
political issues (one item for each issue – see Appendix A). Items asked 
participants whether they thought most Christians would support or oppose 
particular policy positions (e.g. “Greater restrictions placed on abortions”, and “A 
more compassionate approach to accepting asylum seekers”), with higher scores 
indicating greater perceived support for conservative positions. 
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Results 
Data analysis overview 
Table 1 displays the descriptive statistics for each of the scales in the 
study, along with the alpha reliability coefficients for each. Reliabilities were 
satisfactory for most scales with the exception of that measuring attitudes towards 
abortion, which was somewhat lower than others (α = .55). After item analysis we 
removed the item with the poorest connection to the scale (“There would be a lot 
fewer neglected children if abortions were more readily available”). This 
improved the reliability considerably (α = .75).  
The mean level of Christian identification was significantly above the 
scale mid-point, though it was still within the moderate range of identification. 
The mean level of attitudes towards cultural issues was significantly below the 
scale mid-point, that is, towards the more progressive end of the scale. Attitudes 
towards climate change were also towards the progressive end of the scale, while 
attitudes towards welfare were marginally towards the conservative end of the 
scale. Attitudes towards asylum seekers were not significantly different to the 
scale mid-point. As expected, participants perceived Christian norms towards 
cultural issues to be relatively conservative, and norms towards civic issues were 
perceived to be relatively progressive. ANOVAs indicated that there were no 
significant differences in Christian identification, attitudes towards the individual 
issues, or perceived norms for those issues across frame conditions.  
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Table 1. D
escriptive data for m
easures (m
eans, standard deviations, bivariate correlations and reliabilities) – Study 1 
 
 
M
 
S
D
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
1. C
hristian identification 
4.29 
1.35 
(0.89) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. A
bortion (3 - item
) 
2.81 
1.40 
.34** 
(0.75) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. E
uthanasia 
2.79 
1.09 
.34** 
.67** 
(0.83) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. S
am
e-sex m
arriage 
2.33 
1.45 
.36** 
.58** 
.59** 
(0.92) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5. W
elfare 
4.22 
1.11 
.02 
-.12 
-.16 
.14 
(0.73) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6. C
lim
ate change 
2.79 
0.87 
.03 
-.02 
-.01 
.28** 
.50** 
(0.73) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7. A
sylum
 seekers 
3.92 
1.31 
.06 
.18 
.22* 
.32** 
.29** 
.31** 
(0.77) 
 
 
 
 
 
8. A
bortion norm
 
5.30 
1.50 
.08 
.27** 
.01 
.10 
.22* 
.16 
.20 
 
 
 
 
 
9. E
uthanasia norm
 
5.38 
1.53 
-.29** 
-.18 
-.17 
-.17 
-.01 
.02 
.01 
.13 
 
 
 
 
10. S
am
e-sex m
arriage norm
 
5.69 
1.45 
-.18 
-.06 
-.07 
.12 
.06 
.18 
.12 
.27** 
.58** 
 
 
 
11. W
elfare norm
 
2.77 
1.20 
-.08 
-.03 
.11 
.12 
.12 
.18 
.00 
-.21* 
.07 
.04 
 
 
12. C
lim
ate change norm
 
3.59 
1.13 
-.10 
-.12 
-.07 
-.06 
.16 
.04 
.21* 
.00 
.06 
.12 
.20 
 
13. A
sylum
 seekers norm
 
2.91 
1.11 
-.16 
-.01 
.16 
.03 
-.10 
.06 
-.01 
-.15 
.12 
.01 
.48** 
.19 
N
ote: The alpha reliabilities for scale scores are in the diagonal. N
orm
s w
ere each m
easured by a single item
. 
*p< .05; **p< .01. 
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The impact of Christian identification and norms 
Table 2 displays the results of a moderated multiple regression analysis of 
the effects of Christian identification, perceived Christian norms and frame 
condition along with their respective interactions on attitudes to each of the six 
issues under consideration. The comparisons between frame conditions were 
effect coded via three variables: 1 (cultural frame) vs. –1 (control); 1 (civic frame) 
vs. –1 (control); and 1 (cultural and civic frame) vs. –1 (control). In all cases 
centred scores were used to calculate the interaction terms to ensure that 
multicolinearity between the main effects and interaction terms did not distort the 
results (Aiken & West, 1991; Cohen, Cohen, West & Aiken, 2003).  
As expected, there was a significant positive relationship between 
Christian identification and attitudes towards each of the cultural issues, with 
higher levels of Christian identification associated with more conservative 
attitudes on the issues of abortion, euthanasia and same-sex marriage. Also as 
anticipated, the relationship between Christian identification and attitudes did not 
extend to civic issues. Indeed, there was no relationship between Christian 
identification and attitudes to welfare, climate change or asylum seekers. 
There were several moderation effects for perceived Christian norms with 
some variations across cultural and civic issues. Regarding attitudes towards 
abortion, for example, we found the standard group-based social influence pattern 
with a positive relationship between Christian norms and attitudes only at higher 
levels of identification. We found a similar, though weaker, pattern for attitudes 
towards asylum seekers. For attitudes towards euthanasia, however, there was a 
negative relationship with Christian norms at low levels of Christian 
identification. There was no relationship between norms and attitudes towards 
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either same-sex marriage or welfare regardless of the level of Christian 
identification. There was a marginally positive relationship between norms and 
attitudes towards climate change, although this was not moderated by level of 
Christian identification. We did, however, find that the extent to which Christian 
norms predicted attitudes towards climate change was moderated by frame 
condition, as will be discussed below. 
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Table 2. B
 w
eights from
 hierarchical regression m
odels predicting attitudes for each of the six issues - Study 1 
  
Abortion 
Euthanasia 
Sam
e-sex 
M
arriage 
W
elfare 
C
lim
ate 
C
hange 
Asylum
 
seekers 
C
hristian identification 
.34** 
.23** 
.39*** 
.02 
.06 
.04 
C
hristian norm
s 
.27** 
-.11 
.13 
.12 
.15
† 
.11 
N
orm
s x ID
 
.14* 
.16** 
.15
† 
.06 
.06 
.19
† 
M
oral fram
e 
.13 
.10 
.16 
-.26 
.10 
-.11 
C
ivic fram
e 
.04 
-.01 
.35 
.50* 
-.02 
.43 
M
oral & C
ivic fram
e 
.01 
-.15 
.50 
.27 
.26 
.80 
M
oral fram
e x ID
 
.38 
.00 
-.07 
.18 
.03 
-.07 
C
ivic fram
e x ID
 
-.22 
-.08 
-.01 
-.07 
.08 
.06 
M
oral & C
ivic fram
e x ID
 
.03 
-.14 
-.18 
.03 
.05 
.05 
M
oral fram
e x N
orm
s 
-.25 
-.18 
.02 
.07 
.10 
-.32 
C
ivic fram
e x N
orm
s 
.05 
.20 
-.16 
-.25 
.45* 
-.13 
M
oral & C
ivic fram
e x N
orm
s 
-.21 
.24 
.11 
-39 
.71
† 
-.65 
M
oral fram
e x N
orm
s x ID
 
-.13 
-.16 
-.05 
-16 
.02 
-.20 
C
ivic fram
e x N
orm
s x ID
 
.08 
.16 
.14 
.32 
-.20 
.20 
M
oral & C
ivic fram
e x N
orm
s x ID
 
-.22 
.07 
-.05 
.33 
-.05 
.23 
N
ote: Statistics reported for the step w
hen variables are first entered into the m
odel. 
* p < .05; ** p < .01, *** p < .001; † p < .08 
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The impact of frame condition 
The results indicate that the frame manipulations had little impact on the 
relationship between either Christian identification or perceived Christian norms 
and attitudes towards political issues.1 There was, however, one exception, with 
the combined Moral & Civic frame influencing the relationship between 
perceived Christian norms and attitudes towards climate change. As shown in 
Figure 1, in the Control condition, there was no relationship between perceived 
Christian norms regarding climate change on participants’ attitudes towards the 
issue (B = .05, SE = .13, p = .683, β = .08). Among those exposed to the Moral & 
Civic frame, however, there was a marginally significant relationship between 
Christian norms and attitudes towards climate change (B = .60, SE = .25, p = 
.024, β = .52), such that those who perceived Christians to be more concerned 
about the issue were more likely to be concerned themselves. 
As shown in Table 1, the interaction of Civic frame and perceived 
Christian norms on attitudes towards climate change was also significant, (B = 
.45, SE = .19, p = .02, β = .43). In spite of this, however, the relationship between 
perceived Christian norms and attitudes towards climate change was not 
significant in the Civic frame condition (B = .35, SE = .24, p = .16, β = .37).2  
 
 
 
 
                                                 1 After controlling for the effect of Christian identification and norms on attitudes 
towards welfare, there was a significant positive main effect of the Civic frame. 
Participants in the Civic frame condition reported more conservative attitudes towards 
welfare than those in the Control condition. 
 2 Although the effect of the Moral & Civic frame x Norm interaction was stronger (B = 
.71) than the Civic frame x Norm interaction (B = .45) the former failed to reach 
conventional significance because of a high standard error (.38, twice that of the error for 
the Civic x Norm effects).   
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Figure 1. Interaction of frame condition and Christian norms on attitudes towards 
Climate change.  
 
Study 1 Discussion 
The results of Study 1 are consistent with the findings of previous studies 
that there is a connection between religiosity and political attitudes.3 As predicted, 
the results showed that those who reported higher levels of Christian 
identification were more likely to hold conservative attitudes towards cultural 
issues such as abortion, euthanasia and gay marriage. The findings also support 
the prediction that this connection would not extend to civic issues such as 
welfare, asylum seekers, and climate change. The importance of such context was 
also supported by the fact that there was a positive relationship between Christian 
norms and attitudes towards climate change only among those participants who 
were exposed to a message highlighting the relevance of Christianity to issues 
                                                 3 The level of identification with one’s religious group is a different measure of 
religiosity to those used in other research, such as the frequency of religious attendance 
(e.g. Malka et al., 2012), however results indicate that identification is strongly correlated 
with religious attendance (r = .49, p < .001). 
1
2
3
4
Relatively progressive Relatively conservativeConse
rv
at
iv
e 
at
ti
tu
de
s 
to
w
ar
ds
 c
lim
at
e 
ch
an
ge
 
Christian norms 
 Control Moral frame Civic frame  Moral & Civic frame
  71 
including climate change. However, this was the only instance where the frame 
manipulation appeared to have an impact. The absence of any impact of messages 
highlighting the relevance of cultural issues to the Christian faith may have been 
because participants are regularly exposed to similar messages outside the lab. 
However, the fact that the frame manipulations had no effect on the relationship 
between Christian norms and attitudes towards welfare or asylum seekers 
suggests that a more elaborate type of message may be required to readily alter 
the way people understand the relationship between their faith and political 
issues. 
Study 2 
In Study 2 we examine the impact of messages designed to influence the 
types of core values that people associate with their faith and their religious 
groups. We predict that reference to underlying values, rather than to explicit 
issues, may have a more pronounced effect on the way participants understand 
their religious identity, and its relevance to different types of political issues. 
Specifically, we predict that defining Christian identity in terms of family values 
will increase the relationship between religious norms and attitudes towards 
cultural issues. Similarly, we expect that defining Christian identity in terms of 
social justice and sustainability will increase the relationship between religious 
norms and attitudes towards civic issues, particularly among high identifiers. 
Participants and Design 
Participants were 97 self-identified Christians who were recruited for an 
online survey. Participants received credits for completing the survey, which 
could be exchanged for consumer products. Participants were recruited via an 
online panel of United Kingdom residents. As with Study 1, Christian participants 
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were identified on the basis of a range of demographic questions and were not 
aware of the centrality of this identity to the study. The sample consisted of 53 
females and 44 males, with a mean age of 49.32 years (SD = 13.16). The design 
included three between-subjects conditions based on whether participants were 
exposed to a message suggesting the types of values that many Christians see as 
defining their religious faith: family values, social justice and sustainability, or a 
control condition. 
Procedure  
Participants were randomly allocated to complete one of three versions of 
the questionnaire. The three versions were identical in all respects except for the 
title and introductory paragraph that contained the experimental manipulation (see 
below). The manipulations were intended to influence the types of values that 
define the Christian identity, particularly as it relates to social and political issues. 
In the control condition, the section was titled “What influences your attitudes?”, 
in the remaining two conditions it was titled “How does religion influence your 
attitudes”. This framing was also reflected in the introductory paragraph 
participants read before completing the remaining survey items: 
In the remainder of the survey, we are interested in learning about your 
attitudes toward a range of social and political issues, as well as the 
factors that influence your attitudes. [Control condition] 
In the remainder of the survey, we are interested in learning about your 
attitudes towards a range of issues. We are also interested in whether, 
and to what extent, religious beliefs influence your attitudes. For those 
who identify with a religious group, you may find that your attitudes 
towards some issues are heavily influenced by your religious faith, 
  73 
while for others issues your faith might be completely irrelevant. [both 
Family values and Social justice conditions]. 
For example, many in the Christian community would say that a 
commitment to family values is partly inspired by their religious faith, 
and in particular, by the moral principles outlined in the Bible. For 
many, their faith involves recognizing the family as the fundamental 
unit of society and a sanctuary for the creation and nurturing of 
children. [Family values condition only]. 
For example, many in the Christian community would say that a desire to protect 
the vulnerable and assist the disadvantaged is partly inspired by their faith, and in 
particular, by biblical stories like that of the Good Samaritan. For many, their 
faith involves a commitment to a more equitable, peaceful and sustainable way of 
living. [Social justice condition only]. 
 
After reading the introductory message, participants then completed items 
measuring their attitudes towards a range of social and political issues, their level 
of identification with Christians and their perceptions of Christian norms 
regarding various social and political issues. Participants then completed 
demographic items about their sex and age. Unless otherwise indicated, 
participants responded to items on a seven-point Likert scale ranging from 
Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree, with a Neutral mid-point. 
Measures 
 The identification, norms and outcome attitude measures used in Study 2 
were the same as used in Study 1, but for two items that were adapted for the 
different sample by replacing “Australia” with “Britain”. 
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Results and discussion 
Data analysis overview 
Table 3 displays the descriptive statistics for each of the scales in the 
study, along with the alpha reliability coefficients for each. Reliabilities for all 
scales were satisfactory. As the reliability of the 4-item abortion scale was within 
the satisfactory range, the full scale was used for all subsequent analyses. 
The level of Christian identification was significantly above the scale mid-
point, though it was still within the moderate level of identification. Participants’ 
attitudes towards abortion, euthanasia and asylum seekers and same-sex marriage 
were significantly below the scale mid-point, that is, towards the more 
progressive end of the scale (albeit only marginally so in the case of same-sex 
marriage). Attitudes towards climate change and welfare were towards the more 
conservative end of the scale. There were some significant differences in 
participants’ attitudes across the two studies. Participants in Study 2 tended to 
hold more conservative attitudes on same-sex marriage and climate change, but 
more progressive attitudes on asylum seekers. This may reflect differences in the 
demographic profile of the two samples, as well as slightly different political 
contexts of the United Kingdom compared with Australia. Indeed, to the extent 
that the specific political context within a nation, society or group influences the 
social meaning of an issue, we would expect any differences to be reflected in 
group norms. 
As with study 1, participants tended to perceive Christian norms to be 
towards the conservative end on cultural issues, but more progressive on civic 
issues. ANOVAs indicated that there were no significant differences in Christian 
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identification, attitudes towards the individual issues, or perceived norms for the 
individuals across frame conditions.  
  
76 
Table 3. D
escriptive data for m
easures (m
eans, standard deviations, bivariate correlations and reliabilities) – Study 2 
   
M
 
S
D
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
1. C
hristian identification 
4.75 
1.35 
(.92) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. A
bortion 
3.45 
1.24 
.35** 
(.68) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. E
uthanasia 
2.72 
1.23 
.35** 
.37** 
(.80) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. S
am
e-sex m
arriage 
3.70 
1.54 
.32** 
.32** 
.32** 
(.87) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5. W
elfare 
4.65 
1.23 
.01 
-.05 
-.20 
.06 
(.73) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6. C
lim
ate change 
5.15 
1.31 
.03 
-.01 
.04 
.18 
.25* 
(.62) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7. A
sylum
 seekers 
2.87 
0.95 
-.09 
-.15 
-.29** 
.20 
.39** 
.25* 
(.72) 
 
 
 
 
 
8. A
bortion norm
 
4.71 
1.73 
.05 
.35** 
-.05 
-.07 
-.06 
-.04 
-.09 
 
 
 
 
 
9. E
uthanasia norm
 
4.12 
1.92 
-.19 
.09 
.02 
-.15 
.04 
.00 
.16 
.35** 
 
 
 
 
10. S
am
e-sex m
arriage norm
 
5.33 
1.62 
.15 
.16 
-.02 
.32** 
.07 
.03 
.06 
.26* 
.38** 
 
 
 
11. W
elfare norm
 
2.91 
1.52 
-.27** 
-.07 
-.05 
.09 
.41** 
.26* 
.28** 
-.21* 
.02 
.05 
 
 
12. C
lim
ate change norm
 
3.34 
1.42 
-.11 
.05 
-.19 
.13 
.15 
.57** 
.27** 
.09 
.07 
.11 
.33** 
 
13. A
sylum
 seekers norm
 
3.75 
1.80 
-.05 
-.27** 
-.16 
.21* 
.24* 
.41** 
.48** 
-.22* 
-.16 
.03 
.36** 
.37** 
N
ote: The alpha reliabilities for scale scores are in the diagonal. N
orm
s w
ere each m
easured by a single item
. 
*p< .05; **p< .01. 
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The impact of Christian identification and norms 
Table 4 displays the results of a moderated multiple regression analysis of 
the effects of Christian identification, perceived Christian norms and the frame 
condition along with their respective interactions on attitudes to each of the six 
issues under consideration. The comparisons between frame conditions were 
effect coded via two variables: 1 (family values frame) vs. –1 (control); and 1 
(social justice frame) vs. –1 (control). In all cases centred scores were used to 
calculate the interaction terms to ensure that multicolinearity between the main 
effects and interaction terms did not distort the results (Aiken & West, 1991; 
Cohen, Cohen, West & Aiken, 2003). 
In line with the results from Study 1, there was a significant positive 
relationship between religious norms and attitudes towards Christian 
identification and attitudes towards each of the cultural issues with higher levels 
of Christian identification associated with more conservative attitudes towards 
abortion, euthanasia and same-sex marriage. Also consistent with Study 1, the 
relationship between Christian identification and attitudes did not extend to civic 
issues, with no relationship between Christian identification and attitudes to 
welfare, climate change or asylum seekers. 
Unlike Study 1, however, the relationship between Christian norms and 
attitudes was fairly consistent across the range of issues. As shown in Table 4, 
there was a strong main effect of perceived norms for all issues except euthanasia. 
Furthermore, in most cases this effect was moderated by level of Christian 
identification. Indeed, the relationship between norms and attitudes was stronger 
at high levels of identification for attitudes towards abortion, same-sex marriage, 
climate change and asylum seekers. In many cases, however, these relationships 
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were further moderated by frame condition. While there was no main effect of 
Christian norms on attitudes towards euthanasia, nor a two-way interaction with 
Christian identification, the relationship between these factors and attitudes 
towards euthanasia was moderated by frame condition. 
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Table 4. B
 w
eights from
 hierarchical regression m
odels predicting attitudes for each of the six issues - Study 2 
   
Abortion 
Euthanasia 
Sam
e-sex 
M
arriage 
W
elfare 
C
lim
ate 
C
hange 
Asylum
 
seekers 
C
hristian identification 
.31*** 
.33*** 
.28** 
.11 
.04 
-.10 
C
hristian norm
s 
.25*** 
.06 
.25** 
.37*** 
.34*** 
.32*** 
N
orm
s x ID
 
.12** 
.00 
.14
† 
-.05 
.08* 
.10* 
Fam
ily values fram
e 
.02 
-.14 
.00 
-.08 
-.07 
-.16 
Social justice fram
e 
-.04 
.16 
-.10 
.00 
.06 
.01 
Fam
ily values fram
e x ID
 
.16 
-.06 
-.03 
.24 
.06 
.17 
Social justice fram
e x ID
 
-.15 
.11 
.06 
-.19 
.03 
-.11 
Fam
ily values fram
e x N
orm
 
.20* 
.10 
.15 
.06 
.14 
-.02 
Social justice fram
e x N
orm
 
-.23** 
-.04 
-.06 
-.09 
-.19* 
.09 
Fam
ily values fram
e x N
orm
 x ID
 
.14** 
.16* 
-.11 
.15
† 
-.05 
-.07 
Social justice fram
e x N
orm
 x ID
 
-.06 
-.15* 
.05 
-.03 
.10
† 
.03 
N
ote: Statistics reported for the step w
hen variables are first entered into the m
odel. 
* p < .05; ** p < .01, *** p < .001; †  p < .08 
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Impact of the family values frame 
The results indicate that the family values frame had an impact on how the 
interaction of identification and norms predicted attitudes on a number of issues. 
As shown in Figure 2, there was a significant relationship between Christian 
norms and attitudes towards abortion among high identifiers in the control 
condition (B = .38, SE = .10, p = .004, β = .58), but this relationship was even 
stronger among those exposed to the family values frame (B = .90, SE = .16, p < 
.001, β = .96).  
 
 
 
Figure 2. Interaction of frame condition and Christian norms on attitudes towards 
abortion – High identifiers. 
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Figure 3. Interaction of frame condition and Christian norms on attitudes towards 
abortion – Low identifiers. 
 
There was also a significant relationship between Christian norms and 
attitudes towards abortion among low identifiers in the Control condition (B = 
.33, SE = .13, p = .018, β = .51), but this was not evident among those exposed to 
the family values frame (B = .04, SE = .14, p = .72, β = .05), (Figure 3). The 
family values frame also appeared to produced a significant relationship between 
Christian norms and attitudes towards euthanasia among high identifiers (B = .40, 
SE = .15, p = .011, β = .61), one that was not evident among high identifiers in the 
Control condition (B = -.04, SE = .13, p = .761, β = -.07), (Figure 4). In this case, 
however, exposure to the family values frame had no impact on the relationship 
between Christian norms and the attitudes of low identifiers (Figure 5). 
These results are consistent with the notion that the family values frame 
worked to establish or enhance the perceived relevance of cultural issues like 
abortion and euthanasia to the Christian identity. As predicted, this either created 
or accentuated the relationship between Christian norms and attitudes towards 
these issues among high identifiers. A reciprocal process was also apparent 
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among low identifiers. By emphasising the relevance of Christian identity to the 
issue of abortion, it appears that the family values frame undermined the 
influence of Christian norms on the attitudes of low identifiers. 
 
Figure 4. Interaction of frame condition and Christian norms on attitudes towards 
euthanasia – High identifiers. 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Interaction of frame condition and Christian norms on attitudes towards 
euthanasia – Low identifiers. 
 
1
2
3
4
Relatively progressive Relatively conservativeConser
va
ti
ve
 a
tt
it
ud
es
 to
w
ar
ds
 E
ut
ha
na
si
a 
Christian norms 
High identifiers Control Family values
1
2
3
4
Relatively progressive Relatively conservativeConser
va
ti
ve
tt
it
ud
es
 to
w
ar
ds
 E
ut
ha
na
si
a 
Christian norms 
Low identifiers Control Family values
  83 
Unexpectedly, the family values frame also saw high identifiers report 
attitudes towards welfare that were in line with Christian norms (B = .68, SE = 
.32, p = .044, β = .65), a relationship that was not evident among high identifiers 
in the control condition (B = .15, SE = .16, p = .370, β = .18). The family values 
frame also appeared to eliminate the relationship between Christian norms and 
attitudes towards welfare among low identifiers (B = .36, SE = .24, p = .137, β = 
.35), that was apparent in the control condition (B = .87, SE = .27, p = .003, β = 
1.02), (Figures 6 and 7). We categorised the welfare issue among the civic group 
of issues and that categorisation is largely supported by the general patterns of 
correlations in both studies.  However, welfare can be construed as having a 
direct impact on the family life of some in a more tangible way than climate 
change or immigration, and therefore the family values frame may have changed 
the meaning participants attached to the issue. That is, the family values frame 
seemed to influence not only the way participants understood the relevance of the 
issue to their faith, but also the way they understood the issue itself. 
 
  
  84 
 
Figure 6. Interaction of frame condition and Christian norms on attitudes towards 
welfare – High identifiers. 
 
 
Figure 7. Interaction of frame condition and Christian norms on attitudes towards 
welfare – Low identifiers. 
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Impact of the Social justice frame 
The social justice frame also appeared to have an impact on the 
relationship between perceived Christian norms and attitudes towards political 
issues.4 As shown in Figure 8, there was a significant relationship between 
Christian norms and attitudes towards abortion in the Control condition (B = .35, 
SE = .09, p = .001, β = .55), but not among those exposed to the Social justice 
frame (B = .05, SE = .10, p = .607, β = .09). Effectively, it seems that by defining 
the Christian identity beyond the traditional focus on sexual and reproductive 
morality, the social justice frame eliminated the relationship between Christian 
norms and attitudes towards abortion. Unlike other effects, this was not 
moderated by the level of Christian identification.  
  
                                                 
4 In addition to the effects reported, the results also show a significant interaction of 
Christian identification, perceived norms and the social justice frame for attitudes 
towards Euthanasia. However, the effect of norms was not significant among high or low 
identifiers in either the Control condition or the Social justice condition. 
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Figure 8. Interaction of frame condition and Christian norms on attitudes towards 
abortion. 
 
Exposure to the social justice frame also influenced attitudes towards 
climate change. In the control condition, there was a significant relationship 
between Christian norms and attitudes towards climate change among both low 
identifiers (B = .39, SE = .15, p = .013, β = .65) and high identifiers (B = .47, SE = 
.08, p < .001, β = .79), such that those who perceived Christian norms to favour 
addressing climate change were themselves more likely to report such attitudes. 
However, this relationship was not apparent among low identifiers in the social 
justice frame condition (B = -.19, SE = .19, p = .332, β = -.29) (Figure 9). The fact 
that the social justice frame eliminated the relationship between norms and 
attitudes among low identifiers, but not high identifiers is consistent with the 
notion that the Social justice frame established the relevance of climate change to 
the Christian identity. Rather than endorse Christian norms regarding climate 
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change in this situation, it seems that low identifiers instead tended to disregard 
them. 
 
 
  
Figure 9. Interaction of frame condition and Christian norms on attitudes towards 
climate change – Low identifiers. 
 
 
 
 
General discussion 
The current studies were designed to investigate the connection between 
religion and political attitudes, and whether the way religious identity is framed 
can influence the connection between religious identification, religious norms and 
attitudes towards various political issues. More specifically, we wanted to 
examine whether highlighting the relevance of either cultural or civic issues to 
religious identity would increase the extent to which religious group norms 
influence attitudes towards those types of issues, particularly among those who 
were highly identified with the religious group. Across two studies, self-identified 
Christian participants were randomly assigned to conditions in which the 
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relevance of cultural and/or civic issues to their Christian identity was highlighted 
(Study 1) or where their Christian identity was defined in terms of family values 
or a commitment to social justice (Study 2). Both studies also included a control 
condition in order to gauge the underlying meaning participants attach to the 
group and the issues; meanings presumably informed by frames encountered in 
public discourse.  
Many of the findings of the two studies offer considerable support for the 
main predictions. Across both studies, we found that Christian identification was 
strongly associated with conservative attitudes towards cultural issues, but not 
civic issues. We also found, as predicted, that highlighting the relevance of civic 
issues to Christian identity saw Christian norms predicting attitudes towards 
climate change (Study 1), while defining Christian identity in terms of family 
values was associated with an increased influence of Christian norms on attitudes 
towards euthanasia and abortion (Study 2). These findings support the notion that 
elite religious rhetoric that emphasises conservative positions on cultural issues is 
at least partly responsible for the common finding of a connection between 
religiosity and political conservatism. However, the results also suggest that such 
rhetoric works to define what issues are relevant to the religious identity such that 
group members should be guided by the religious group norms. By implication, 
this rhetoric defines other issues as not relevant to the group, such that group 
members need not feel compelled to look to or be bound by group norms. As 
such, evidence that highlighting the relevance of civic issues led to normative 
influence on attitudes towards climate change indicates that, given a supportive 
context, the relevance of religion can extend beyond the realm of cultural issues. 
While these findings were in line with the predictions, there were a number of 
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other findings that, while not explicitly predicted, are nonetheless explicable in 
terms of the same group-based social influence processes.   
In Study 2, for example, we found normative influence on attitudes 
towards abortion among participants in the control condition. That is, the more 
conservative participants perceived Christians norms towards abortion, the more 
conservative their own attitudes. However, the significant relationship between 
group norms and attitudes was not apparent among those exposed to the message 
highlighting the relevance of social justice values to their Christian identity. This 
suggests that defining the identity on the basis of social justice values did not so 
much expand participants’ understanding of the identity and the issues relevant to 
it, but shifted it away from an understanding that was relevant to abortion. While 
this is explicable in terms of social identity processes, it was not a specific effect 
we had predicted prior to the study. 
Based on previous research, we confined our predictions about normative 
influence and the impact of messages about the religious identity to those who 
were highly identified with the group. However, in a number of cases we found 
that these framing messages appeared to undermine normative influence among 
low identifiers. In Study 2, exposure to the family values frame saw normative 
influence eliminated on attitudes towards abortion among low identifiers, while 
the social justice frame negated normative influence on attitudes towards climate 
change. That is, while there was a degree of normative influence among low 
identifiers in the control condition, they responded to messages highlighting the 
relevance of particular issues to religious identity by effectively disregarding the 
group norm on that issue. Again, though these effects were not explicitly included 
among our hypotheses, they are in line with the theory of group-based social 
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influence. Although we would largely expect normative influence to be most 
evident among high identifiers, it is certainly plausible that there would be 
contrasting effects among low identifiers.  
A further notable result concerns attitudes towards welfare. Based on our 
own conceptions of welfare as a matter of social justice, we expected that defining 
the Christian identity in terms of these values would increase the relationship 
between group norms and attitudes among high identifiers. However, it was the 
family values message that appeared to have this effect, along with eliminating 
the normative influence among low identifiers, suggesting that framing Christian 
identity in terms of family values led participants to regard the issue of welfare as 
relevant to their Christian identity. This points to the plurality not only in how 
group identity can be understood, but also in how the issues themselves can be 
understood (Cohen, 2003; Malka & Lelkes, 2010). Perhaps the family values 
frame, and particularly the reference to the nurturing of children, led participants 
to consider welfare in light of their own family circumstances, or in terms of the 
caring, prosocial norms associated with the Christian identity (see Malka, Soto, 
Cohen & Miller, 2011).  
The pattern of results across the two studies suggests that messages about 
the underlying values associated with the Christian identity were more effective 
in establishing an alignment between recipients’ understanding of the content of 
the identity and the social meaning of the issue than the more simple and direct 
message about the types of issues relevant to the identity. However, it should also 
be noted that there was considerable variability in the effects of the family values 
and social justice frames across various issues. As outlined above, they had 
significant effects in some cases, but little effect in others. While this pattern of 
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results does not provide consistent support for the theoretical approach examined 
in these studies, a certain amount of variation in the effect of frames is to be 
expected given the dynamic nature of the meanings ascribed to issue and groups, 
particularly in the context of critical and engaged message recipients. To the 
extent that the predicted effects were evident in some but not all cases, this 
suggests that participants did not simply accept the implicit message of the frames 
(i.e. the issues that were relevant to the group Christians) in a mindless or 
heuristic fashion, but instead they actively interpreted the frames, accepting those 
they found convincing, and dismissing those they did not. This may reflect a 
degree of rigidity in participants’ understanding of the nature of some issues, or 
the group content, or perhaps simply the inadequacy of the frame in establishing 
an alignment between the two. It is possible that a more elaborate message that 
more closely replicates the type of frames encountered in public debate would 
prove more effective. 
Theoretical implications 
 The present research contributes to our understanding of the connection 
between religion and political attitudes at several levels. By demonstrating the 
general association between religiosity and political conservatism in both 
Australia and the UK, and among both a student and a general sample, these 
results attest to the generalisability of this association beyond the US (where the 
bulk of the research has been conducted). While this may offer a degree of 
support to the argument that the connection between religiosity and conservative 
political attitudes is indeed organic (e.g. Graham, et al, 2009; Jost et al, 2008), the 
findings are also consistent with previous research (e.g. Malka et al, 2012; Guth et 
al, 2006; Jelen, 2009, Layman & Greene, 2005) in showing that the connection is 
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generally limited to cultural issues. Furthermore, the fact that the influence of 
religious group norms was to some extent dependent on the messages participants 
read about their religious identity adds weight to the notion that the connection 
between religion and conservatism is context dependent, and at least partly a 
product of elite discourse (Malka, et al, 2012).  
 By highlighting the relationship between religious group norms, in 
addition to (and in interaction with) religious identification, and political attitudes, 
these findings also add to the growing body of literature exploring religion from a 
social identity perspective (e.g. Herriot, 2007; Jackson & Hunsberger, 1999; 
Cairns et al, 2006; Verkuyten, 2007; Koteskey, Little & Matthews, 1991; 
Ysseldyk, Mattheson & Anisman, 2009). Indeed, we believe this research is the 
first to experimentally investigate the classic pattern of social-identity based 
normative influence for religion identities and political attitudes. Moreover, the 
results add to previous findings (Smith, et al, 2005; Mackie, et al, 1990; Wyer, 
2010) in demonstrating that group members, even those who are highly identified, 
will not be influenced by group norms on all issues; that the perceived relevance 
of the issue to the group identity is often an important moderating factor.  
 In demonstrating that messages about the nature of group identity can 
affect the extent to which group norms influence attitudes towards particular 
issues, these findings also contribute to the literature on the rhetorical construction 
of identity. We argue that this research is an effective experimental demonstration 
of the process of identity entrepreneurship that Reicher and colleagues have 
examined beyond the lab (Reicher & Hopkins, 1996a; Reicher & Hopkins, 1996b; 
Reicher & Hopkins, 2001; Kahani-Hopkins & Hopkins, 2002; Hopkins & Kahani-
Hopkins, 2004). These results extend this work by showing that influencing the 
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range of issues deemed relevant to a group identity is a potential strategy available 
to entrepreneurs of identity.  
 These findings also have considerable practical import for those who seek 
to shape public opinion, showing the potential efficacy of messages that define 
group identity in a way that establishes the relevance of the group to particular 
issues. However, the results also sound a note of caution that the effect of such 
messages can be more subtle and complex than one might expect. While a 
message may, for example, have the intended effect of generating normative 
influence among some, it may also undermine the effect of group norms among 
others. Similarly, it is difficult to predict how such messages will be interpreted; 
the meaning derived by those who receive the message, whether about the nature 
of the group or of the issue, may be different to the meaning intended.   
 These findings will also be heartening to those who have sought to expand 
the public discussion of religion’s relevance to politics beyond the narrow focus 
on cultural issues. While these findings may not herald the imminent emergence 
of a powerful ‘Religious Left’, they do suggest that there is scope to construct a 
religious identity that encompasses concerns about a broader range of issues 
including poverty, inequality, war and climate change. 
Limitations and opportunities for future research 
It is important to note that while this research sought to investigate the 
connection between religion and political attitudes, the samples included only 
those who self-identified as Christians, and the frame manipulations referred 
explicitly to this identity group. While there is no reason to suspect that the social 
influence processes explored are limited to Christians, future research should seek 
to replicate and extend these findings with a broad range of religious groups. 
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Indeed, to the extent that both norms and elite discourse vary across different 
religious denominations, replicating these results across other religious groups 
would lend greater confidence to the conclusions. 
 Another limitation of the present research was the nature of the 
experimental manipulations. While the findings suggest that the simple messages 
employed were sufficient, in some instances, to influence participants’ 
understanding of group identity and the issues relevant to it, these messages do 
not replicate the type of rich and sustained messages delivered by political and 
other elites. Some of the factors that were not part of the current research design, 
but are likely to augment the impact of framing include repeated exposure to a 
message, features of the message source, and deliberation with others.  
As such, these results likely underestimate the potential of elite discourse to 
influence how groups are defined and understood.  
The results discussed here are best understood as complementary to the 
more complex and nuanced analyses of elite rhetoric offered through discursive 
analyses of political speech. Future research could seek further convergence of 
these methods by having participants read or listen to more typical speeches or 
interviews, and over an extended period. Similarly, having participants discuss 
the meaning of group identity in small interactive groups could provide insights 
into the role that dynamic social reinforcement plays in shaping religious and 
political group identities (see Thomas, McGarty & Mavor, 2015; Thomas & 
McGarty, 2009; Thomas, McGarty & Mavor, 2009; Postmes, Haslam & Swaab, 
2005; Postmes, Spears, Lee & Novak, 2005).  
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Conclusion 
 The connection between religion and political attitudes and behaviour has 
been a source of fascination to social scientists since the earliest studies of voting 
behaviour (Lazarsfeld, Berelson & Gaudet, 1944). While this research replicates 
the common finding that religiosity is associated with political conservatism, it 
suggests that this is due as much to the social context as to a natural connection. 
Drawing on the social identity perspective, the present studies offer new insights 
into the processes through which people’s religious faith influences their political 
attitudes. They also suggest that though this influence has come to be largely 
manifested in conservative attitudes on cultural issues, this is likely a product of 
elite discourse and may be subject to change should the nature of elite discourse 
shift over time. 
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1. Interaction of frame condition and Christian norms on attitudes towards 
Climate change – Study 1. 
Figure 2. Interaction of frame condition and Christian norms on attitudes towards 
abortion (High identifiers) – Study 2. 
Figure 3. Interaction of frame condition and Christian norms on attitudes towards 
abortion (Low identifiers) – Study 2. 
Figure 4. Interaction of frame condition and Christian norms on attitudes towards 
euthanasia (High identifiers) – Study 2. 
Figure 5. Interaction of frame condition and Christian norms on attitudes towards 
euthanasia (Low identifiers) – Study 2. 
Figure 6. Interaction of frame condition and Christian norms on attitudes towards 
welfare (High identifiers) – Study 2. 
Figure 7. Interaction of frame condition and Christian norms on attitudes towards 
welfare (Low identifiers) – Study 2. 
Figure 8. Interaction of frame condition and Christian norms on attitudes towards 
abortion – Study 2. 
Figure 9. Interaction of frame condition and Christian norms on attitudes towards 
climate change (Low identifiers) – Study 2. 
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Appendix A 
Items measuring political attitudes 
 
Abortion 
x Abortion is a personal moral choice for a women, not a decision society 
should make on her behalf. * 
x Legalised abortion leads to a lower regard for the value of all human life. 
x There would be a lot fewer neglected children if abortions were more 
readily available. * 
x Abortion is never an option for a Christian person. 
 
Euthanasia 
x When palliative care fails to manage a terminally ill person’s pain, 
voluntary death should be an allowable option. * 
x Even if death is positively preferable to life in the judgement of a terminal 
patient, no action should be taken to induce the patient’s death. 
x If voluntary euthanasia became legal, it is just a short step to political or 
social euthanasia of the powerless in society. 
x To me, anyone who assists a suffering and terminally ill person to die is 
nothing but a common murderer. 
 
Same-sex marriage 
x It would be wrong for same-sex couples to be allowed to adopt children. 
x It is only fair that same-sex couples have all the same property and 
financial rights as heterosexual couples. * 
x Homosexual marriages should be recognised as legal in Australia. * 
x Granting equal status to same-sex relationships would be detrimental to 
society. 
 
Welfare 
x Limits should be placed on the amount of time people can claim 
unemployment benefits. 
x A generous welfare system is a sign of a healthy society. * 
x The welfare system often undermines self-reliance and creates a culture of 
dependence. 
x Welfare is the best way to help people get back on their feet. * 
 
Climate change 
x It is the responsibility of the current generation to preserve the natural 
environment for those that follow. * 
x We all need to be prepared to make sacrifices if we want to avoid 
environmental catastrophe. * 
x We need to take whatever steps necessary to reduce carbon dioxide 
emissions even if it involves economic costs. * 
x If we followed the advice of environmentalists, the economy would be 
ruined. 
 
Asylum seekers 
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x I don’t understand why [Australians/people] are so concerned about a few 
boat people. * 
x We should only accept refugees who come here through the proper 
channels. 
x As a peaceful, affluent country, we have an obligation to accept refugees 
fleeing persecution. * 
x The government should do more to prevent asylum seekers getting to 
[Australia/Britain]. 
 
 
Items measuring Perceived Christian norms towards political issues 
 
Please indicate the extent you think most Christians would oppose or support the 
following positions: 
 
 
x Greater restrictions placed on abortion * 
 
x Legalised euthanasia in certain circumstances * 
 
x Legalising same-sex marriage * 
 
x More funding for welfare programs * 
 
x Taking urgent action to address climate change * 
 
x A more compassionate approach to accepting asylum seekers * 
 
 
* Indicates reverse-scored items.  
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Chapter 6 – Context statement 
 
Title: Framing the climate change debate: The impact of issue frames on the 
normative influences on attitudes towards climate change 
Student contribution: Study design (in consultation with supervisor Mavor), 
implementation, data collection, data analysis, interpretation (in consultation with 
Mavor). Lead author on write-up. 
Publication outlet: Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 
Publication status: Preparing manuscript for submission. 
 
The studies outlined in Chapter 5 aimed to assess whether messages about 
the nature of group identity can influence the extent to which group norms predict 
attitudes towards different types of issues. More specifically, the research sought 
to examine whether highlighting the relevance of either cultural or civic issues to 
religious identity would increase the extent to which religious group norms 
influence attitudes towards those types of issues, particularly among those who 
were highly identified with their religious group. The results indicated that 
highlighting the relevance of these different types can indeed affect the extent to 
which group norms influence attitudes, particularly, though not always 
exclusively, among high identifiers. These types of messages were also shown to 
undermine normative influence among low identifiers in some cases.  
These findings support the notion that messages about the nature of group 
identity can, in some cases, influence the extent to which recipients see an 
alignment between the content of the group identity – the types of interests and 
values that it embodies – and the social meaning of the issue – the interests and 
  100
values that are implicated. That is, by influencing how recipients understand the 
nature of the group, framing an identity according to a particular issue can lead 
them to recognise the issue as relevant to the group. Furthermore, the findings 
suggest that the perceived relevance of the issue to the group is an important 
factor in moderating normative influence.  
The findings outlined in Chapter 5 follow on from previous qualitative 
research demonstrating the rhetorical construction of identity (e.g. Reicher & 
Hopkins, 1996a; Reicher & Hopkins, 1996b; Reicher & Hopkins, 2001a; Reicher 
and Hopkins, 2001b; Haslam, Reicher & Platow, 2010). However, rhetorical 
messages about an identity group designed to influence attitudes towards specific 
issues is only one side of a two-sided coin. The research outlined in Chapter 6 
explores whether similar group based influence can be achieved through messages 
about the nature of a specific issue. Using a traditional issue framing paradigm, 
we examine whether different constructions of the issue of climate change can 
influence the group identities that are seen as relevant to the issue and thus the 
extent to which those group norms come to predict attitudes. The second of the 
two studies also examines whether political knowledge moderates the effect of 
frames in terms of group based processes, as it has been shown to do in traditional 
framing processes. Study 2 also investigates whether the effect of the issue frame 
on climate change attitudes is mediated by an increase in the perceived relevance 
of the issue to the group in question. 
These results suggest that framing can influence the extent to which 
people view the issue of climate change through the prism of various group 
identities. Furthermore, this can be achieved with frames that do not explicitly 
mention the group, but merely align the social meaning of the issue with the 
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meaning associated with the group. The results provide experimental support for 
the more qualitative work on the effects of political rhetoric on the identities 
through which people understand political issues. They also contribute to our 
understanding of how issues like climate change come to be invested with 
symbolic meaning through their relevance to particular cultural or political 
groups. Significantly, this research offers some guidance as to how such meanings 
can be challenged and overcome. 
The results also suggest that the effect of frames that operate through 
group based influence can be greater among those with higher levels of political 
knowledge. This contributes to our understanding of social influence processes, 
and corroborates previous findings suggesting that such influence is often the 
product of rational, thoughtful processes. Finally, the results contribute to the 
research on social influence by demonstrating that group based social influence 
can operate as a symmetrical process of attraction to, and repulsion from, referent 
group norms, depending on the salience of the group, the level of identification, 
and the meaning associated with the group. 
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Abstract 
The way climate change is framed is often just as contested as the policy 
responses. The current research adopts a social identity approach in investigating 
whether the normative influences on attitudes towards climate change vary 
according to how the issue is framed. Across two studies, climate change was 
framed as a moral, economic or political issue, or in the absence of an issue frame. 
Framing climate change as an economic issue (Study 1) or a political issue (Study 
2) saw a positive relationship between perceived class norms and attitudes at high 
levels of class identification, and a negative relationship between class norms and 
attitudes at low levels of class identification. Furthermore, mediation analysis 
(Study 2) indicated that the effect of the frame on attitudes towards climate 
change was partly mediated by the extent to which the issue was perceived as 
relevant to class identity. These results suggest that the way an issue is framed can 
influence the group identities through which people understand an issue, and the 
extent to which group norms influence attitudes. However, the effect of the frame 
and the group norms depends upon recipients’ relationship to the group evoked. 
 
Keywords: Climate change, entrepreneurs of identity, normative influence, issue 
frames 
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Framing the climate change debate: The impact of issue frames on the 
normative influences on attitudes towards climate change 
In the public debate over climate change, the way the issue is framed is 
often just as contested as the policy responses. Many proponents of action to 
address climate change have sought to highlight the moral dimension of the issue. 
In An Inconvenient Truth, Al Gore (2006) argued that climate change is not just 
an environmental or political issue, but a moral one. Similarly, both US President 
Barack Obama (Eilperin, 2013) and Pope Francis (Roberts & Kirchgaessner, 
2015) have emphasised the moral imperative to address climate change. In 
contrast, the general practice of those who oppose climate change action has been 
to frame climate change as an economic issue, emphasising the economic costs of 
any proposed action. These frames are undoubtedly designed to influence public 
opinion about climate change, but the exact process through which influence 
might occur is unclear. Drawing on the social identity perspective, we argue that 
these alternative characterisations of climate change influence the extent to which 
different group identities are seen as relevant to the issue. Furthermore, those who 
employ such frames in order to influence public opinion represent what Reicher, 
Hopkins and colleagues call “entrepreneurs of identity” (e.g. Reicher & Hopkins, 
2001; Haslam, Reicher & Platow, 2010). This article investigates the effect that 
different framings of climate change have on the extent to which various group 
norms predict attitudes towards climate change. 
Social influence in social identity theory 
According to the social identity perspective, incorporating both social 
identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and self-categorisation theory (Turner, 
Hogg, Oakes, Reicher & Wetherell, 1987), an individual’s self-concept comprises 
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not only personal identity, but also social identity, which is derived primarily from 
membership in social groups and categories. Numerous studies have shown that 
the extent to which one’s personal or social identity is salient can have a 
considerable impact on their perceptions, attitudes and behaviour (see Turner, 
Oakes, Haslam & McGarty, 1994, for a review). In a context in which an 
individual’s personal identity is salient, their attitudes and behaviour accord with 
their own personal, idiosyncratic characteristics. However, when social identity is 
salient, people come to define themselves in terms of that particular social 
category or group and, through a process known as referent informational 
influence (Turner, 1985; Turner, 1991), their attitudes and behaviour come to be 
guided by what they perceive to be the norms of the group. Numerous studies 
have supported the referent informational influence model, with referent group 
norms predicting attitudes and behaviour, particularly for those who strongly 
identify with the reference group (e.g. Terry & Hogg, 1996, Terry, Hogg & 
White, 1999; Smith & Terry, 2003; Louis, Davies, Smith & Terry, 2007; Smith, 
Terry & Hogg, 2007; White, Smith, Terry, Greenslade & McKimmie, 2009).  
However, even when a group identity is salient, those who strongly 
identify with the group will not be guided by group norms on every conceivable 
issue. Smith and colleagues found that the relationship between ingroup norms 
and attitudes and behavioural intentions was moderated by the perceived 
relevance of the issue to the group (Smith, Terry, Crosier & Duck, 2005). They 
concluded that, “individuals do not follow group norms automatically, but take 
into account the extent to which the issue and the norm are both relevant and 
central to group membership” (p. 168). This accords with evidence from ingroup 
persuasion studies which have found that ingroup messages lead to more 
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systematic processing only when the issue is seen as relevant to the group 
(Mackie, Worth & Asuncion, 1990; Wyer, 2010).  
For some issues the group or social identity that is most relevant might be 
perfectly obvious. However, there is often ambiguity as to how relevant various 
groups are to a particular issue, or how relevant various issues are to a particular 
group. This ambiguity can be significant as different groups may be perceived to 
have different norms regarding an issue like climate change, and we would 
therefore expect very different attitudes and behaviour depending on which group 
or social identity was seen as most relevant (Reicher, 2004). Consider, for 
example, someone who lives in a region whose economy is heavily dependent 
upon coal mining, and is an active member of the local church. They may 
understand the norms of their religious group to favour conserving the 
environment, as God’s creation, for future generations. They may also understand 
that most people in their local community oppose any measures that threaten the 
viability of the coal industry. Based on the social identity perspective, we would 
expect that if they perceived the issue of climate change to be relevant to their 
religious group they would view the issue through the prism of that identity and 
their views would be shaped by the norms of their church. They would be inclined 
to see climate change as an urgent threat and support action to reduce carbon 
dioxide emissions regardless of the economic consequences. However, if they saw 
climate change as more relevant to their local coal-mining community, their 
interpretation of the issue would be more aligned with that group’s norms and 
they would be more likely to oppose action to address climate change on account 
of the economic costs. From this perspective, anything that affects the perceived 
relevance of climate change to the individual’s identity as a member of their 
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church or the mining community would, in turn, influence their attitude towards 
climate change. 
The extent to which an individual sees an issue as relevant to a particular 
group (or a group to an issue) can be influenced by a range of factors including 
their personal experience and motivation, as well as objective features of the 
social context. For politically charged issues, however, the relevance of various 
group identities is often hotly contested, and those who seek to shape public 
opinion commonly do so by framing issues in order to highlight the relevance of 
particular groups and group norms (see Reicher & Hopkins, 2001a). This is just 
one of the influence strategies that Reicher, Hopkins and colleagues (e.g. Reicher 
& Hopkins, 1996a, Reicher & Hopkins, 1996b, Reicher, Hopkins & Condor, 
1997, Reicher & Hopkins, 2001a, Reicher and Hopkins, 2001b; Reicher, 2004; 
Kahani-Hopkins & Hopkins, 2002; Hopkins & Kahanin-Hopkins, 2004; Haslam, 
Reicher & Platow, 2010) describe in their work on entrepreneurs of identity. In 
this work, the researchers analyse the ways in which political leaders and other 
elites use rhetoric to fashion and promote a version of group identity that 
advances or reinforces their status as group leader and their agenda for group 
action. While this work draws upon a rich array of historical and contemporary 
examples to demonstrate how identity processes are harnessed to influence public 
attitudes and promote collective action, these processes have yet to be explored 
and demonstrated in an experimental setting. 
Issue frames 
The way in which issues are framed and the processes through which this 
influences attitudes has been the subject of considerable research under the banner 
of issue framing. Much of the research on issues framing is based on an 
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expectancy value model of attitudes (e.g. Azjen & Fishbein, 1980), according to 
which an individual’s attitude towards an object can be thought of as the weighted 
sum of a series of evaluative beliefs. From this perspective, frames provide 
meaning to an issue and influence attitudes by making particular underlying 
considerations about the issue seem more relevant such that they are given greater 
weight in forming the overall attitude. One example commonly cited in the 
literature involves attitudes towards a proposed public rally by a hate group. An 
individual might have a commitment to the notion of free speech, but also be 
concerned about the threat to public safety should the rally go ahead. In this case, 
a frame could influence an individual’s attitude by emphasising, for example, the 
free speech consideration over public safety. To the extent that the frame is 
successful in enhancing the weight ascribed to the free speech consideration, it 
would likely shift the individual’s attitudes in favour of the rally.  
While this view of framing is well supported by experimental research 
(see Chong & Druckman, 2007), it rests on a limited, individualistic 
understanding of attitudes as “cognitive representations that are acquired and 
possessed by individuals and which, to a great extent, are a part of human 
individuality” (Hogg & Smith, 2007, p. 91). As a result, the framing literature has 
tended to focus largely on individual and inter-individual processes while 
neglecting the influence of social context in terms of the wider social environment 
of group memberships, group norms, social identities, intergroup relations and 
ideologies. 
There have been notable exceptions that explore the important role of 
group-based attitudes (e.g. Nelson & Kinder, 1996), and even social identity and 
group norms (e.g. Price, 1989) in framing effects. While such research represents 
  109 
an important step towards integrating the issue framing literature with an 
understanding of the role of social groups and social context, we extend these 
efforts by applying and measuring accepted social identity concepts in the context 
of a traditional issue framing paradigm.   
The social psychology of climate change 
Given the gravity of the threat posed by climate change, and the fact that 
action to address it requires cooperation by disparate groups, it is hardly 
surprising that there is growing interest in social psychological research on the 
issue. Indeed, the American Psychological Association (2009) issued a task force 
report outlining the need for a greater focus on the psychological dimension of 
climate change. Among the research to date is work by Kahan and colleagues 
which has sought to understand why the scientific consensus about the threat of 
climate change is not reflected in public attitudes. They cite evidence from the US 
context that the public is polarized along ideological and political lines with 
liberals largely convinced by the science and in favour of action to address the 
threat, while conservatives are sceptical of the claims of a scientific consensus, 
and the need to take drastic action (Kahan et al, 2012; Kahan, 2013; Kahan 2015; 
see also Bliuc, McGarty, Thomas, Lala, Berndsen & Misajon, 2015). In one study, 
participants with a ‘hierarchical/individualist’ world-view reported much lower 
perceptions of the risk associated with climate change than those with an 
‘egalitarian/communitarian’ world-view. Analysis showed that scepticism about 
the risks was not due to a poor understanding of science; indeed, there was a slight 
negative correlation between scientific literacy and risk perception. The results 
also showed that the degree of polarization between those with different world-
views was greater at higher levels of scientific literacy (Kahan et al, 2012). The 
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researchers explain these results with reference to what they term ‘cultural 
cognition’, a tendency for individuals to “form perceptions of societal risks that 
cohere with values characteristic of groups with which they identify” (Kahan et al, 
2012, p. 732). This interpretation is based on the notion that the issue of climate 
change has become politically or ideologically charged; another front in the 
Culture war between liberals and conservatives. As such, individuals’ attitudes 
towards the issue are not so much a reflection of ‘what they know’ but of ‘who 
they are’ or ‘which side they are on’. In this sense, disagreement about an issue 
like climate change represents not the lack of reason, but the application of it in 
defence of one’s group identity. 
“Individuals can be expected to use reason to apprehend both what is 
known to climate science and what stance toward climate-change 
information expresses their identity… it is the antagonistic cultural 
meanings that advocates on both sides have succeeded in infusing into 
their positions that creates for ordinary citizens the conflict between 
recognizing what is known to science and being who they are. Forced 
to choose, individuals predictably attend to information as identity-
protective reasoners” (Kahan, 2015, p. 29). 
This research confirms the American Psychological Association’s (2009) 
view that group identification can have a powerful impact on people’s attitudes 
and behaviours about climate change. The findings also accord with work by 
Morton and colleagues showing that judgements about science, particularly 
among people with scientific training, are influenced by identity concerns 
(Morton, Haslam, Postmes, Ryan, 2006). Despite some differences, there are 
many parallels between Kahan’s notion of cultural cognition and the social 
identity view that attitudes towards an issue like climate change can be influenced 
by group norms through a process of referent informational influence. Indeed, 
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research from the social identity perspective offers insights not only into how 
issues come to be invested with particular relevance for groups and group 
identities, but also how an understanding of these processes can be used to 
influence attitudes towards an issue like climate change. Research by Rabinovich 
and colleagues, for example, looked at how identity processes can influence 
attitudes towards climate change through shifts in the social context. They found 
that among a sample of British participants, changes in the comparative context 
(with either the United States or Sweden as a comparison group) led to changes in 
the ingroup (British) stereotype for environmentalism. These changes in ingroup 
stereotype, in turn, influenced individual values and ultimately influenced 
attitudes and behaviours regarding climate change (Rabinovich, Morton, Postmes, 
and Verplanken, 2012). This research underscores the importance of considering 
the role of identity and group influence on attitudes towards climate change, but 
also the power of the social context to shape the way we understand the 
relationship between group identity and issues. 
Overview of the present research 
The current research draws on the insights of previous research and seeks 
to extend it in important ways. While Rabinovich and colleagues (2012), for 
instance, explored how changes in comparative context affect attitudes by 
changing the content of the ingroup identity, we investigate whether the way the 
issue itself is framed can influence which group identity is seen as relevant, and 
therefore which group’s norms come to influence attitudes. The current research 
seeks to explore these processes in a way that reflects the (often subtle) rhetorical 
framing strategies that are employed in the political debate over climate change.  
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Based on the theory and research outlined above, we predict that framing 
climate change as a moral or economic issue (Study 1), or in ways that highlight 
the moral, economic or political dimensions involved (Study 2) will increase the 
perceived relevance of groups whose content has some resonance with these 
frames. This will lead to greater influence of those groups’ norms on individuals’ 
attitudes towards climate change. We also examine the extent to which the 
influence of group norms, and particularly the effect of framing on normative 
influence, will be moderated by individuals’ level of identification with the group 
(Studies 1 and 2), and predict the effect will be greater at higher levels of 
identification. In Study 2, we also investigate the role of political awareness in 
moderating the effect of the frames, and examine whether the effect is more 
pronounced among those with higher levels of political knowledge. Finally, we 
investigate whether the effect of framing is mediated by perceptions of the extent 
to which the issue of climate change is seen as relevant or central to the group 
identity.  
Study 1 
Participants and Design 
A total of 444 people took part in the study. Participants were recruited via 
an email sent to post-graduate students at the Australian National University. The 
email included a short message about the survey, a link to the survey website, and 
a request to forward the email on to others, facilitating further snowball sampling. 
The sample comprised 233 females and 211 males, with a mean age of 33.61 
years (SD = 10.94; range = 14 - 70 years). The design included three between-
subjects conditions based on the type of frame participants were exposed to 
(control, moral frame, or economic frame).  
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Procedure  
The survey was conducted in the weeks leading up to the Copenhagen 
Climate Change Summit in late 2009. Participants were supplied with the web 
address for the survey web page, which directed them randomly to one of three 
versions of an online survey hosted on an Australian National University web 
page. The three versions were identical in all respects except for the survey title 
and the introductory paragraph that contained the experimental manipulation (see 
below). The manipulation was intended to reflect the subtle use of issue frames 
such that they appear to be an incidental or uncontroversial part of the debate, 
rather than an explicit attempt to impose a contested interpretation on an issue. In 
the control condition, the survey was titled “Climate change – the greatest 
challenge of our time”, in the moral frame condition it was titled “Climate change 
– the greatest moral challenge of our time”, and in the economic frame condition 
it was titled “Climate change – the greatest economic challenge of our time”. This 
framing was also reflected in the introductory paragraph participants read before 
completing the survey items: 
“Climate change has been described as the greatest [ 
…../moral/economic] challenge of our time. As governments around the 
world grapple with how to respond to the challenge that climate change 
poses, we are interested in your thoughts [about/on the moral 
dimension of/on the economic dimension of] this issue.” 
The words in square brackets indicate the differences between conditions.  
After reading the introductory paragraph, participants completed 
demographic items about their age, sex and country of birth and their attitudes 
towards climate change. Participants then completed items measuring the nature 
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of their religious/spiritual orientation, their identification with people who share 
their religious/spiritual orientation, and their perception of the normative attitude 
towards climate change among those who share their religious/spiritual 
orientation. Participants were then asked about the nature of their socio-economic 
class, their identification with others who share their class, and their perception of 
the normative attitude towards climate change among those who share their socio-
economic class.5 Unless otherwise indicated, participants responded to items on a 
seven-point Likert scale ranging from Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree, with a 
Neutral mid-point. 
Measures  
Climate change attitudes were assessed via 10 items (e.g. “We all need to 
be prepared to make sacrifices if we want to avoid environmental catastrophe” – 
see Appendix A for a full list of items) specifically developed for the study. A 
scale score was calculated as the mean of the 10 item scores with higher scores 
indicating greater concern about climate change (α = .89).  
Participants were asked to identify their Religious/spiritual orientation 
from a list of eight choices including Christian, Muslim, Hindu, Jewish, Buddhist, 
as well as Spiritual but not religious; Agnostic; and Atheist.6 An ‘Other’ category 
was also provided for participants to nominate an orientation not in the list. 
Participants were also asked to identify their Socio-economic class from the 
                                                 5 We also included two other self-categories in order to tap into participants’ moral and economic self-concept. Participants were asked to describe their values or belief system as well as their occupational 
status (e.g. professional, white collar, blue collar), before answering questions about their level of identification with, and the norms of, others who shared those characteristics. These were included for exploratory purposes, and as no effects emerged for either variable, in the interests of brevity, they will not be discussed further. 6 While atheists and agnostics are not commonly recognised as discrete social groups, Ysseldyk, Matheson & Anisman (2010) make the point that many people are quite devout unbelievers and some people identify highly with others members of their irreligious group. Indeed, Ysseldyk, Matheson & Anisman (2009) found that the responses of atheists to an identity threat was similar to that of religious individuals. 
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following categories: Upper class, Middle class, Working class, and Poor. An 
‘Other’ category was also provided for participants to nominate a class not in the 
list. Responses to these items were not intended for analyses, but were included to 
ensure participants had a group in mind when responding to the identification and 
norm items (see Appendix B). 
Group identification with those who share religious/spiritual beliefs and 
socio-economic class was each assessed via five items derived from Leach et al 
(2008). Items assessed solidarity with other members of the group, satisfaction 
with being a member of the group, the centrality of membership to one’s self-
concept, degree of self-stereotyping with the group, and perceived in-group 
homogeneity. Scale scores were computed as the mean of the five items with 
higher scores indicating greater identification with religious/spiritual group (α = 
.79) and socio-economic class (α = .81), respectively.  
Perceived group norms regarding climate change for both 
religious/spiritual group and socio-economic class were assessed via three items 
(see Appendix A). Separate scale scores were computed as the mean of the three 
items, with higher scores indicating greater perceptions of normative concern 
about climate change among the religious/spiritual group (α = .79), and socio-
economic class (α = .72), respectively.  
Results 
Data analysis overview 
Table 1 displays the descriptive statistics for each of the scales in the 
study, along with the alpha reliability coefficients for each. Reliabilities were all 
satisfactory. The mean for climate change attitudes was significantly above the 
  116
scale mid-point indicating a high degree of concern about climate change among 
the sample. As can be seen in Table 1, the mean levels of identification and 
perceived norms for each group type lie close to or slightly above the mean. Item 
and scale distributions were assessed for violations of normality. Attitudes 
towards climate change were found to be highly negatively skewed (Skewness = -
1.16, SE = .12) and were transformed via a log transformation (Skewness = -.27, 
SE = .12) for subsequent analyses. It should be noted that the transformation does 
not substantially alter the pattern of results reported below.  
ANOVAs revealed no mean differences for the variables across the three 
frame conditions. Attitudes towards climate change were positively correlated 
with perceived religious/spiritual group norms. Climate change attitudes were not 
correlated with perceived class norms, nor were attitudes correlated with 
religious/spiritual or class identification. There was a small positive correlation 
between religious/spiritual identification and class identification. 
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Table 1. D
escriptive data for m
easures (m
eans, standard deviations, bivariate correlations and reliabilities) – Study 1 
 P
redictor 
M
 
S
D
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
1. C
lim
ate change attitudes 
5.54 
1.09 
(.89) 
 
 
 
 
2. R
eligious / spiritual identification 
4.28 
1.07 
.08 
(.79) 
 
 
 
3. S
ocio-econom
ic class identification 
3.95 
1.09 
-.06 
.19** 
(.81) 
 
 
4. P
erceived religious / spiritual norm
s 
4.40 
1.01 
.35** 
.30** 
.00 
(.79) 
 
5. P
erceived socio-econom
ic class norm
s 
4.01 
1.03 
-.01 
.02 
.34** 
.21** 
(.72) 
** p < .01 
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A hierarchical moderated multiple regression analysis was performed to 
examine the effects of religious/spiritual group identification, class identification 
and perceived group norms (both separately, and their interaction) across 
experimental conditions on attitudes towards climate change. The main effects of 
group identification and group norms were entered at step one, the interaction of 
religious/spiritual group identification and group norms along with the interaction 
of class group identification and group norms were entered at step two, followed 
by the main effects of frame condition and their respective two- and three-way 
interactions with group identification and norms at step three. The comparisons 
between frame conditions were effect coded via two variables: 1 (moral frame) vs. 
–1 (control); and 1 (economic frame) vs. –1 (control). In all cases centred scores 
were used to calculate the interaction terms to ensure that multicolinearity 
between the main effects and interaction terms did not distort the results (Aiken & 
West, 1991; Cohen, Cohen, West & Aiken, 2003). A significant proportion of the 
variance in attitudes towards climate change was accounted for at step one, 
R2change = .13, Fchange (4, 412) = 16.87, p < .001. The inclusion of the identification 
x norms interaction terms at step two accounted for a significant increase in the 
amount of variance explained, R2change = .05, Fchange (2, 410) = 12.81, p < .001, as 
did the addition of the frame conditions and the associated interaction terms at 
step three, R2change = .07, Fchange (14, 396) = 2.55, p < .01. 
 
  
  119 
Table 2. Association between Religious and Class identification, Religious and Class 
group norms, Frame condition and Climate change attitudes – Study 1 
  
 
 B SE t Sig. 
Religious/spiritual Identification - ..00  .01 - .22  .827 
Religious/spiritual norm  ..07  .01  7.65  .000 
Class Identification - ..01  .01 - 1.06  .287 
Class norm - ..02  .01 - 1.70  .089 
Religious/spiritual norm x Identification  ..01  .01  1.49  .136 
Class norm x Identification  ..03  .01  4.52  .000 
Moral frame - ..00  .01 - .32  .748 
Economic frame - ..01  .01 - .92  .357 
Religious/spiritual norm x Identification x Moral frame  ..03  .01  2.34  .020 
Religious/spiritual norm x Identification x Economic frame - .01  .01 - .76  .447 
Class norm x Identification x Moral frame - .01  .01 - .55  .583 
Class norm x Identification x Economic frame  .03  .01  3.52  .000 
Note: Statistics reported for the step when variables are first entered into the model. 
 
Identification and norms 
The regression analysis revealed a significant positive relationship 
between religious/spiritual group norms and climate change attitudes. Contrary to 
expectations, the relationship between religious/spiritual group norms and 
attitudes was not moderated by identification, however the two-way interaction 
was moderated by frame condition, as discussed in the following section. 
As for the influence of perceived class group norms, the marginal positive 
relationship with attitudes towards climate change was moderated by the level of 
class identification. Analysis of the simple slopes revealed that the influence of 
perceived group norms was not significant at higher levels of class identification, 
B = .08, t = 1.15, p < .25, CI = [-.06, .21]. At lower levels of class identification, 
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however, there was a significant negative relationship between perceived class 
norms and attitudes, B = -.26, t = -3.69, p < .001, CI = [-.40, -.12]. That is, at 
higher levels of class identification there was no relationship between group 
norms and attitudes towards climate change, while at lower levels of class 
identification there was a negative relationship between group norms and 
attitudes. Again, though, the interaction of class group norms and identification 
was further moderated by frame condition, as discussed below. We report the two-
way effects first simply to demonstrate that the overall pattern is consistent with 
the traditional referent informational influence pattern, with some minor 
variations. 
The effect of framing – religious/spiritual group 
We tested the prediction that the way climate change was framed would 
moderate the influence of perceived group norms among high identifiers. We 
found that the moral frame did qualify the interaction between religious/spiritual 
group identification and norms. However, contrary to expectations, this effect was 
found only at lower levels of religious/spiritual identification. Simple slope 
analyses presented in Figure 1 show that among higher religious/spiritual 
identifiers, the relationship between perceived religious/spiritual group norms and 
climate change attitudes was significantly positive in both the control condition, B 
= .09, t = 6.35, p < .001, CI = [.06, .12], and the moral frame condition, B = .10, t 
= 4.63, p < .001, CI = [.06, .14].  
There was, however, an effect of the frame for lower identifiers. As shown 
in Figure 2, there was a positive relationship between perceived religious/spiritual 
norms and climate change attitudes among lower identifiers in the control 
condition, B = .09, t = 4.23, p < .001, CI = [.05, .13], but no relationship between 
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perceived norms and attitudes in the moral frame condition, B = -.01, t = -.25, p = 
.803, CI = [-.07, .05], indicating that the positive normative influence for lower 
identifiers found in the control condition was undermined by framing climate 
change as a moral issue.7 
 
  
                                                 7 Separate analyses were conducted for participants who identified with a recognised religious group 
and those who identified as what might be called ‘non-believers’ (e.g. agnostic, atheist, etc.). The results indicate that the general pattern of results is consistent across both groups: a significant positive relationship between group norms and attitudes towards climate change among low identifiers in the control condition, but not in the moral frame condition. 
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Figure 1. Interaction of religious/spiritual identification and perceived norms on 
climate change attitudes at higher levels of religious/spiritual identification, across 
control and moral frame condition – Study 1. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Interaction of religious/spiritual identification and perceived norms on 
climate change attitudes at lower levels of religious/spiritual identification, across 
control and moral frame condition – Study 1. 
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Effects of framing - Socio-economic class 
As with religious/spiritual group norms, frame condition qualified the 
interaction between class group identification and norms. As expected, it was the 
contrast between the economic frame and the control condition where the effect 
was found. Analysis of the simple slopes presented in Figure 3 show that while 
there was no relationship between perceived class norms and climate change 
attitudes at higher levels of class identification in the control condition, B = .00, t 
= .06, p = .953, CI = [-.03, .03], the relationship was significantly positive in the 
economic frame condition, B = .04, t = 2.11, p = .037, CI = [.00, .07]. Thus, while 
there was no evidence that group norms predicted attitudes among those highly 
identified with their class group in the control condition, the fact that this 
relationship emerged when climate change was framed as an economic issue 
supports the predicted effect of the frame. 
Framing climate change as an economic issue also had an unexpected 
impact at lower levels of class identification. As shown in Figure 4, at higher 
levels of class identification, there was no relationship between perceived class 
norms and climate change attitudes at lower levels of class identification in the 
control condition, B = .00, t = -.01, p = .995, CI = [-.04, .04]; but when climate 
change was framed as an economic issue, there was a significant negative 
relationship between perceived norms and attitudes among those with low levels 
of class identification, B = -.09, t = -4.97, p < .001, CI = [-.13, -.05]. Thus, just as 
with low religious/spiritual identifiers, framing climate change in a way that 
highlighted a relevant identity appeared to undermine the influence of the group. 
However, rather than negate conformity to group norms, the economic frame 
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seemed to generate reactance against group norms among those with low levels of 
class identification. 
 
 
Figure 3. Interaction of class identification and perceived norms on climate 
change attitudes at higher levels of class identification, across control and 
economic frame condition– Study 1. 
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Figure 4. Interaction of class identification and perceived norms on climate 
change attitudes at lower levels of class identification, across control and 
economic frame condition– Study 1. 
 
Discussion 
 
The results of Study 1 confirm the prediction that both religious/spiritual 
group and class group norms would be positively related to attitudes towards 
climate change among those highly identified with the group, particularly when 
the issue was framed in a way designed to resonate with the content of the group 
identity. The positive relationship between class group norms and climate change 
attitudes was only evident among those highly identified with their class group 
who were exposed to the economic frame, suggesting that the frame was 
successful in establishing the relevance of the issue to the group. The relationship 
between norms and attitudes among those highly identified with their 
religious/spiritual group was evident in both the control condition and the moral 
frame condition, indicating that high identifiers saw the group as relevant to the 
issue regardless of framing, and the moral frame served to reinforce rather than 
enhance this impression. This will be discussed in greater detail in the General 
Discussion. 
The results for low identifiers were somewhat different. The moral frame 
worked to negate the positive relationship between group norms and attitudes 
among low religious/spiritual group identifiers. The economic frame saw a 
negative relationship between class group norms and attitudes among low class 
identifiers. While framing effects were not expected among low identifiers, both 
of these results are consistent with the notion that the frame established a link 
between the issue and the group. The fact that this link eliminated the relationship 
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between group norms and attitudes among low religious/spiritual group 
identifiers, while producing a negative relationship among low class identifiers 
may reflect the different nature of these group identities. This too will be explored 
in more depth in the General Discussion. 
The results of Study 1 provide strong evidence that framing can shape 
attitudes towards an issue like climate change by influencing the group identities 
through which people understand and view the issue. However, there are a 
number of factors that remain to be clarified. First, while the results strongly 
suggest that the frame worked to establish the relevance of the issue to the group 
identity (particularly the economic frame in relation to class identity), something 
that previous theory (e.g. Turner, 1987) and research (e.g. Mackie et al, 1990) 
suggest is an important factor in group-based social influence that produces 
meaningful attitudes change. However, as the concept of relevance was not 
measured in Study 1, this mediation process is yet to be fully demonstrated. This 
is something that will be addressed in Study 2. Secondly, the frame manipulations 
used in Study 1 were designed to be quite subtle in their evocation of social 
identities. It remains to be seen what effect more elaborate frames that are more 
directly related to specific group identities will have. Furthermore, in recognition 
of the fact that there is often a political divide in attitudes towards climate change 
(Kahan, et al, 2012, Kahan, 2015; McCright & Dunlap, 2011; Krosnick, 
Hollbrook & Visser, 2000), it is also interesting to explore the effect of a political 
frame along with partisan identity and norms. 
It should be noted that the sample for Study 1 was made up largely of 
postgraduate university students who are likely to have a high degree of political 
awareness, something which has been shown to moderate the effect of issue 
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frames (Slothuus, 2008; Slothuus & de Vreese, 2010) on the basis that such 
awareness is associated with increased ability and motivation to interpret and 
understand the import of frames. The question remains whether these effects will 
generalise to a more diverse sample and whether indeed they will be limited to 
those with high levels of political awareness. Finally, as mentioned previously, 
Study 1 was conducted at a place and time (in Australia in the lead up to the 2009 
Copenhagen Climate Change Summit) when climate change was a highly salient 
issue both in the media and in the political debate. As such, it remains to be seen 
whether these results will be replicated in a context in which the issue is not such 
a dominant part of public debate. 
 
Study 2 
Participants and Design 
A total of 306 people took part in the study. Participants were recruited via 
an online polling organisation in the United Kingdom and represented a more 
diverse general population compared with Study 1. Participants received credits 
for completing the survey, which could be exchanged for consumer products. 
Thirty participants were excluded prior to analysis as they had completed the 
survey in less time (7 minutes) than was deemed necessary to provide genuine 
responses.8 The remaining sample comprised 143 females and 133 males, with a 
mean age of 48.85 years (SD = 15.05). The design included four between-subjects 
conditions based on the type of frame participants were exposed to (control, moral 
frame, economic frame, political frame).  
                                                 8 Study 2 was conducted with different software to Study 1. As the software used for Study 1 did not capture the times at which respondents started and finished the survey, we were not able to exclude any responses from Study 1 based on the amount of time taken to complete the survey. 
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Procedure  
Participants were supplied with the web address for the survey web page, 
which directed them randomly to one of four versions of an online survey hosted 
on an Australian National University web page. The four versions were identical 
in all respects except for the survey title and the introductory paragraph that 
contained the experimental manipulation (see below). While the frame 
manipulations were similar to those of Study 1 in that they did not refer directly to 
specific groups, the frames in Study 2 employed a more elaborate structure in 
order to establish the relevance of climate change to various group identities. In 
the control condition, the survey was titled “Attitudes towards climate change”. In 
the other frame conditions it was titled “Climate change – the greatest 
[moral/economic/political] challenge of our time”, respectively. The title was 
displayed on all subsequent survey webpages. In the moral, economic and 
political frame conditions, this framing was also reflected in the introductory 
paragraphs participants read before completing the survey items. The first and last 
paragraphs of the frames were similar across the three frame conditions - the 
words in square brackets below indicate the differences between conditions.  
First paragraph 
“Climate change is one of the most pressing problems we face as a 
community. There are arguments about how serious the problem is and 
what should be done about it, but at a deeper level, climate change 
forces us to confront fundamental [moral questions / questions about 
the nature of our economy and society / political questions].  
Last paragraph 
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To help us understand the many varied perspectives, in the remainder of 
the survey, we are interested in your attitudes about climate change and 
what you perceive to be the views held by others.” 
The crux of the frame manipulations were contained in the second and 
third paragraphs which framed climate change as a contrast between conflicting 
perspectives on the issue. The moral frame condition described climate change as 
a contrast between a religious or spiritual perspective in which the natural 
environment is seen as a sacred gift to be preserved, against a more secular view 
that sees nature simply as a source of resources. The economic frame presented 
climate change as challenge to the economic structure of society with 
consequences for those both at the top of the economic and social structure, as 
well as those at middle and lower ends. The political frame described the issue in 
terms of wealth and autonomy as opposed to sustainability and fairness (see 
Appendix C for the full frames). 
After reading the introductory paragraph, participants completed questions 
about their attitudes towards climate change. They then completed questions 
about their religious or spiritual orientation, their socio-economic class, and their 
political affiliation. On subsequent pages, participants were asked about their level 
of identification with those who shared their religious or spiritual orientation, their 
perception of the normative attitudes towards climate change among those who 
shared with religious or spiritual orientation, as well as the extent to which they 
regard the issue of climate change to be relevant to being a member of that 
particular group. Participants were also asked similar questions about those who 
shared their socio-economic class and political affiliation. In all cases, the order of 
presentation across the three groups was randomised. Finally, participants were 
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asked a number of questions to gauge their level of political knowledge. Unless 
otherwise indicated, participants responded to items on a seven-point Likert scale 
ranging from Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree, with a Neutral mid-point. 
Measures 
 Climate change attitudes were assessed via eight items (e.g. “Reducing the 
amount of carbon-dioxide humans emit into the atmosphere is vital if we are to 
combat climate change” – see Appendix A for a full list of items). The items used 
were adapted slightly from those used in Study 1 to account for the different 
context (e.g. removing “Australia should introduce an emissions trading scheme 
as soon as possible to reduce carbon emissions”). A scale score was calculated as 
the mean of the item scores with higher scores indicating greater concern about 
climate change (α = .90). 
Identification with each of the three groups included in the study was 
measured with the same five items derived from Leach et al (2008) that were used 
in Study 1. Separate scale scores were computed as the mean of the five items, 
with higher scores indicating greater identification with the religious/spiritual (D = 
.92), class (D = .90), and political group (D = .93), respectively.  
Perceived group norms regarding climate change for both 
religious/spiritual group and socio-economic class and political groups were 
assessed via the same three items from Study 1, with the addition of a fourth item 
measuring perceived norms about the extent to which humans are responsible for 
climate change (“A typical […….] would believe that human activity is largely 
responsible for climate change.”). Separate scale scores were computed as the 
mean of the four items, with higher scores indicating greater perceptions of 
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normative concern about climate change among the religious/spiritual group (D = 
.94), class group (D = .95), and political group (D = .95), respectively. 
The perceived relevance of climate change to each of the three groups was 
measured with a single item (“How important is the issue of climate change to 
what it means to be a [……..].”). 
In line with previous work (e.g. Zaller, 1992; Slothuus, 2008; Slothuus & 
de Vreese, 2010), participants’ level of political knowledge was measured via 
eight factual multiple-choice questions (including an ‘Unsure’ option) about 
contemporary and historical UK politics (e.g. “Who is the current speaker in the 
House of Commons?” – see Appendix A for a full list of items). A scale score was 
calculated as the number of items answered correctly, with higher scores 
indicating greater political knowledge (α = .75). 
Results 
Data analysis overview 
Table 3 displays the descriptive statistics for each of the scales in the 
study, along with the alpha reliability coefficients for each. Reliabilities were all 
satisfactory. The mean for climate change attitudes was significantly above the 
scale mid-point indicating a moderate to high degree of concern for climate 
change among the sample. The mean levels of identification for each of the three 
groups was above the above the scale mid-point, as were the perceived norms for 
each of the three groups, and the perceived relevance of climate change to each of 
the three groups.  
ANOVAs revealed no mean differences for the variables across the four 
frame conditions. As can be seen in Table 3, there was a weak but significant 
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correlation between climate change attitudes and religious/spiritual group 
identification. Attitudes towards climate change were also moderately correlated 
with perceived norms for each of religious/spiritual, class and political group 
norms. Identification with each of the three groups was moderately correlated 
with each other, and there were moderate positive correlations between the 
perceived norms of the three identity groups. 
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Table 3. D
escriptive data for m
easures (m
eans, standard deviations, bivariate correlations and reliabilities) – Study 2 
 P
redictor 
M
 
S
D
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
 
1. C
lim
ate change attitudes 
5.10 
1.22 
(.90) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. R
eligious / spiritual identification 
4.44 
1.38 
.18** 
(.92) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. S
ocio-econom
ic class 
identification 
4.53 
1.35 
.07 
.24** 
(.90) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. P
olitical party identification 
4.39 
1.20 
.00 
.24** 
.37** 
(.93) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5. P
erceived religious / spiritual 
norm
s 
4.58 
1.35 
.43** 
.39** 
.25** 
.13* 
(.94) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6. P
erceived socio-econom
ic class 
norm
s 
4.49 
1.37 
.50** 
.30** 
.33** 
.09 
.54** 
(.95) 
 
 
 
 
 
7. P
erceived political party norm
s 
4.70 
1.22 
.48** 
.23** 
.30** 
.26** 
.58** 
.54** 
(.95) 
 
 
 
 
8. R
elevance to religious/spiritual 
group 
4.25 
1.59 
.35** 
.43** 
.23** 
.15* 
.56** 
.44** 
.41** 
 
 
 
 
9. R
elevance to socio-econom
ic 
class 
4.26 
1.48 
.39** 
.31** 
.34** 
.13* 
.41** 
.62** 
.39** 
.63* 
 
 
 
10. R
elevance to political party 
4.41 
1.46 
.48** 
.18 
.19** 
.25** 
.39** 
.42** 
.60** 
.57** 
.55** 
 
 
11. P
olitical know
ledge 
4.12 
2.15 
-.07 
-.06 
-.21** 
.00 
-.10 
-.12* 
-.07 
-.26** 
-.30* 
-.20** 
(.75) 
*p< .05; **p< .01. 
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The effect of the identification and norms for each of the three groups, 
framing and political knowledge and their interactions on climate change attitudes 
was analysed via a hierarchical moderated multiple regression. As with Study 1, 
the main effects of group identification and group norms were entered at step one, 
the interaction of group identification and the respective group norms were 
entered at step two, followed by the main effects of frame condition and their 
respective two- and three-way interactions with group identification and norms at 
step three. The comparisons between frame conditions were effect coded via three 
variables: 1 (moral frame) vs. –1 (control); 1 (economic frame) vs. –1 (control); 
and 1 (political frame) vs. -1 (control). The main effect of political knowledge 
along with the interaction terms were entered at step four. In all cases centred 
scores were used to calculate the interaction terms to ensure that multicolinearity 
between the main effects and interaction terms did not distort the results (Aiken & 
West, 1991; Cohen, Cohen, West & Aiken, 2003). A significant proportion of the 
variance in attitudes towards climate change was accounted for at step one R2change 
= .35, Fchange (6, 260) = 22.87, p < .001, as well as at step two with the inclusion of 
the identification x norms interaction terms R2change = .06, Fchange (3, 257) = 8.41, p 
< .001. The addition of the frame conditions and their interactions did not 
significantly add to the explained variance, R2change = .09, Fchange (30, 227) = 1.30, 
p = .144, however the inclusion of political knowledge and its interactions 
accounted for a marginally significant increase in explained variance at step four, 
R2change = .12, Fchange (40, 187) = 1.40, p = .07. To contextualise these higher order 
interactions completely we will first examine all the relevant lower level effects. 
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Table 4. Association between Religious, Class and Partisan identification, 
Perceived group norms, Frame condition and Climate change attitudes by level of 
Political knowledge - Study 2 
 
Overall 
Low 
Political 
Knowledge 
High 
Political 
knowledge 
Religious/spiritual Identification  ..03  .09 - .02 
Religious/spiritual norm  ..12†  .15  .29** 
Class Identification - ..13*  .08 - .24* 
Class norm  ..27***  .03  .31** 
Partisan Identification - -.09 - .12 - .08 
Partisan norm  ..31***  .21  .28† 
Religious/spiritual norm x Identification  ..06†  .09 - .05 
Class norm x Identification  ..08*  .04  .17* 
Partisan norm x Identification  ..06  .01  .08 
Moral frame  ..05 - .01  .09 
Economic frame - ..00 - .06  .00 
Political frame  ..01 - .03 - .03 
Religious/spiritual norm x Identification x Moral frame  ..03 - .11 - .04 
Religious/spiritual norm x Identification x Economic frame - ..17* - .40† - .06 
Religious/spiritual norm x Identification x Political frame  -04  .06  .06 
Class norm x Identification x Moral frame - ..09 - .11 - .07 
Class norm x Identification x Economic frame  ..00  .15 - .08 
Class norm x Identification x Political frame  ..13†  .02  .44* 
Partisan norm x Identification x Moral frame  ..02  .19 - .17 
Partisan norm x Identification x Economic frame  ..06 - .06  .09 
Partisan norm x Identification x Political frame  ..01 - .21  .20 
Note: Numbers represent unstandardised regression coefficients reported for the step when 
variables are first entered into the model. 
* p < .05; ** p < .01, *** p < .001; † p < .10 
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Identification and norms 
 The regression analysis revealed a significant negative relationship 
between class identification and climate change attitudes, B = -.13, t = -2.73, p = 
.018, CI = [-.24, -.02], but no main effect of either religious/spiritual 
identification, or partisan identification. There was also a significant positive 
relationship between attitudes and class norms, B  = .27, t = 4.64, p < .001, CI = 
[.16, .39], and partisan norms, B = .31, t = 4.50, p < .001, CI = [.17, .44], and a 
marginally significant positive effect of religious/spiritual group norms, B = .12, t 
= 1.92, p = .054, CI = [-.00, .24]. The relationship between both class norms and 
religious/spiritual group norms and attitudes were moderated by level of 
identification with those groups, with the relationship being significant at higher 
levels of identification. Level of identification did not moderate the relationship 
between partisan norms and attitudes. 
The effect of framing 
 Unlike the moral frame in Study 1, in this case the moral frame had no 
impact on the relationship between religious/spiritual group norms and climate 
change attitudes. Similarly, the economic frame did not have any impact on the 
relationship between class group norms and attitudes, nor did the political frame 
moderate the relationship between partisan norms and climate change attitudes.9   
                                                 9 There was a significant effect of the economic frame on the religious/spiritual norms x identification interaction, B = -.17, t = -2.21, p = .028, CI = [-.33, -.02]. As the addition of the frames did not account for a significant increase in the variance explained, this result was not discussed in the body.  There was a significant effect of the moral frame on the class norms x political knowledge interaction, B = .17, t = 2.19, p = .030, CI = [.02, .33]. Analysis of the simple slopes indicates that the relationship between class norms and attitudes at high levels of political knowledge was marginally significant in the control condition, B = .32, t = 1.93, p = .06, CI = [-.01, .66] and significant in the moral frame condition, B = .59, t = 2.13, p = .038, CI = [.03, 1.14]. At lower levels of political knowledge, the relationship between class norms and attitudes was not significant in either the control, B = .32, t = 1.25, p = .219, CI = [-.20, .84], or the moral frame condition, B = -.45, t = -1.43, p = .159, CI = [-1.07, .18].  
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The most notable of the framing effects was a marginally significant four-
way interaction of the impact of the political frame on the relationship between 
class norms and attitudes in interaction with class identification and political 
knowledge, B = .10, t = 1.96, p = .052, CI = [-.00, .20]. Investigation of the simple 
interaction terms indicated that the effect of the political frame on the interaction 
of class norms and identification was significant at high levels of political 
knowledge, B = .44, t = 2.81, p = .006, CI = [.13, .75], but not at low levels, B = 
.02, t = 0.18, p = .857, CI = [-.24, .29]. Further investigation of the simple slopes 
presented in Figures 5 and 6 shows that among those with higher levels of 
political knowledge there was no relationship between class norms and climate 
change attitudes in the control condition at either high levels of identification, B = 
.28, t = 1.26, p = .214, CI = [-.17, .72], or low levels of identification, B = .44, t = 
1.63, p = .11, CI = [-.11, .99]. However, among those exposed to the political 
frame, there was a positive relationship between class norms and attitudes at high 
levels of identification, B = 1.11, t = 3.05, p = .004, CI = [.38, 1.84], and a 
negative relationship at low levels of identification, B = -.79, t = -2.93, p = .005, 
CI = [-1.34, -.25]. Thus, the effect of the political frame in Study 2 among those 
with higher levels of political knowledge mirrors that of the economic frame in 
Study 1, in that it produced a positive relationship between group norms and 
attitudes among high class identifiers while producing a negative relationship 
among low class identifiers.  
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Figure 5. Interaction of class identification and perceived norms on climate 
change attitudes at higher levels of political knowledge and lower levels of 
class identification, across control and political frame condition – Study 2. 
 
 
Figure 6. Interaction of class identification and perceived norms on climate 
change attitudes at higher levels of political knowledge and higher levels of 
class identification, across control and political frame condition – Study 2. 
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Mediation analysis 
Analysis of the simple correlations revealed an interesting pattern of 
relationships. First, there was a positive relationship between the political frame 
and the perceived relevance of climate change to the class group. There was also a 
positive correlation between perceptions of relevance and perceived class norms 
about climate change, along with a positive correlation between perceived class 
norms and attitudes towards climate change. As such, we tested whether the 
political frame had an indirect effect on attitudes towards climate change that was 
mediated through perceptions of relevance to the class group and perceived class 
norms (see Figure 7.).  We used Hayes’ (2013) PROCESS macro (Model 6) to 
test for this dual-mediation effect, bootstrapping (10,000 iterations). The results 
indicated that there was a significant positive indirect effect of the political frame 
on climate change attitudes through perceived relevance to the class group and 
perceived class norms, B = .06, bias corrected 95% CI = [.01, .13]. Neither of the 
simpler mediation effects from the political frame to climate change attitudes 
within this model (i.e. through perceived relevance or perceived norms, alone) 
was significant. The results indicate that the political frame led participants to 
perceive the issue of climate change to be of greater relevance to their class group 
which in turn led them to perceive greater normative concern about climate 
change. This was then reflected in participants’ attitudes towards climate change.  
  
  140
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Mediation model for the effect of the political frame on climate change 
attitudes with perceived relevance to class group and perceived class norms as 
mediators – Study 2. 
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Discussion 
 The results of Study 2 largely replicate and extend the findings of Study 1. 
As in Study 1, we found that group norms exert a positive influence on attitudes 
towards climate change. As in Study 1, class norms had no relationship with 
climate change attitudes in the control condition, but framing (in this case the 
political frame) led to a positive relationship between group norms and attitudes 
among those highly identified with their class group, and a negative relationship 
among low identifiers. In addition, Study 2 extended the results by showing that 
this effect of the frame was limited to those with higher levels of political 
knowledge. In this sense, the results accord with evidence from previous research 
on framing (Slothuus, 2008, Slothuus & de Vresse, 2010). Furthermore, mediation 
analysis indicated that the political frame also had an indirect effect on climate 
change attitudes by increasing the extent to which participants saw the issue as 
relevant to their class group, and increasing the perceived normative concern 
about the issue. Taken together, these results confirm that framing can influence 
attitudes through a process of referent informational influence (Turner et al, 1987) 
by establishing the relevance of a particular group identity to the issue, such that 
individual’s attitudes come to be a reflection of the group’s norms and their 
relationship to the group. 
General Discussion 
Drawing on the social identity understanding of attitudes and social 
influence, the present research aimed to investigate whether the way an issue is 
framed can affect the perceived relevance of various social identities and the 
extent to which the norms associated with those identities predict attitudes 
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towards the issue. Across two studies, participants were randomly assigned to 
experimental conditions in which climate change was framed as either a moral, 
economic, or political (Study 2 only) issue, or in the absence of such a frame. We 
tested the prediction that the attitudes towards climate change of those highly 
identified with their religious/spiritual, class and partisan group would reflect 
perceived group norms, and particularly so when climate change was framed in a 
way that emphasised the relevance of the issue to that specific group. We also 
investigated the effect of framing among those who did not highly identify with 
these groups. 
There was a consistent pattern across both studies that group norms 
positively predicted the climate change attitudes of highly identified group 
members. In both studies, as expected, group norms predicted attitudes of those 
highly identified with their religious/spiritual group, a relationship that was found 
across framing conditions. Likewise, in Study 2, the attitudes of those highly 
identified with their partisan group were positively related to partisan group 
norms regardless of how climate change was framed. For those highly identified 
with their class group, however, we found that the relationship between group 
norms and climate change attitudes was contingent on the issue being framed in a 
way that highlighted the relevance of the issue to that group identity. In Study 1, 
this effect was found across the highly educated sample, whereas in Study 2 it was 
limited to those with higher levels of political knowledge.  
The findings for group members with lower levels of identification were 
somewhat different. In the absence of a specific frame in both studies there was 
no relationship between class group norms and attitudes towards climate change 
at low levels of identification. However, among low identifiers exposed to a frame 
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that emphasised the relevance of climate change to class identity, group norms 
had a negative influence on attitudes. That is, framing led those with little sense of 
identification to their class group to report attitudes that were at odds with their 
understanding of the group norm. Again, the effect was found across a highly 
educated sample in Study 1, and in Study 2 was limited to those with higher levels 
of political knowledge.  
Framing also had an effect on the relationship between group norms and 
attitudes among low religious/spiritual group identifiers in Study 1. In the control 
condition, there was a positive relationship between religious/spiritual group 
norms and attitudes among low identifiers, however this relationship was non-
significant among those exposed to the moral frame. That is, framing climate 
change in a way that highlighted its relevance to the religious/spiritual identity 
undermined the relationship between group norms and attitudes among low 
identifiers.  
This pattern of results supports the notion that framing can influence the 
extent to which people view the issue of climate change through the prism of 
various group identities. Participants’ attitudes towards climate change became, at 
least in part, an expression of their relationship to the group. When climate change 
was framed as a moral issue in Study 1, those who were highly identified with 
their religious/spiritual group were influenced by their understanding of the group 
norms, while those who felt little identification with their religious/spiritual group 
effectively disregarded the norms of the group when considering their attitudes 
towards climate change. Similarly, when climate change was framed as an 
economic issue (Study 1), or a political issue (Study 2), those who were highly 
identified with their class group gravitated towards the normative position of the 
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group, while those with lower levels of class group identification reported 
attitudes that were polarised away from what they perceived to be the group norm. 
In other words, participants with higher levels of identification displayed greater 
fidelity to group norms, particularly when the frame linked the group to the issue 
of climate change. 
While the results of the frame manipulations were largely consistent with 
those hypothesised, it is worth considering why neither the moral nor economic 
frames had an impact on attitudes in Study 2, and why it was that the political 
rather than economic frame that appeared had an affect via class identity and 
norms in Study 2. The fact that neither the moral nor economic frames had the 
predicted effects indicates that they were not successful in establishing or 
accentuating the extent to which participants viewed their religious/spiritual, class 
or partisan identity as relevant to the climate change. That is, either participants 
did not find the frames convincing or compelling in terms of influencing their 
understanding of the social meaning of climate change and it alignment with the 
content of their religious/spiritual, class or partisan identity. Or, perhaps these 
frames were similar in content to those participants had already encountered in 
public discourse and thus had no additional effect in establishing the relevance of 
climate change to those identity groups. 
The fact that the political frame had an impact on class identity rather than 
partisan identity indicates that the content of the frame in some way resonated 
with the meaning participants ascribed to their class identity, more so than their 
partisan identity. This is understandable given that the different political parties in 
the UK represent, to some degree, class-based interests and these interests are 
often implicated in political debate. Indeed, the political frame did not explicitly 
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identify the various political parties, but it did link climate change to questions of 
wealth and fairness, which may have evoked participants’ sense of class identity. 
In any case, our primary interest is this research is not so much determining what 
element of the frame was pivotal in establishing the relevance of the issue to the 
group identity, but demonstrating that it can do so, and can thereby influence 
participants’ attitudes. 
One notable aspect of the results, particularly in Study 1, was the strong 
main effect of religious/spiritual group norms across the sample. This may be a 
product of the tenor of the public debate about climate change in Australia at the 
time of the study - in the weeks leading up to the Copenhagen climate change 
summit. At that time, both the government and the main opposition party in 
Australia supported the introduction of an emissions trading scheme and planned 
to use the Copenhagen summit to lobby other countries to take similar action. The 
dominant frame from both sides of politics, as reflected in the media coverage, 
was that climate change was an existential threat to the future of the planet. The 
economic frame had largely been relegated to the margins. In this context, it is 
hardly surprising that participants, even those highly identified with their 
economic group, should interpret the issue through the moral prism and connect it 
to a group that resonated with that frame. Participants in the control condition 
may have been operating on the basis of an implicit moral frame. This accords 
with the findings of Sniderman and Theriault (2004) who noted that a “frame can 
be a sufficient condition to define an issue. But it is not a necessary one. Issues 
can be meaningful even in the absence of a ‘frame’” (p. 151). To the extent that 
they interpreted the issue in moral terms even in the absence of an explicit moral 
frame, it follows that those highly identified with their religious/spiritual group 
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would report attitudes in line with group norms. While the moral frame may have 
made this connection explicit, it served merely to reinforce rather than accentuate 
the existing normative influence among high identifiers. As the economic element 
of the issue was less salient, it was only when the economic frame made the 
connection between climate change and the class group explicit that high 
identifiers conformed to the norms of their class group.  
It is also worth considering why in both studies framing produced a 
negative relationship between group norms and the attitudes of low class 
identifiers, particularly when the effect of group norms among low 
religious/spiritual group and partisan group identifiers were either mildly positive 
or not apparent at all. The answer may have something to do with the nature of 
these respective identities. For most people, religious/spiritual orientation and 
party affiliation is voluntarily chosen and one can change or redefine them as they 
see fit. Furthermore, with respect to religious/spiritual orientation, we provided a 
range of identity options such that someone who had disavowed an erstwhile 
religious affiliation such as Christianity (for example) could identify as an 
agnostic or atheist rather than as a low-identified Christian. As such, a low level 
of identification with those who share the same religious/spiritual orientation or 
party affiliation likely indicates that that particular aspect of identity is not 
generally an important element of the individual’s self-concept; it implies 
neutrality, or a lack of valence, rather than negative valence. Once the moral 
frame in Study 1 linked religious/spiritual identity to the issue of climate change it 
prompted low identifiers to dismiss those group norms as irrelevant in formulating 
their attitudes. Respondents’ understanding of religious/spiritual group norms thus 
had little or no bearing on their reported attitude towards climate change. Class, 
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by contrast, is usually understood as a function of one’s family background, 
education, profession, or material living standard and is therefore not so readily 
assumed or redefined as a simple act of will. Consequently, a low level of class 
identification is more likely to be indicative of a negative attitude towards the 
group and that aspect of one’s identity. Therefore, once the economic (Study 1) or 
political (Study 2) frame linked climate change to their class identity, the negative 
valence associated with the identity among low identifiers led them to not simply 
disregard the group norms, but to actively repudiate them. 
Theoretical implications 
These findings contribute to the literature on social identity processes of 
social influence in a number of ways. The results provide experimental support 
for the work of Reicher, Hopkins and colleagues (e.g. Reicher & Hopkins, 1996a, 
Reicher & Hopkins, 1996b, Reicher, Hopkins & Condor, 1997, Reicher & 
Hopkins, 2001a, Reicher and Hopkins, 2001b; Reicher, 2004; Kahani-Hopkins & 
Hopkins, 2002; Hopkins & Kahani-Hopkins, 2004; Haslam, Reicher & Platow, 
2010) on the effects of political rhetoric on the identities through which people 
understand political issues. In particular, the current research demonstrates that 
the way an issue is framed in public debate can affect the likelihood that particular 
social identities will be used to give meaning to the issue, and the extent to which 
the associated group norms will influence attitudes. As framing is just one of the 
means entrepreneurs of identity use to influence public opinion, future research 
should seek to investigate other strategies, such as how and when political elites 
are able to successfully redefine group boundaries. 
By demonstrating that linking an issue to particular groups can lead group 
norms to exert a negative influence on the attitudes of low identifiers, these 
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findings also raise interesting questions about the process of group-based social 
influence. Our results suggest that the process of group-based social influence is 
not only relevant to high identifiers (see Terry & Hogg, 1996; Terry et al., 1999), 
but can also have a reciprocal effect among low identifiers. Group-based social 
influence could be seen as a symmetrical process of attraction to, and repulsion 
from, group norms, depending on the salience of the referent group, the level of 
identification, and the meaning associated with the group. Taken together with 
previous research showing that people react against the position espoused by 
outgroup sources (e.g. Mackie & Queller, 2000; Slothuus & de Vreese, 2010), the 
current results suggest that, at least in some cases, people will also react against 
the position of ingroups. As such, it may be useful for researchers to distinguish 
ingroups for which people feel positive, neutral or negative valence, in addition to 
distinguishing between ingroups and outgroups. 
The varying effects of the frames, from positive effects among high 
identifiers to negative effects among low identifiers, to no effect at all, suggest 
that those who receive such messages will interpret them in light of their existing 
understanding of the groups and issues involved. As such, those who seek to 
manipulate the meanings people attach to issues and groups need to start from a 
solid understanding of the existing meanings, and the range of meanings that their 
targets may be willing to accept - much like the latitudes of acceptance, rejection 
and non-commitment in Sherif and Hovland’s (1961) study of attitudes - and 
work to find areas of potential overlap or alignment between the meaning of the 
issue and the content of the group.  
The fact that the frames were effective among a highly educated sample 
(Study 1) and among those with high levels of political awareness (Study 2) 
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suggests that interpreting frames in such a way as to recognise the alignment 
between issue and group meaning (i.e. relevance) is not always straightforward, 
particularly when the frame does not explicitly draw the connection. In these 
cases, it may be that a requisite level of ability and motivation on the part of the 
recipient (more common among the politically aware) is a necessary, if not a 
sufficient, pre-condition for this type of identity-based frame to have an impact on 
attitudes. This lends further credence to the notion that group-based social 
influence can result from a thoughtful, rational process (Mackie, et al, 1990; 1992, 
Wyer, 2010; Kahan et al, 2012; Kahan, 2013). The results accord with previous 
research showing that people do not simply conform to group norms on any given 
issue; that the extent to which they are influenced by group norms on a given 
issue is critically dependent upon how relevant they see their group identity to that 
issue (Smith, et al, 2005), as well as how they feel about the group. Similarly, the 
fact that the political frame had a direct impact on attitudes (moderated by group 
identity and norms) at high levels of political knowledge and an indirect effect 
(mediated by group relevance and norms) that was independent of political 
knowledge adds to previous findings from the issue framing literature (Slothuus, 
2008; Slothuus & de Vreese, 2010), which indicate that political awareness 
moderates not only the effect of issue frames, but also the process through which 
they operate. 
In confirming the importance of group norms in shaping people’s attitudes 
towards climate change, these results are also in line with research indicating that 
attitudes towards climate change are as much an expression of ‘with whom one 
stands’ as ‘what one knows’ on the issue (Kahan et al, 2012; Kahan 2013; Kahan, 
2015, Bliuc et al, 2015). Moreover, the current research offers valuable insights 
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into the process by which issues come to be seen as relevant to particular group 
identities, and, importantly, how these associations might be influenced through 
framing.  
On a more practical level, the results highlight the benefits of measuring 
group identification, even in studies where identity salience is manipulated. While 
many studies assume that an in-group will be self-defining when made highly 
salient, this may not be the case for low identifiers. Participants may report that 
they are a member of a group (e.g. social class, university), but not identify 
strongly with the group even when it is made salient. The results of the current 
study suggest that the effect of salience manipulations can be very different 
depending on the level of identification. 
The current research also has implications for the literature on issue 
framing, demonstrating the importance of considering group processes and a 
broader understanding of the social context in which attitudes are formed and 
influenced (see Hogg & Smith, 2007). The findings support Nelson and Kinder’s 
(1996) assertion that group-centrism plays a significant role in public opinion and 
can vary according to how issues are framed. However, the results take this one 
step further by highlighting the role that social identity processes play in this 
group-centrism. That is, issue frames can enhance the perceived relevance of a 
particular group identity, leading to a process of referent informational influence 
whereby individuals’ attitudes are influenced by the perceived norms of the 
group. This is compatible with the traditional understanding of attitudes based on 
expectancy value models (see Azjen & Fishbein, 1980), but extends it by 
suggesting that frames not only influence the range or relative weight of 
considerations that bear on individuals’ attitudes, they can also influence how 
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people see themselves in relation to the issue, and how this impacts on their 
understanding of the issue as well as the groups and group norms that are relevant 
to it. As such, these findings complement previous research in the area (Price, 
1989), and indicate that frames need not refer explicitly to groups or group 
conflict in order to establish the relevance of groups to an issue. Even subtle 
frames that merely allude to or resonate with the content of group identities can 
lead recipients to view the issue through the prism of group membership. 
On a practical level, the present research lends weight to the American 
Psychological Association’s (2009) call for psychologists to investigate the 
human dimension of climate change. They suggest that the nature of the political 
debate about climate change can have a considerable impact on public attitudes. 
Moreover, to the extent that entrepreneurs of identity can influence the way an 
issue like climate change is discussed and characterised in public debate, they can 
hold considerable sway over public opinion. However, the findings also sound a 
note of caution, in that framing can lead to unintended consequences, repelling 
low identifiers away from group norms as much as attracting high identifiers 
toward them.  
To the extent that the issue’s association with ideological Culture wars 
presents a barrier to achieving a public and political consensus about taking action 
to address climate change, these results offer some cause for optimism. They 
suggest that such associations should not be taken as a necessary or inevitable part 
of the equation; that there is scope to shift the social meaning of an issue like 
climate change and the types of identities that are connected to it. Identifying 
what would be the ideal strategy is not the aim of the current paper, however, it 
would make sense to frame climate change messages around identities that span 
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the political/ideological divide and are capable of uniting both sides. Explaining 
how the issue affects the national group, for example, and how taking action is 
congruent with national interests and values (values that are neither liberal nor 
conservative) may be one avenue worth exploring. 
Limitations and future directions 
It should be noted that the participants in both studies predominantly 
reported a high degree of concern about climate change. Future research should 
examine whether the pattern of results may vary further for those who are either 
less concerned or less convinced of the risks associated with climate change. 
Another factor to consider about the design of these studies was that attitudes 
towards climate change were measured immediately following exposure to the 
frame manipulations. One might expect that the impact of such frames would be 
greatest immediately following exposure, and would fade rapidly over time. It is 
also possible, however, that the effect would increase with time as participants 
have the chance to reflect and fully process the messages. Finally, while the 
design of this research, with individuals exposed to a single frame manipulation in 
isolation, is appropriate for drawing causal inferences about the effect of the 
frame, the real-world experience of political communication is one where 
individuals are exposed to many, often countervailing, messages. Future research 
should explore the impact of exposure to multiple, competing frames. Similarly, 
research should look to real-world examples of communication campaigns to 
establish whether these coincided with measurable shifts in public sentiment. 
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Conclusion 
The present studies demonstrate that the way an issue is framed can 
influence the group identities people see as relevant to the issue, and the norms 
that affect their attitudes. Thus, to the extent that political elites can influence the 
way that issues are framed in public debate, they have considerable power to 
shape public opinion. However framing can have unintended consequences, doing 
as much to turn low identifiers away from group norms as attracting high 
identifiers to them. As such, those who seek to influence public opinion by linking 
issues to group identities need to consider the nature of the groups they evoke and 
the relationship between their audience and the group. 
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1. Interaction of religious/spiritual identification and perceived 
norms on climate change attitudes at higher levels of religious/spiritual 
identification, across control and moral frame condition – Study 1. 
Figure 2. Interaction of religious/spiritual identification and perceived 
norms on climate change attitudes at lower levels of religious/spiritual 
identification, across control and moral frame condition – Study 1. 
Figure 3. Interaction of class identification and perceived norms on climate 
change attitudes at higher levels of class identification, across control and 
economic frame condition – Study 1. 
Figure 4. Interaction of class identification and perceived norms on climate 
change attitudes at lower levels of class identification, across control and 
economic frame condition – Study 1. 
Figure 5. Interaction of class identification and perceived norms on climate 
change attitudes at higher levels of political knowledge and lower levels of 
class identification, across control and political frame condition – Study 2. 
Figure 6. Interaction of class identification and perceived norms on climate 
change attitudes at lower levels of political knowledge and lower levels of 
class identification, across control and political frame condition – Study 2. 
Figure 7. Mediation model for the effect of the political frame on climate 
change attitudes with perceived relevance to class group and perceived class 
norms as mediators – Study 2. 
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Appendix A 
Items measuring climate change attitudes (Study 1) 
1. It is the responsibility of the current generation to preserve the 
environment for those that follow. 
2. If we followed the advice of environmentalists the economy would be 
ruined.* 
3. Australia should take the lead in global efforts to combat the effects of 
climate change. 
4. We all need to be prepared to make sacrifices if we want to avoid 
environmental catastrophe. 
5. The evidence that human activity is responsible for climate change is not 
very convincing.* 
6. We need to take whatever steps are necessary to reduce carbon emissions 
regardless of the economic costs. 
7. We should not take any action that threatens our nation’s economic 
competitiveness.* 
8. Australia should introduce an emissions trading scheme as soon as 
possible in order to reduce carbon emissions. 
9. We should wait to see what other countries are prepared to do before 
committing to any action on climate change.* 
10. We have a moral obligation to protect the environment against the effects 
of climate change. 
Items measuring group identification (Study 1 & 2) 
1. I have a lot in common with the average [……..] person. 
2. I feel solidarity with the [……..]. 
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3. Being [……..] is an important part of how I see myself. 
4. I am glad to be [……..]. 
5. The [……..] have a lot in common with each other. 
Items measuring perceived group norms (Study 1) 
6. A typical member of this group would think that climate change is one of 
the most urgent threats we face. 
7. A typical member of this group would think that we should do whatever is 
necessary to reduce carbon emissions. 
8. A typical member of this group would think that we should not act until 
we see what other countries are prepared to do.* 
Items measuring climate change attitudes (Study 2) 
1. It is the responsibility of the current generation to preserve the 
environment for those that follow. 
2. There is little doubt that climate change is happening. 
3. The evidence that human activity is responsible for climate change is not 
very convincing.* 
4. There is a danger that climate change could lead to environmental 
catastrophe. 
5. We need to take whatever steps are necessary to reduce carbon dioxide 
emissions regardless of the economic costs. 
6. There is too much alarmism about climate change.* 
7. Reducing the amount of carbon dioxide humans emit into the atmosphere 
is vital if we are to combat climate change. 
8. We have a moral obligation to protect the environment against the effects 
of climate change. 
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Items measuring perceived group norms (Study 2) 
1. A typical […….] would believe that climate change is real. 
 
2. A typical […….] would believe that human activity is largely responsible 
for climate change 
 
3. A typical […….] would consider climate change to be one of the most 
urgent threats we face. 
 
4. A typical […….] would think that we should do whatever we can to 
reduce carbon dioxide emissions. 
Items measuring political knowledge (Study 2) 
1.  David Cameron represents which electorate in the House of Commons? 
a) Sedgefield b) Huntingdon c) Finchley d) Witney e) Unsure 
 
2.  How many MPs are there in the House of Commons? 
a) 230 b) 650 c) 590 d) 430 e) Unsure 
 
3.  In what year was Margaret Thatcher first elected Prime Minister? 
a) 1979 b) 1976 c) 1981 d) 1983 e) Unsure 
 
4.  What party did Herbert Asquith represent as Prime Minister? 
a) Conservative b) Labour c) 
Liberal 
Democrat 
d) Liberal e) Unsure 
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5.  Who is the Chancellor of the Exchequer? 
a) 
William 
Hague 
b) 
Nick 
Clegg 
c) 
George 
Osborne 
d) 
Danny 
Alexander 
e) Unsure 
 
6.  Who is the current speaker in the House of Commons? 
a) 
Lindsay 
Hoyle 
b) 
Nigel 
Evans 
c) 
Dawn 
Primarolo 
d) 
John 
Bercow 
e) Unsure 
 
7.  Who is the deputy leader of the Labour Party? 
a) 
Ed 
Milliband 
b) 
Harriet 
Harman 
c) Ed Balls d) 
Yvette 
Cooper 
e) Unsure 
 
8.  Who is the leader of the Liberal Democrats? 
a) 
Nick 
Clegg 
b) 
Danny 
Alexander 
c) 
Vince 
Cable 
d) 
Michael 
Moore 
e) Unsure 
 
* Indicates reverse scored items. 
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Appendix B 
Responses to item concerning self-identified religious/spiritual group – Study 1 
 
Category N % 
Christian 94 21.2 
Muslim 9 2.0 
Hindu - - 
Jewish 3 0.7 
Buddhist - - 
Spiritual but not religious 64 14.4 
Agnostic 82 18.5 
Atheist 154 34.7 
Other 32 7.2 
Missing 6 1.4 
Total 444 100.0 
 
Responses to item concerning self-identified socio-economic class group – Study 
1 
 
Category N % 
Upper class 17 3.8 
Middle class 351 79.1 
Working class 34 7.7 
Poor 12 2.7 
Other 22 5.0 
Missing 8 1.8 
Total 444 100.0 
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Responses to item concerning self-identified religious/spiritual group – Study 2 
Category N % 
Christian 162 58.7 
Muslim 4 1.4 
Hindu 3 1.1 
Jewish 7 2.5 
Buddhist - - 
Spiritual but not religious - - 
Agnostic 23 8.3 
Atheist 53 19.2 
Other 21 7.6 
Missing 3 114 
Total 276 100.0 
 
Responses to item concerning self-identified socio-economic class group – Study 
2 
Category N % 
Upper class 3 1.1 
Middle class 135 48.9 
Working class 130 47.1 
Poor - - 
Other 7 2.5 
Missing 1 0.4 
Total 276 100.0 
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Responses to item concerning self-identified partisan group – Study 2 
Category N % 
Conservative supporter 68 24.6 
Labour supporter 60 21.7 
Liberal Democrat supporter 20 7.2 
Supporter or another party 17 6.2 
Do not support any political party 107 38.8 
Missing 4 1.4 
Total 276 100.0 
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Appendix C 
 
Frame manipulations – Study 2 
 
Control condition 
Attitudes towards climate change 
 
 
Moral frame condition 
Climate change – the greatest moral challenge of our time 
Climate change is one of the most pressing problems we face as a community. 
There are arguments about how serious the problem is and what should be done 
about it, but at a deeper level, climate change forces us to confront fundamental 
moral questions. 
There are many who see the natural environment as a sacred gift. They believe we 
have a particular responsibility to live in harmony with and care for the 
environment, ensuring God’s creation is preserved for generations to come. From 
this perspective, an appropriate response to climate change must start with a 
commitment to sustainability and recognition of the inter-relatedness of all life. 
Others, however, see our relationship to the natural world very differently. 
According to this more secular view, people have dominion over nature and 
humanity’s interests naturally take precedence over the environment. In this 
sense, the environment is valuable to the extent that it provides resources to 
advance people’s material wellbeing. 
To help us understand the many varied perspective, in the remainder of the 
survey, we are interested in your attitudes about climate change and what you 
perceive to be the views held by others. 
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Economic frame condition 
Climate change – the greatest economic challenge of our time 
Climate change is one of the most pressing problems we face as a community. 
There are arguments about how serious the problem is and what should be done 
about it, but at a deeper level, climate change forces us to confront fundamental 
questions about the nature of our economy and society. 
Addressing climate change will involve significant changes to our economic and 
social structure. This may lead to resistance from those at the top of the economic 
pile who might fear that any change will threaten their relatively privileged 
position. 
However, if we fail to adequately respond to climate change, it may be those 
hardworking people in the middle and lower end of the social and economic 
ladder who actually bear the greatest burden. 
To help us understand the many varied perspective, in the remainder of the 
survey, we are interested in your attitudes about climate change and what you 
perceive to be the views held by others. 
 
  
  164
Political frame condition 
Climate change – the greatest political challenge of our time 
Climate change is one of the most pressing problems we face as a community. 
There are arguments about how serious the problem is and what should be done 
about it, but at a deeper level, climate change forces us to confront fundamental 
political questions. 
Our political system tends to place a great deal of emphasis on the pursuit of 
individual wealth and autonomy. However, this focus can come at the expense of 
environmental sustainability. 
To address climate change, politicians from all sides have to strike a balance 
between values of wealth and autonomy, and values of sustainability and fairness 
in order to serve the common good. 
To help us understand the many varied perspective, in the remainder of the 
survey, we are interested in your attitudes about climate change and what you 
perceive to be the views held by others. 
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Chapter 7 - Conclusion 
This thesis aimed to extend our understanding of the processes involved in 
group-based social influence. Drawing on the social identity approach to social 
influence (Tajfel, 1972; Tajfel & Turner, 1979, Turner et al, 1987), this thesis 
examined the critical role that the perceived relevance of an issue to a group 
identity plays in group-based social influence. It also investigated whether this 
process can be influenced by frames designed to affect the way people understand 
either the issue or the group.  
The social identity approach to social influence is based on the notion that 
we regard people who are similar to ourselves as valid sources of information 
about reality. We both expect to agree with similar others and are motivated to do 
so (Turner, 1982; 1991). In line with this theory, research has shown that 
individuals’ perceptions, attitudes and behaviour are influenced by the groups 
with which they identify (e.g. Terry & Hogg, 1996; Terry, Hogg & White, 1999). 
However, evidence from both the social identity (e.g. Smith et al, 2005) and 
persuasion (e.g. Mackie et al, 1990; Wyer, 2010) literature suggest that this 
group-based influence is limited to those issues that are perceived to be relevant 
to the group. This sense of relevance depends upon a degree of congruence 
between the meaning attached to the group (i.e. what the group stands for, what 
interests and values it represents) and the meaning associated with the issue (what 
interests and values are implicated). Where there is congruence or alignment, the 
attitudes of group members, particularly those highly identified with the group, 
will tend to reflect group norms. Where this congruence does not exist, where the 
issue is not perceived to be relevant to the group, there is no compulsion to seek 
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or reach agreement with other group members; since the issue does not implicate 
group interests or values, it is only natural for group members to differ. 
In many cases it is quite clear which issues are relevant to a particular 
group identity, or which group identity is relevant to a particular issue. In other 
cases, however, these judgements are not so clear-cut. There can be a degree of 
ambiguity in the meanings people attach to both groups and issues. That is, there 
may be a range of group identities that could be perceived as relevant to a 
particular issue. The corollary is that to the extent that the norms of these various 
groups differ on the issue in question, one’s attitude towards the issue could vary 
considerably depending on which group is perceived to be relevant. As such, 
anything that affects one’s understanding of the nature of the issue, or of various 
groups, could have a marked impact on one’s attitude towards the issue. 
A great deal of research in the communication and political science 
literature has demonstrated that the meaning people attach to issues is often 
highly ambiguous and attitudes can be influenced by issue frames which highlight 
certain meanings over others (see Chong & Druckman, 2007 for a review).  
Similarly, research from the social identity tradition indicates that the meaning 
attached to group identities can vary with shifts in the social context (e.g. Hopkins 
et al, 1997; Rabinovic et al, 2011). Qualitative research by Reicher, Hopkins and 
colleagues also suggests that the meaning attached to social groups is susceptible 
to rhetorical manipulation (see Reicher & Hopkins, 1996a; Reicher & Hopkins, 
1996b; Reicher & Hopkins, 2001; Kahani-Hopkins & Hopkins, 2002; Hopkins & 
Kahani-Hopkins, 2004; Reicher, 2004; Haslam, Reicher & Platow, 2010). If the 
meaning attached to both issues and groups is variable and open to influence, then 
  167 
manipulating one or other to establish the relevance of an issue to a group identity 
is a potential strategy for those who seek to influence public opinion. 
The current research investigated these processes of social influence 
through four empirical studies in the context of real-world issues and real-world 
groups. The first two studies investigated the effect of frames designed to 
manipulate the perceived relevance of Christian identity to different types of 
political issues. The final two studies examined the potential to manipulate the 
perceived relevance of climate change to different social identities. The results of 
these studies have implications for our understanding of the processes involved in 
group-based social influence, as well as the research techniques used to 
investigate them. The results also have implications for the practice of social 
influence, with lessons for those who would seek to influence attitudes towards 
important social issues. 
Study 1 
Study 1 investigated the role of religious identification and its influence 
on attitudes towards different types of issues. Research on the intersection of 
religion and politics consistently finds a strong relationship between religiosity 
and conservative political attitudes (Malka, Lelkes, Srivastava, Cohen & Miller, 
2012; Guth, Kellstedt, Smidt & Green, 2006; Layman & Green, 2005; Olson & 
Green, 2006). However, this relationship is largely confined to what are called 
‘cultural’ issues (e.g. abortion, gay rights). Based on the premise that this 
connection is driven at least in part by elite religious and political rhetoric that 
emphasises the relevance of these types of issues over others, we sought to 
determine whether simple frames could influence the extent to which religious 
identity and norms predict attitudes towards different types of issues. 
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We presented a sample of self-identified Christians from Australia with 
simple messages about the types of issues that are relevant to their Christian faith. 
In one condition, we emphasised the relevance of cultural issues, in another we 
emphasised the relevance of civic issues (i.e. welfare, climate change, asylum 
seekers). We also included a control condition in order to capture the underlying 
position based on participants’ understanding of their religious faith and the types 
of issues relevant to it. In line with previous research, we found that those who 
reported higher levels of Christian identification were more likely to hold 
conservative attitudes towards cultural issues, but that this connection did not 
extend to civic issues. The fact that the relationship between Christian 
identification and conservative attitudes was confined to the types of issues 
commonly framed in religious terms in public discourse supports the notion that 
elite rhetoric does indeed inform the way people understand their religious 
identity and its relevance to political issues.  
We also found that the frame highlighting the relevance of Christian 
identity to both moral and civic issues produced normative influence on attitudes 
towards climate change. However, this was the only instance where the frame 
manipulation had an effect. The absence of any impact of messages highlighting 
the relevance of cultural issues to the Christian faith may have been because 
participants are regularly exposed to similar messages outside the lab. However, 
the fact that the frame manipulations had no effect on the relationship between 
Christian norms and attitudes towards other civic issues suggested that a more 
elaborate type of message may be required to readily alter the way people 
understand the relationship between their faith and political issues. 
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Study 2 
Study 2 built in the findings of Study 1, again in the context of Christian 
identity, but with a sample from the United Kingdom. In this study, we examined 
the effect of more elaborate messages designed to influence the types of core 
values that people associate with their faith and their religious group. In one 
condition, we presented participants with a message that framed Christian identity 
in terms of family values, in another in terms of social justice values. Again, we 
included a control condition to capture the underlying sense in which participants 
understand their religious faith and its connection to various issues.  
As in Study 1, we found that Christian identification was strongly 
associated with conservative attitudes towards cultural issues, but not civic issues. 
We found that the frames had a more pronounced impact on the connection 
between religious identification, norms and political attitudes than was the case in 
Study 1. Defining Christian identity in terms of family values either precipitated 
or accentuated the influence of Christian norms on attitudes towards euthanasia 
and abortion, respectively, among high identifiers. The family values frame also 
led to normative influence on attitudes towards welfare among high Christian 
identifiers, and undermined normative influence among low identifiers. This 
finding was notable in two respects: first, it suggested that the family values 
frame led participants to see welfare (an ostensibly civic issue) as relevant to their 
religious identity, and secondly, the frame had a contrary impact among low 
identifiers (undermining normative influence) to that among high identifiers. 
The social justice frame also had significant effects, undermining the 
extent to which Christian norms predicted attitudes towards abortion. This 
suggests that framing religious identity in a way that emphasised the relevance of 
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civic issues had the effect of undermining the perceived relevance of cultural 
issues. The social justice frame also undermined normative influence on attitudes 
towards climate change among low identifiers, again showing that the effect of 
establishing the relevance of an identity to an issue can be moderated by the level 
of group identification. 
Study 3 
Whereas Studies 1 and 2 examined the effect of framing group identity, 
Study 3 looked at the effect of framing an issue, and shifted the focus to 
specifically examine attitudes to climate change. Working with an Australian 
sample, we examined whether the effect of issue frames commonly found in 
public debate about climate change had an effect on the extent to which different 
group identities and norms predicted attitudes. In one condition, climate change 
was framed as a moral issue, in another condition as an economic issue. As with 
earlier studies, we included a control condition in which the issue was not framed 
in any particular way in order to capture participants’ underlying understanding of 
the issue. 
We found that the norms of both religious/spiritual group and class group 
were positively related to attitudes towards climate change among those highly 
identified with the group. The relationship between class group norms and climate 
change attitudes was only evident among high identifiers exposed to the 
economic frame, suggesting that the frame was successful in establishing the 
relevance of the issue to the group. The relationship between norms and attitudes 
among those highly identified with their religious/spiritual group was evident in 
both the control condition and the moral frame condition, indicating that high 
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identifiers saw the group as relevant to the issue regardless of framing, and the 
moral frame served to reinforce rather than enhance this impression.  
The results for low identifiers were somewhat similar to those found in 
Study 2. The moral frame worked to undermine relationship between group 
norms and attitudes among low religious/spiritual group identifiers, while the 
economic frame produced a negative relationship between class group norms and 
attitudes among low class identifiers. The results among low identified group 
members suggest that the frame established a link between the issue and the 
group. We speculate that the fact that this link eliminated the relationship between 
group norms and attitudes among low religious/spiritual group identifiers while 
producing a reactance against group norms among low class identifiers was due to 
the different nature of these identities and the resulting valence associated with 
low identification.  
Study 4 
Study 4 built on the findings of Study 3, again in the context of attitudes 
towards climate change, but with a sample from the United Kingdom. Once 
again, climate change was framed in different ways across conditions, but in this 
study more elaborate frame manipulations were employed to influence the types 
of values associated with the issue. Given the considerable evidence that attitudes 
towards climate change have become increasingly politicised in recent times 
(Kahan et al, 2012; Kahan, 2013), a political frame condition was included in the 
study design, as were measures of partisan identification and norms. Again, we 
included a control condition without any explicit frame. Study 4 also included a 
measure of political knowledge to test whether the effect of framing was greater 
among those who were more engaged with politics (Slothuus, 2008; Slothuus & 
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de Vreese, 2010), and we directly measured the extent to which participants 
regarded climate change as relevant to their religious/spiritual, class and partisan 
groups in order to test whether changes in perceived relevance mediated the effect 
of the frames. 
The results of Study 4 largely replicate and extend those of Study 3. As in 
Study 3, group norms predicted attitudes towards climate change. As in Study 3, 
class norms had no effect on climate change attitudes in the control condition, but 
framing (in this case the political frame) appeared to establish a link between 
class identity and the issue, leading high identifiers to report attitudes in line with 
their perception of group norms, while low identifiers reported attitudes polarized 
away from group norms. Study 4 extended these results by showing that this 
effect of the political frame was limited to those with higher levels of political 
knowledge. In this sense, the results accord with evidence from previous research 
on framing (Slothuus, 2008, Slothuus & de Vresse, 2010). Furthermore, 
mediation analysis indicated that there was an indirect effect of the political 
frame. The political frame led participants to perceive climate change to be more 
relevant to their class group, which in turn increased the perceived normative 
concern about the issue, which was reflected in participants’ attitudes. These 
results indicate that framing can influence attitudes by establishing the relevance 
of a particular group identity to the issue, and that framing can lead individual’s 
attitudes to become a reflection of the group norms and their relationship to the 
group. 
Overall findings 
Taken as a whole, there are a number of themes that emerge from the 
findings of these four studies. I will discuss each of the main themes in turn. 
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Group-based social influence 
Across the studies, the results were consistent with the standard group-
based social influence pattern (e.g. Terry & Hogg, 1996). In each of the studies, 
we found that participant attitudes were in line with the norms of groups with 
which they identified. Often this was exclusively or at least particularly the case 
for those who strongly identified with the group. In many cases, this pattern was 
evident in the control condition of the studies – i.e. in the absence of explicit 
framing. This reflects the fact that participants did not come to the studies as 
blank slates; they came with existing understandings of the issues and the groups 
involved, which informed their judgements of the relevance of specific group 
identities to specific issues. These understandings and this evidence of the 
underlying perceptions of the relevance of particular groups to issues (and vice 
versa) presumably reflect frames that participants have encountered in their 
private interactions and public discourse.  
The impact of frames 
The results indicate that the process of group-based social influence can 
be manipulated by rhetorical frames designed to shift participants’ understanding 
of the nature of the group or the meaning of the issue. In some cases the frame 
either produced or accentuated the impact of group norms. In others, the frame 
appeared to have the effect of undermining normative influence, and in some 
cases actually led to counter-normative influence. These results are consistent 
with the notion that the frames established the relevance of the issue to the group 
identity (or vice versa) by creating an alignment between recipients’ 
understanding of the content of the identity and the social meaning of the issue. 
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And in the final study (Study 4), relevance was explicitly measured to 
demonstrate its role in mediating the effect of the frame.  
The moderating effect of the level and nature of group identification 
While frames tended to produce or accentuate the relationship between 
group norms and attitudes among those who were strongly identified with the 
group, the results were very different for those with low levels of identification. 
In a number of cases, frames that established the relevance of an issue to a group 
had the effect of undermining a certain level of normative influence among low 
identifiers. That is, those who might otherwise have reported attitudes in line with 
group norms tended to disregard group norms when the frame made the 
connection explicit. In other cases, though, the frames led low identifiers to report 
attitudes that were polarized away from group norms. This polarization occurred 
only among those with low levels of class identification and was not evident for 
the other group identities explored across the studies (i.e. Christian identity, 
religious/spiritual identity or partisan identity). This may reflect a particular 
feature of class identity (e.g. being largely externally constrained rather than 
freely adopted) that does not apply to the other identities explored in these 
studies. 
The effect of the frames interacts with participants’ understanding of groups and 
issues 
Viewing the results across the studies we can conclude that the effect of 
the frames is neither uniform nor readily predictable. In many cases the frames 
had no impact on participants’ attitudes, or the extent to which they were 
predicted by group identification or norms. This could suggest either of the 
following: 
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x That the frame simply reflected participants’ existing understanding of 
the issue and/or group; or 
x That participants did not accept the frame because it proposed a notion 
of group or issue meaning that was outside the bounds of their 
understanding and they simply did not find the frame compelling or 
convincing enough to adjust their understanding. 
We also found that the frames produced results that were unexpected. For 
example, while we anticipated that framing Christian identity in terms of social 
justice values would enhance the perceived relevance of welfare to the group, the 
results in Study 2 suggest that it was the family values frame that had this effect. 
In other words, participants interpreted the family values frame in a way that led 
them to see the issue of welfare through the lens of their Christian identity. While 
this is explicable in retrospect, it is not something we had anticipated. Similarly, 
while we expected that a message framing climate change in economic terms 
would prompt participants to view the issue through the lens of their class identity 
(as in Study 3), what we found in Study 4 was that it was the political frame that 
has this effect.  
Considering the range of results, including the instances where the frames 
produced no discernible effect, highlights the fact that the frames interact with the 
perceptions and understandings that participants bring to them; that people 
actively interpret the frames they encounter, rather than passively accepting them. 
It suggests that those existing understandings will both constrain the range of 
frames that will be successful in influencing attitudes through the social influence 
processes outlined, and, in some cases, produce effects that are difficult to 
anticipate. These findings therefore indicate that those who employ framing to 
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shape public opinion should develop and refine their messages on the basis of a 
thorough understanding of the existing understandings people bring to the 
consideration of issues and groups.  
Implications 
Group-based social influence 
The findings of these studies support the general applicability of the social 
identity approach to the study of social influence (Turner, 1982; 1991; Turner, et 
al, 1987). Across each of the four studies we found the classic pattern of group-
based social influence evident in previous research (e.g. Terry & Hogg, 1996, 
Terry, Hogg & White, 1999; Smith & Terry, 2003; Louis, Davies, Smith & Terry, 
2007; Smith, Terry & Hogg, 2007; White, Smith, Terry, Greenslade & 
McKimmie, 2009), with group norms predicting attitudes particularly for those 
highly identified with the group.  
The results also contribute to our understanding of the critical role of 
perceived relevance in group-based social influence. As with previous research 
(Smith et al, 2005; Mackie et al 1990; Wyer, 2010), these studies indicate that 
social influence is in large part dependent on the perceived relevance of the issue 
to the group. Even in contexts in which the design of the experiment all but 
assured the salience of a particular identity (e.g. Christian identity in Studies 1 
and 2), we found that group norms predicted attitudes to some issues but not 
others. In some cases, the extent to which group norms predicted attitudes was 
significantly affected by exposure to a frame that highlighted the relevance of the 
issue to the group (or vice versa). This critical role of perceived relevance was 
further confirmed by the results of Study 4, in which the effect of the frame on 
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attitudes was partly mediated by an increase in the perceived relevance of the 
issue to that specific group identity.  
These findings go beyond previous work in this area by demonstrating 
that perceptions of relevance are malleable and can be influenced by relatively 
simple messages about the nature of the group or the issue. In so doing, this 
research indicates that influencing perceived relevance in this way has the 
potential to produce persuasion and attitude change through a process of group-
based social influence. 
These findings also contribute to the understanding of group-based social 
influence as a rational, considered process, rather than one based on mindless 
conformity. The results of Studies 3 and 4, for example, suggest that the effect of 
framing was apparent among those with higher levels of political knowledge: 
those with both the motivation and the ability to interpret the frame, and 
assimilate it with the meanings associated with the issue and the group. This 
accords with previous research demonstrating that the interpretation of 
information about group norms and their relevance to specific issues is moderated 
by political engagement or knowledge (e.g. Slothuus & de Vreese, 2010; Malka et 
al, 2012). Furthermore, the fact that only some of the frames produced normative 
influence also indicates that participants actively interpret them, discriminating 
between those that did establish the alignment of the group and issue meaning, 
and those that did not. If the frames had worked on the basis of a simple priming 
effect, we would have expected more uniform results. Finally, the fact that 
framing produced polarization away from group norms among low class 
identifiers in Studies 3 and 4 also suggests that the issue was actively considered 
in light of the meaning associated with the group. All of these findings are at odds 
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with the cognitive miser view of group cognition; the notion that reference to 
group norms and group understandings reflects the absence of considered, 
rational cognition.  
The findings relating to low group identifiers also have implications for 
our understanding of the processes involved in group-based social influence. The 
fact that linking an issue to particular groups can lead low identifiers to repudiate 
group norms suggests that the process of group-based social influence is not only 
relevant to high identifiers (see Terry & Hogg, 1996; Terry et al., 1999). Group-
based social influence could be seen as a symmetrical process of attraction to, and 
repulsion from, referent group norms, depending on the perceived relevance of 
the group, the level of identification, and the meaning associated with the group. 
Taken together with previous research showing that people react against positions 
espoused by outgroup sources (e.g. Mackie & Queller, 2000; Slothuus & de 
Vreese, 2010), the current results suggest that, at least in some cases, people will 
also react against the position of ingroups. In effect, the nominal ingroup 
appeared to be a negative referent group. In each case participants were not pre-
allocated to particular groups but had the opportunity to choose the group label 
(from a range of categories in a given domain) that they felt best described 
themselves. That said, simply indicating that a particular group label applies to 
oneself is not to say that the group is an important, nor, for that matter, a 
particularly welcome, aspect of the self-concept. This may be particularly the case 
for class categories, where participants may have picked labels that represent 
externally imposed constraints rather than choice.  
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An alternative explanation may be that low identifiers who were 
nominally part of the group may have actually re-defined themselves as ‘other’ on 
the basis of a different categorization. This seems unlikely, however, at least in 
Study 4, given that the impact of the political frame was mediated by an increase 
in the relevance of the issue to the class group. That is, the negative association 
between class group norms and attitudes towards climate change found in Study 4 
was dependent upon those exposed to the political frame perceiving greater 
relevance of climate change to the class group than those in the control condition. 
If the negative impact of class norms were simply an artifact, the product of an 
alternative identification, we would expect to see a decline in perceived relevance 
of the issue to the class group. 
Practically speaking, these results suggest that it may be useful for 
researchers to capture the meaning attached to an ingroup identity (i.e. the extent 
to which they are embraced or rejected), in addition to distinguishing between 
ingroups and outgroups. The results also highlight the benefits of measuring the 
level of group identification, even in studies where identity salience is 
manipulated. While many studies assume that an ingroup will be self-defining 
when made salient, this may not be the case for low identifiers. Participants may 
report that they are a member of a group (e.g. social class, university), but not 
identify strongly with the group even when it is made salient. The results of these 
studies suggest that the effect of salience manipulations can be very different 
depending on the level of identification and the meaning or valence associated 
with the group.  
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The strategic construction of identity 
The results of these studies offer an effective empirical demonstration of 
identity entrepreneurship to complement the work of Reicher, Hopkins and 
colleagues (e.g. Reicher & Hopkins, 1996a; Reicher & Hopkins, 1996b; Reicher 
& Hopkins, 2001; Kahani-Hopkins & Hopkins, 2002; Hopkins & Kahani-
Hopkins, 2004; Reicher, 2004; Haslam, Reicher & Platow, 2010) examining the 
strategic construction of identity inherent in much political rhetoric. More 
specifically, the current research demonstrates that even fairly simple messages 
about either an issue or a group can affect the way social identities are used to 
give meaning to issues, and the extent to which the associated group norms will 
influence attitudes. The findings also point to the limits and the pitfalls of this 
strategy of social influence. Namely, the findings suggest that those who receive 
such messages will interpret them in light of their existing understanding of the 
groups and issues involved, and will only be persuaded by those messages that 
make a compelling case for the alignment between the two. Equally, the 
understandings people bring to these messages may produce quite different 
effects to those expected. They can, for example, lead people to repudiate the 
exact norms they might be intended to embrace. As such, those who seek to 
manipulate the meanings people attach to issues and groups in order to influence 
public opinion need to start from a solid understanding of the existing meanings, 
and the bounds of ambiguity. That is, much like the latitudes of acceptance, 
rejection and non-commitment in Sherif and Hovland’s (1961) study of attitudes, 
they should understand the range of meanings that their audience will accept 
about the group and the issues, and work to find areas of potential overlap or 
alignment.  
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The results are also consistent with the interdependent understanding of 
the relationship between social categories and social reality proposed by Reicher, 
Hopkins and colleagues (e.g. Reicher & Hopkins, 2001; Kahani-Hopkins & 
Hopkins, 2002; Hopkins & Kahani-Hopkins, 2004; Reicher, 2004). The findings 
indicate that the rhetoric used to define an issue or a group can have a 
considerable impact on how the issue or group is understood. To the extent that 
these understandings and resulting attitudes influence behaviour, they are likely to 
shape the social context in which those issues and groups are discussed, contested 
and acted upon in the future. Few would dispute, for example, that the emergence 
of a conservative, politicised strand of religious activism in the form of the 
Religious Rights has had a profound impact on US politics and policy in recent 
decades. Equally, the promulgation of a more progressive form of religious 
identity could help mobilise a constituency in support of a more liberal policy 
agenda. 
Issue framing 
In demonstrating the importance of group processes and the broader social 
context in which attitudes are formed and influenced (see Hogg & Smith, 2007), 
the current research also has implications for our understanding issue framing. 
The findings support Nelson and Kinder’s (1996) assertion that group-centrism 
plays a significant role in public opinion and can vary according to how issues are 
framed. However, the results take this one step further by highlighting the role 
that social identity processes play in this group-centrism. That is, by influencing 
the meaning people attach to an issue, frames can affect which social identity is 
perceived as relevant and which group norms therefore come to guide attitudes. 
This is compatible with the traditional understanding of attitudes based on 
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expectancy value models (see Azjen & Fishbein, 1980). However, it also extends 
this understanding by suggesting that frames not only influence the range or 
relative weight of considerations that bear on individuals’ attitudes, they can also 
influence how people see themselves in relation to the issue, and how this impacts 
on their understanding of the issue as well as the groups that are relevant to it. As 
such, these findings complement previous research in the area (Price, 1989), and 
indicate that frames need not refer explicitly to groups or group conflict in order 
to establish the relevance of groups to an issue. Even subtle frames that merely 
allude to the types of interests and values associated with group identities can lead 
recipients to view the issue through the prism of group identity. 
Applying the social identity perspective to the study of religion 
This research also contributes to the growing body of literature 
demonstrating the value of the social identity perspective in the study of religion 
and its connection to topics as diverse as fundamentalism (Herriot, 2007), 
prejudice (Jackson & Hunsberger, 1999), intergroup conflict (Cairns et al, 2006; 
Verkuyten, 2007), and mental health (Koteskey, Little & Matthews, 1991; 
Ysseldyk, Mattheson & Anisman, 2009). This research makes a vital advance by 
experimentally applying the social identity model of influence to the connection 
between religion and political attitudes. In doing so, this research contributes to 
the debate about whether the association between religiosity and conservative 
political attitudes results from a natural confluence of underlying values and 
ideological proclivities (e.g. Alford, Funk & Hibbing, 2005; Graham, Haidt & 
Nosek, 2009; Jost, Nosek & Gosling, 2008), or from a social context dominated 
by the discourse of religious conservatism (Malka et al, 2012; Guth, Green, 
Smidt, Kellstedt & Poloma, 1997; Layman & Green, 2005). While the findings of 
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the current research do not preclude an organic association, they do indicate that 
discourse highlighting the relevance of different types of issues to Christian 
identity can influence the meaning people ascribe to their religious identity and its 
relevance to various issues. As such, it suggests that the connection between 
religion and political attitudes is to some degree contingent on the social 
environment, and thus there is the possibility for the connection to change over 
time as that environment changes. Indeed, it suggests that there is scope for those 
with a more progressive understanding of the connection between religion and 
politics to promulgate this understanding and create a constituency around it. 
Applying the social identity perspective to climate change 
In a similar vein, this research also supports the role that groups and 
group-based social influence play in attitudes towards climate change and the 
importance of extending our understanding of these effects (American 
Psychological Association, 2009). The results accord with work by Kahan and 
colleagues (Kahan et al, 2012; Kahan, 2013; Kahan, 2015) to the effect that 
individuals’ attitudes towards climate change can be seen in part as an expression 
of their identification with, and loyalty to, particular groups for whom the issue 
has taken on a certain symbolic resonance (see also Bliuc et al, 2015). The current 
findings have a number of implications for this line of research. First, they offer 
an insight into how issues can come to develop this symbolic meaning for 
political or ideological groups. They indicate, for example, that the public 
discourse around the issue may serve to establish and reinforce the association 
between the liberal/conservative divide and positions on the issue.  
In demonstrating how these associations can be made, this research 
suggests that there may not be anything natural or inevitable about the connection 
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between ideological conservatism and scepticism about the risks of climate 
change. Indeed, to the extent that this connection, such that it exists, is the product 
of a particular public discourse, this research suggests that challenging that 
discourse can alter the meaning associated with the issue thereby promoting a 
more open and collaborative approach to weighing the risks and possible 
responses. 
Challenging the status quo 
While this research suggests that the meanings attached to group identities 
such as Christianity and important public issues like climate change are 
susceptible to social influence, a word of caution is warranted. While 
communication on any scale has the potential to influence the meaning people 
attach to groups and issues, in many cases it is mass communication through 
media and large networks of people that lead to a significant change in public 
opinion. As such, those with the power and the resources to access those 
communication channels are at a natural advantage in shaping public opinion. 
This creates a bias towards the status quo in society, or, at least, a bias in favour 
of change that serves the interests of those with power and influence. That said, 
recent developments in communication and social media do open up possibilities 
for small groups of committed people to communicate and reach larger audiences 
than has previously been possible. Furthermore, while this research indicates that 
the meaning people attach to groups and to issues is open to influence, it also 
suggests that there are limits – latitudes of rejection – and it is not simply a case 
of anything goes. While there may be a bias in favour of the loudest voice, there 
is also a bias in favour of the most compelling voice. 
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Sociological literature on frame alignment and mobilisation 
In bringing together the largely disparate theoretical perspectives of social 
identity and issue framing, this research also points towards other avenues for 
interdisciplinary cross-fertilisation. The insights from the current research, for 
example, may be of relevance to sociologists involved in framing research. The 
framing perspective in sociology was sparked by a seminal paper (Snow, 
Rochford, Worden & Benford, 1986) which examined the factors that lead people 
to become involved in collective action via social movement organisations, and in 
particular the role the framing plays in this process. They define a frame as a 
“schemata of interpretation that enable individuals to locate, perceive, identify 
and label occurrences within their life space and the world at large” (p. 464), and 
argue that frame alignment or “the linking of individual and social movement 
organisation (SMO) interpretive orientations, such that some set of individual 
interests, values and beliefs and SMO activities, goals and ideology are congruent 
and complementary” (p. 464), is a necessary condition for participation in 
collective action. Furthermore, they outline four types of frame alignment 
processes: 
x Frame building – linking two or more ideologically congruent by 
structurally unconnected frames regarding a particular issue or problem.  
x Frame amplification – the clarification and amplification of an interpretive 
frame that bears on a particular issue, problem or set of events, either 
through elevating a particular value or belief that might motivate 
participation. 
x Frame extension – extending the boundaries of a movements’ objectives 
to those that may be salient to potential participants. 
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x Frame transformation – presenting a new interpretive prism that 
characterises a specific domain or life, or every aspect of life, as 
problematic or unjust.   
While the concept of a frame as conceived in this sociological literature is 
perhaps more broad than that used in the current research, the potential relevance 
is based on more than simply terminological similarity. The concept of social 
identity and more specifically, identity content, provides a conceptual framework 
around which to understand the meaning ascribed to social movements. Indeed, 
another way to think about SMOs is as identity groups, where the identity content 
is based on shared interests or values along with a commitment to take action to 
address a perceived violation of those interests of values (see Bliuc, McGarty, 
Reynolds, & Muntele’s, 2007 work on opinion-based groups as a predictor of 
commitment to collective action).  
Related work within the social identity tradition also provides a detailed, 
empirical analysis of the factors that promote collective action. Analysis by 
Thomas and colleague (Thomas et al, 2009a, Thomas et al, 2009b), for example, 
suggests that sustained commitment to collective action to bring about social 
change is best facilitated by aligning social identity with congruent norms for 
action, emotions (e.g. moral outrage), and beliefs regarding efficacy (see also 
work by van Zomeren, Postmes & Spears, 2008). To some degree, this was 
addressed by Snow and colleagues (1986) in their concept of belief amplification, 
where they identified beliefs about the potential efficacy of taking collective 
action as a key element to be brought into alignment through frame amplification. 
However, Thomas and colleagues provide a more systematic and practical 
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analysis in suggesting that the motivating force of this belief can be maximized 
when aligned with identity and emotion. 
The current research offers some guidance to the sociological work on 
‘frame extension’ by showing how rhetorical messages can be used to connect a 
new issue to a SMO. As the empirical studies outlined in the pages above 
indicate, this can be achieved either through framing a specific group (e.g. a 
SMO) in a way that aligns with the social meaning of a previously unconnected 
issue, or by framing the issue in a way that aligns with the content of a previously 
unconnected group. These same rhetorical strategies could also be employed to 
promote the alignment of norms, emotions and beliefs Thomas and colleagues 
identify within the content of an identity group. 
Finally, the findings outlined above also offer some insights on the 
question of frame resonance, an issue that has been the focus of much research 
within the sociological literature on framing. Snow and Benford (1988), for 
example pose the question, “under what conditions do framing efforts strike a 
responsive chord or resonate with the targets of mobilization? What are the key 
determinants of the differential success or movement framing efforts? What, in 
short, accounts for what might be termed frame resonance?” (pp. 198-199). While 
these and other sociological researchers offer a range of answers to this question, 
the current research suggests that efforts to achieve frame extension, at least, will 
resonate to the extent that they forge a perceived alignment of the meaning or 
content of a group identity with the social meaning of the issue. As is noted 
above, this places an onus on those doing the framing to come armed with a solid 
understanding of the existing meanings their intended audience attach to the 
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group and issues and the bounds of potentially accepted meanings to ensure they 
craft frames that are pitched where there is most room for alignment. 
Future directions 
The current series of studies highlight the critical role that the perceived 
relevance of an issue to a group plays in group-based social influence. The results 
indicate that perceptions of relevance can be manipulated by simple messages 
about the nature of groups or of issues. Both the theoretical and practical 
implications of these findings have been canvassed. To conclude, it is useful to 
consider how these ideas might be further developed to provide greater insights 
into the processes of social influence and the effect of public discourse.  
Mediating processes 
The current research was based on the notion that perceptions of relevance 
rely on some degree of congruence or alignment in the meaning attached to the 
group and to the issue. While the results of the studies are consistent with this 
notion, and indeed indicate that frames can work to enhance perceived relevance, 
further work is required to fully clarify the factors that mediate group-based social 
influence. For instance, future research could examine the meaning associated 
with both issues and groups, and determine the effect that persuasive messages 
have on them, and on the alignment of the two. Research in the field of issue 
framing (e.g. Slothuus, 2008) has investigated the effect of frames on both the 
range of considerations people associate with an issue as well as the relative 
importance of those considerations. Likewise, research in the field of social 
identity has examined how the content ascribed to group identities is affected by 
changes in the frame of reference (e.g. Hopkins et al, 1997; Rabinovic et al, 
2012). Future research should seek to measure both of these elements in order to 
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determine how shifts in meaning ascribed to both issues and groups mediate 
group-based influence and attitudes change.  
This also points to opportunities for research that develops a more 
nuanced understanding of the meanings associated with both issues and with 
groups. Future research should build on the framing studies that investigate the 
range of considerations associated with issues by applying similar measures to 
ascertain the range of meanings associated with groups. Such research may reveal 
that, like attitudes, the meaning people ascribe to both issues and groups are 
characterised by latitudes of acceptance, rejection and non-commitment. Such 
research would offer insights into the potential areas of overlap, and therefore the 
types of messages that would be likely to enhance perceptions of relevance.  
Manipulating both issue and group meaning 
The studies conducted in this research sought to influence the meaning 
associated with either a specific group (Christians - Studies 1 and 2) or a specific 
issue (Climate change – Studies 3 and 4). While the results indicate that each of 
these was successful in establishing the relevance of the group to the issue (or 
vice versa), logic suggests that there would be a higher degree of success if both 
group and issue meaning were manipulated in a single frame. Future research 
should test this assumption. 
Enhancing external validity 
The frame manipulations included in these studies were designed to reflect 
the types of messages that are a common feature of public discourse. In this sense, 
the effects found can be said to have a certain degree of external validity. 
However, these studies did not fully reflect many of the features of the 
  190
communication environment people face when receiving and responding to 
frames outside the lab. Future research should consider ways to include some of 
these features in the design of experimental studies. For example, while the 
current studies examined the effect of exposure to a single frame manipulation, 
the discourse surrounding any issue that is a matter of public dispute (and indeed 
many that are not) will include a range of competing frames. This raises a number 
of interesting questions to be explored in future research, including: whether 
competing frames cancel each other out; whether competing frames interact to 
produce unanticipated effects; whether one particular frame will resonate over 
others, and, if so, what characteristics distinguish those that are effective. While 
many of these points have been addressed in the issue framing literature 
(Sniderman & Theriault, 2004; Druckman, 2004), the approach developed here 
based on the context of group-based frames and group-based social influence 
processes would be a valuable addition to that literature. 
Just as the meaning individuals attach to issues and to groups is influenced 
by the social context and the groups to which people belong, we would expect 
that the way messages about those groups and issues are interpreted will be 
affected by social influence processes. Research by Druckman and Nelson (2003) 
suggests that the effect of issue frames can be nullified by interpersonal 
conversations that raise alternative frames. Again, however, it would be 
interesting to explore these phenomena while also taking account of the group-
based features of interpersonal communication. Having participants discuss the 
meaning of group identity and issues in small interactive groups (see Thomas & 
McGarty, 2009; Thomas, McGarty & Mavor, 2009; Postmes, Haslam & Swaab, 
2005; Postmes, Spears, Lee & Novak, 2005) following exposure to frames could 
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shed light on the role that dynamic social reinforcement plays in moderating 
framing effects. 
The frame manipulations featured in the current series of studies were not 
attributed to any particular source. Previous research (Mackie et al, 1990; Mackie 
et al, 1992) suggests that messages from ingroup sources are likely to be more 
effective than others. As such, the results of the current studies may well 
underestimate the potential effect of frames. Future research should examine 
whether messages designed to establish the relevance of particular issues to the 
ingroup are more effective if they are attributed to an ingroup source. Similarly, 
the role of source prototypicality should also be explored. 
Conclusion 
Public discourse about contentious issues is often characterised by 
disputes over how the issues are understood, and the types of groups that are 
relevant to them. While previous research has explored the effect of different 
frames about the nature of issues and rhetoric about the nature of groups, there 
has been limited integration of the insights from these two literatures. This 
research has aimed to bridge this gap, to contribute to our understanding of the 
social influence processes that are commonly at play in public debate and how 
rhetoric about issues and about social groups might influence public opinion. 
In four experimental studies, we explored how messages about the nature 
of groups and issues can influence the extent to which individuals perceive issues 
through the prism of particular group memberships. We found that such frames 
produced or enhanced group-based normative influence in some cases, while in 
others it led individuals who were not highly identified with the group to react 
against group norms. The results also indicated that perceptions about the 
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relevance of the issue to the group partly mediated the effect of the frame. These 
findings support the application of the social identity perspective to the 
investigation of issue framing and pave the way for further integration of the 
social identity perspective on group-based social influence with the literature on 
public opinion and communication. By shedding additional light on some of the 
processes through which rhetoric can influence public opinion, these findings 
offer some guidance for those who seek to engage in public debate. However, 
these findings also offer insights for those members of the so-called ‘reality-based 
community’ who seek not only to study but also to challenge powerful forces as 
they attempt to create new realities.  
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